


April 29, 2021

AWARENESS & ADOPTION

NTIA Software Component Transparency
Audra Hatch, Joshua Corman



OVERVIEW

- ➤ Recap: Mission and Goals
- ➤ What We're Working On
 - ➤ Today's Highlights
 - ➤ Ongoing Efforts
 - ➤ Future Initiatives
- ➤ Community Ask
- ➤ Resources



RECAP: AWARENESS & ADOPTION MISSION

- ➤ Work will focus on promoting SBOM as an idea and a practice.
- ➤ Tasks identified include:
 - > Building a broader outreach strategy with outreach targets
 - ➤ Shorter documents with specific outreach goals for sectors, organizational role, etc.
 - Coordinating with related efforts
 - ➤ More explicit business cases for SBOM adoption



RECAP: HIGH LEVEL APPROACH TO GOALS

- Outreach / Increase Awareness
 - ➤ Let people know about SBOM
 - ➤ Conference Presentations, Webinars, etc.
 - ➤ Connect People
 - ➤ Invitation to NTIA groups & documents, other networking, etc.
- ➤ Increase Adoption
 - ➤ Address early questions about SBOM
 - ➤ Provide fit-for-purpose "getting started" materials
 - ➤ Journeys: Crawl / Walk / Run



WHERE TO START: README

- ➤ README file containing links to documents and ongoing efforts in the NTIA SBOM Awareness & Adoption Working Group Google Drive:
 - https://bit.ly/sbom-awareness-readme

| My Drive → NTIA SBOM: Practices / Awareness & Adoption → | | c> &+ | ◎ ॥ : ⊞ |
|--|---------------|-----------------|-----------|
| Name | Owner | Last modified ↓ | File size |
| Archived Documents | me | 10:00 AM me | _ |
| Video | Arthur Hicken | Jan 15, 2021 me | _ |
| Artifacts | me | Nov 12, 2020 me | _ |
| Slide Decks | me | Mar 19, 2020 me | _ |
| Graphics | me | Dec 5, 2019 me | _ |
| Outreach Strategy | me | Nov 22, 2019 me | _ |
| Meeting Notes | me | Nov 22, 2019 me | _ |
| SBOM Options and Decision Points 🚢 | me | 10:27 AM me | _ |
| SBOM Related Efforts | me | Apr 26, 2021 me | _ |
| ■ README ♣ | me | Apr 26, 2021 me | _ |
| RSAC 2021 1 45 | me | Apr 25, 2021 | _ |
| SBOM at a Glance 🐣 | me | Apr 14, 2021 me | _ |
| SBOM FAQ 10 44 | me | Apr 9, 2021 | _ |



WHAT WE'RE WORKING ON

- Today's Highlights:
 - > SBOM at a Glance
 - SBOM Options & Decision Points Graphic
 - Asking for SBOMs
 - Supplying SBOMs
 - ➤ SBOM Related Efforts
 - > FAQ
 - Graphics Repository
 - Slide Repository

- Ongoing Efforts:
 - > FAQ
 - Graphics & Slide Repositories
 - ➤ News, Recordings, & Presentations
 - ➤ SBOM Calendar
 - Business Two-Pagers
 - Virtual Engagement Opportunities
 - ➤ POC Conversations & Expansions
 - Knowledge Base
 - ➤ SBOM-Adjacent Topics
 - Questions For Your Suppliers

- > Future Initiatives:
 - ➤ Use Case Repository
 - ➤ Journeys & Playbooks
 - ➤ SBOM Starter Slides
 - ➤ Additional Explainer Videos
 - Proof of Concept Virtual Summit
 - ➤ Ideas for 2021



DELIVERABLES AND STATUS

* Available and/or continuously updated in Google Drive

| Deliverable | On Deck | Development | In Review | Released |
|---|---------|-------------|-----------|----------|
| FAQ | | X | X | X |
| FAQ on GitHub | | | | X |
| SBOM at a Glance | | | | X |
| SBOM Options & Decision Points | | | | X |
| NTIA SBOM Overview Two-Pager | v 2 | | | X |
| Explainer Videos | X | | | X^* |
| SBOM Calendar | | | | X |
| SBOM Related Efforts | | | X | |
| SBOM News | | X | | * |
| Recordings & Presentations | | X | | * |
| Graphics & Slide Repositories | | X | | * |
| Community Survey on SBOM Process | | | X | * |
| SBOM Business Two-Pagers | | X | | |
| Virtual Engagement Opportunities | | X | | |
| Proof of Concept Conversations & Expansions | | X | | |
| Knowledge Base | | X | | |
| SBOM-Adjacent Topics Spreadsheet | | X | | |
| Questions for your Suppliers | | X | | |
| SBOM Starter Slides | | X | | |
| Asking for SBOMs | X | | | |
| Supplying SBOMs | X | | | |
| Journeys & Playbooks | X | | | |
| Proof of Concept Virtual Summit | X | | | |
| | | | | -/ |

⁷



SBOM AT A GLANCE

- ➤ Intro to SBOMs, supporting literature, and the pivotal role of SBOMs for supply chain transparency
 - ➤ What is an SBOM?
 - ➤ Benefits & Use Cases
 - ➤ Baseline Component Information
 - ➤ Machine-Readable Formats & Tools
 - ➤ Sharing & Exchanging
 - ➤ Learn More

➤ Published on ntia.gov/sbom

NTIA Multistakeholder Process on Software Component Transparency | ntia.gov/sbom

SBOM at a Glance

Purpose

This document is an introduction to the practice of Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), supporting literature, and the pivotal role SBOMs play in providing much-needed transparency: enabling stakeholders to answer questions like "Am I affected?" and "Where am I affected?" when faced with a supply chain concern.

What is an SBOM?

An SBOM is a formal, machine-readable inventory of software components and dependencies, information about those components, and their hierarchical relationships. These inventories should be comprehensive – or should explicitly state where they could not be. SBOMs may include open source or proprietary software and can be widely available or access-restricted.¹

SBOMs should also include baseline attributes with the ability to uniquely identify individual components in a standard data format. The most efficient generation of SBOMs is as a byproduct of a modern development process. For older software, less-automated methods exist.




Figure: Conceptual SBOM tree with upstream relationship assertions


Benefits and Use Cases

The benefits and use cases for SBOMs² are numerous; vary across stakeholders who produce, choose, and operate software; and are amplified when combined. Benefits include reducing cost, security risk, license risk, and compliance risk. Use cases include improved software development, supply chain management, vulnerability management, asset management, procurement, and high assurance processes. An ongoing SBOM Healthcare Proof of Concept³ has exercised many of these use cases and demonstrated the value of producing, sharing, and consuming SBOMs, prompting similar proofs of concept in the Automotive and Energy industries.



- Purpose
 - ➤ To frame the dimensions for what is possible with modern development practices
 - ➤ To support more consistent and effective articulation of needs between requesters and suppliers of SBOMs

➤ Published on ntia.gov/sbom





| Dimension | |
|---|--|
| Baseline Component Information | Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes |
| Format & Machine Readability | SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) |
| Depth | All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared |
| Generation Frequency | At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time |
| Delivery & Interoperability | Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier |
| Adjacent Enhancement: Vulnerability Claims | Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

‡ SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats[‡], maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship



| Dimension | |
|---|--|
| Baseline Component Information | Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes |
| Format & Machine Readability | SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) |
| Depth | All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared |
| Generation Frequency | At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time |
| Delivery & Interoperability | Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier |
| Adjacent Enhancement: Vulnerability Claims | Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

‡ SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats‡, maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship



| Dimension | | |
|---|--|--|
| Baseline Component Information | Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes | |
| Format & Machine Readability | SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) | |
| Depth | All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared | |
| Generation Frequency | At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time | |
| Delivery & Interoperability | Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier | |
| Adjacent Enhancement: Vulnerability Claims | Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request | |
| | | |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

‡ SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats‡, maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship



| Dimension | |
|---|--|
| Baseline Component Information | Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes |
| Format & Machine Readability | SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) |
| Depth | All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared |
| Generation Frequency | At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time |
| Delivery & Interoperability | Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier |
| Adjacent Enhancement: Vulnerability Claims | Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

‡ SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats‡, maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship



| Dimension | |
|---|--|
| Baseline Component Information | Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes |
| Format & Machine Readability | SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) |
| Depth | All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared |
| Generation Frequency | At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time |
| Delivery & Interoperability | Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier |
| Adjacent Enhancement: Vulnerability Claims | Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request |
| | |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

‡ SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats‡, maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship



| Dimension | |
|---|--|
| Baseline Component Information | Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes |
| Format & Machine Readability | SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) |
| Depth | All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared |
| Generation Frequency | At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time |
| Delivery & Interoperability | Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier |
| Adjacent Enhancement: Vulnerability Claims | Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats[‡], maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship

[‡] SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID



| Dimension | | |
|---|--|--|
| Baseline Component Information | Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes | |
| Format & Machine Readability | SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) | |
| Depth | All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared | |
| Generation Frequency | At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time | |
| Delivery & Interoperability | Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier | |
| Adjacent Enhancement: Vulnerability Claims | Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request | |
| | | |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

‡ SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats[‡], maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship



| Dimension | |
|---|--|
| Baseline Component Information | Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes |
| Format & Machine Readability | SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) |
| Depth | All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared |
| Generation Frequency | At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time |
| Delivery & Interoperability | Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier |
| Adjacent Enhancement: Vulnerability Claims | Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats[‡], maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship

[‡] SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID



PERSPECTIVE: ASKING FOR SBOMS

| Dimension | |
|---|--|
| Baseline Component Information | Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes |
| Format & Machine Readability | SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) |
| Depth | All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared |
| Generation Frequency | At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time |
| Delivery & Interoperability | Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier |
| Adjacent Enhancement: Vulnerability Claims | Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats[‡], maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship

[‡] SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID



PERSPECTIVE: SUPPLYING SBOMS

| Contains core subset* of Baseline Component Information attributes |
|--|
| SBOM in any machine-readable format (e.g. csv) |
| All primary components with direct dependencies and known-unknowns declared |
| At time of pre/purchase and/or provided upon request within <i>x</i> time |
| Emailed and/or hosted/archived by the supplier |
| Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities upon request |
| |

^{*} Core subset of Baseline Component Information: Component Name, Supplier Name, Version String, Unique Identifier

‡ SBOM Formats: SPDX, CycloneDx, SWID

Initial Consensus

Includes all Baseline Component Information† attributes

SBOM in a baseline-supporting, machine-readable format[‡]

All primary components with all transitive dependencies and known-unknowns declared

With every update or change to code (major/minor release or patch)

Bundled with every product version and archived by the supplier

Supplier makes attestations for potentially exploitable vulnerabilities within x time of a new vulnerability



Contains component information beyond baseline supportive of high assurance use cases

SBOM in all machine-readable, interoperable formats‡, maintaining currency as standards evolve or emerge

All primary components with all transitive dependencies with no unknowns

Additionally hosted in an archive for every version

Supports machine interfaces (e.g. API) and adjacent interoperability (e.g. DBOM, MUD, OpenC2)

Standardized API query for current attestation of product-specific risks to SBOM components

[†] Baseline Component Information: Author Name, Supplier Name, Component Name, Version String, Component Hash, Unique Identifier, Relationship



SBOM RELATED EFFORTS

- ➤ Originally Appendix I in "Roles and Benefits for SBOM Across the Supply Chain" Phase I document
- ➤ Releasing as standalone "SBOM Related Efforts" document
- ➤ 15+ Additions and Updates

http://bit.ly/sbom-related-efforts

NTIA Multistakeholder Process on Software Component Transparency | ntia.gov/sbom **Table of Contents** Introduction Atlantic Council "Breaking Trust" Report BSA Framework for Secure Software Building Security in Maturity Model CISQ Trustworthy System Manifesto Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Cloud Native Computing Foundation Digital Bill of Materials Edison Electric Institute - Model Procurement Contract Language Addressing Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk ENISA - European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services ENISA – Guidelines for Securing the Internet of Things FDA Premarket Guidance FS-ISAC Third Party Governance International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ISO/IEC 27002:2005 and 27002:2013 – Code of Practice for Information Security Controls 7 ISO/IEC 5230:2020 - OpenChain Specification ISO/SAE 21434 - Road Vehicles - Cybersecurity Engineering Joint Security Plan Manufacturers Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security MITRE Deliver Uncompromised Manufacturer Usage Description NERC CIP-013 National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) - Using the Software Bill of Materials for Enhancing National Highway Traffic Safety Administration – Cybersecurity Best Practices for the Safety of NIST's Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities by Adopting a Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) 12 Open Command and Control OWASP Component Analysis Project 12 12 OWASP Software Component Verification Standard SAFECode Managing Security Risks Inherent in the Use of Third party Components 13 13 Software Heritage UL 2900-1 – Standard for Software Cybersecurity for Network-Connectable Products 14 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe WP.29 / R155 SBOM Related Efforts 2



SBOM RELATED EFFORTS - FEEDBACK REQUEST

- ➤ SBOM Related Efforts prepared for feedback: http://bit.ly/sbom-related-efforts
- Feedback Due: May 14, 2021
- ➤ Please provide feedback via "Add a comment" on Google Document:



➤ Please also nominate new SBOM-related efforts for inclusion.



FAQ

- ➤ Published on NTIA SBOM Website:
 - ntia.gov/sbom


- ➤ GitHub Mirror of FAQ:
 - https://github.com/NTIADC/SBOM_FAQ/

SBOM FAQ

Table of Contents

| | _ | | | | | | |
|--|----|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| OVERVIEW | 3 | | | | | | |
| Q: What is an SBOM? | | | | | | | |
| Q: Who should have an SBOM? | | | | | | | |
| Q: Who uses an SBOM and for what? | | | | | | | |
| BENEFITS | | | | | | | |
| Q: What are the benefits of an SBOM? | 4 | | | | | | |
| Q: How does an SBOM help in the event of a cyberattack? | 4 | | | | | | |
| Q: In addition to vulnerability management, how can SBOMs help me? | | | | | | | |
| Q: How have bills of material and supply chain transparency been helpful elsewhere? | | | | | | | |
| COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS & CONCERNS | | | | | | | |
| Q: Won't SBOMs be a "roadmap to the attacker"? | | | | | | | |
| Q: Does an SBOM require source code disclosure? | | | | | | | |
| Q: Does a list of the software components I include expose my intellectual property? | (| | | | | | |
| Q: Does an SBOM increase my exposure to license violations? | | | | | | | |
| Q: Does an SBOM enable patent or license "trolls"? | | | | | | | |
| Q: Will SBOMs increase my licensing costs or licensing commitments? | 7 | | | | | | |
| CREATION | ; | | | | | | |
| Q: Who creates and maintains an SBOM? | 7 | | | | | | |
| Q: What should be included in an SBOM? Q: What data formats exist for conveying SBOM data? | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | Q: Are there tools that translate between SBOM formats? | |
| Q: When is an SBOM created, changed, or maintained? | | | | | | | |
| Q: Some software components are made up of other software components themselve | | | | | | | |
| an SBOM show that hierarchy? | | | | | | | |
| Q: How deep in the dependency graph should an SBOM enumerate? | (| | | | | | |
| DISTRIBUTION & SHARING | 9 | | | | | | |
| Q: If I make an SBOM, do I have to make it public? | 9 | | | | | | |
| Q: How will SBOM data be shared? | 9 | | | | | | |
| ROLE SPECIFIC | 10 | | | | | | |
| Q: How can SBOMs be leveraged as a Purchaser? | 10 | | | | | | |

GRAPHICS REPOSITORY*




SBOM SLIDE REPOSITORY

https://bit.ly/sbom-awareness-slides



These slides could be used as a starting point for I deck" or library of slides for stakeholders to use to conferences, briefings, etc

SBOM draft slides



Presentation for GSA/TTS

GSA Presentation on NTIA S...




SBOM Infraguard TestGuild C...





















"HOW DOES SBOM RELATE TO..."

➤ PowerPoint Template: http://bit.ly/sbom-relates-to-ppt

HOW DOES SBOM RELATE TO MDS²?

SBOM

Software Bill of Materials

A formal record containing the details and supply chain relationships of various components used in building software.

HOW THEY RELATE

The 2019 revision of MDS² contains questions relating to the availability and format of SBOM for the medical device. It was designed to be flexible enough to accommodate varying SBOM formats.

The combination of MDS² and SBOM provides
Healthcare organizations increased
transparency into the security of medical devices
and software in their environment.

MDS^2

Manufacturer Disclosure
Statement for Medical Device
Security

Provides medical device manufacturers with a means for disclosing to healthcare providers the security related features of the medical devices they manufacture.



ONGOING EFFORTS

- ➤ FAQ
 - Cost and Investment-related questions
- ➤ SBOM Perspectives
 - ➤ Asking for SBOMs
 - Supplying SBOMs
- ➤ Virtual Engagement Opportunities
 - ➤ Webinars, Podcasts, Virtual Conferences, Other
 - ➤ RSA Conference 2021: SBOM & Supply Chain Content
- ➤ Business Two-Pager being reworked into two documents:
 - ➤ Business Customer
 - ➤ Producer
- ➤ SBOM Related Efforts & SBOM-Adjacent Topics Spreadsheet
- Questions for your Suppliers
- ➤ Proof of Concept Conversations & Expansions
- ➤ Knowledge Base Searchable, cross-linked Phase I Documents



ADDITIONAL SBOM RESOURCES

- ➤ SBOM News:
 - https://bit.ly/sbom-awareness-news


- ➤ SBOM Recordings, Presentations, and Podcasts:
 - https://bit.ly/sbom-awareness-recordings

➤ If you have a news story, recording, presentation, or podcast to add to the lists, please submit a comment in the Google Doc.



PHASE I SBOM EXPLAINER VIDEOS

- ➤ Available on YouTube:
 - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?
 list=PLO2lqCK7WyTDpVmcHsy6R2HWftFkUp6zG



➤ Also linked to on ntia.gov/sbom



SBOM EVENTS CALENDAR

| M Events | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------|--|--|--|---|----------|-----------|
| y 🚺 🕨 | October | 2020 🔻 | | | | Print We | ek Month | Agenda |
| Sun | | Mon | Tue | Wed | Thu | Fri | Sat | |
| | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | | 1pm NITA SBOM Awarenes 2pm NTIA SBOM Framing | | |
| | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | | 1 |
| | | | | | 1pm NTIA SBOM Healthcar | 11am NTIA SBOM Formats 1pm NITA SBOM Awarenes 2pm NTIA SBOM Framing | | |
| | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | | 1 |
| | | | 8am CISQ - 8th Annual Cyl 11:30am WHAT'S IN MY SO | | 6:30am INTERSCT 1pm NTIA SBOM Healthcar | 1pm NITA SBOM Awarenes 2pm NTIA SBOM Framing | | |
| | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | | 2 |
| | 4:3 | 0pm Secure Guild 2020 | | | | 11am NTIA SBOM Formats 1pm NITA SBOM Awarenes 2pm NTIA SBOM Framing | | |
| | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | | | | 3 |
| | | | | OpenC2 SBOM Event - Vir 2pm OpenC2 Keynote: Nea | | 1pm NITA SBOM Awarenes 2pm NTIA SBOM Framing | | |
| a chown in time | zono: Enete | ern Time - New York | | | | | + Googl | e Calenda |



SBOM EVENTS CALENDAR

- ➤ View SBOM Events Calendar: https://bit.ly/sbom-calendar-public
- ➤ Subscribe to SBOM Events Calendar: https://bit.ly/sbom-calendar-subscribe
- ➤ To submit SBOM-related events or talks for inclusion, email details and/or forward an existing calendar invitation to:
 - ➤ sbom.calendar@gmail.com
 - ➤ Include:
 - ➤ Event Title, Time, & Time Zone
 - ➤ Location & Cost, if applicable
 - ➤ Description
 - ➤ Link to registration or more information



SBOM-ADJACENT TOPICS SPREADSHEET

- ➤ Anomalous Software Detection
- ➤ BSA Framework
- ➤ BSIMM
- > CISQ
- ➤ CVE
- ➤ CycloneDx
- ➤ DBOM
- ➤ DevSecOps
- ➤ End of Life Management
- ➤ FDA Premarket Guidance
- ➤ FS-ISAC Controls
- ➤ Hardware BOMs
- ➤ ISO Security Standards

- ➤ Joint Security Plan (JSP)
- ➤ License Management
- ➤ MDS2
- ➤ MITRE's Deliver Uncompromised
- ➤ MUD
- ➤ NERC CIP 13
- ➤ NIST SSDF
- ➤ OpenC2
- ➤ OpenChain
- ➤ OWASP Component Analysis
- ➤ OWASP SCVS
- ➤ Package URL
- ➤ Procurement

- ➤ Runtime monitoring
- ➤ SAFE Code 3rd Party Guidance
- ➤ SBOM Integrity Monitoring
- ➤ SCAP
- ➤ SCRM
- ➤ Software Dependencies
- ➤ Software Heritage
- ➤ SPDX
- ➤ Supply Chain Attack Detection
- ➤ SWID
- Vulnerability Management
- ➤ Vulnerability Prioritization
- ➤ WP.29



QUESTIONS FOR YOUR SUPPLIERS

- ➤ Link to document listing questions to ask your suppliers about SBOM:
 - http://bit.ly/sbom-questions-for-suppliers

Do you have an SBOM?

If Yes:

- Is it machine readable?
- What format(s) are your SBOM(s)?
 - o SWID
 - ⇒ SPDX
 - CycloneDx
 - Other
- Does the SBOM include subcomponents?
 - o If yes, how many levels?
 - Does the SBOM include indications of completeness?

If No:

- How do you track components for compliance?
- Do you have an approved list of components?
- Do you have a list of components that developers are not allowed to use (non-permitted technology list)?
- Do you use any SCA tools?
- Do you have a customer communication plan for vulnerabilities in your upstream components?
- Do you intend to create an SBOM in the future?
- Will you be willing to confirm an SBOM generated by a 3rd party?



FUTURE INITIATIVES & IDEAS FOR 2021

- ➤ Use Case Repository
- ➤ SBOM Starter Slides
- ➤ NTIA GitHub
- ➤ Additional SBOM Surveys
- ➤ Journeys & Playbooks
- ➤ Additional Explainer Videos
- ➤ Revisit Outreach Strategy
- ➤ Proof of Concept Virtual Summit
- ➤ Other Virtual Conference Opportunities
- ➤ SBOM SWAG



FUTURE INITIATIVES & IDEAS FOR 2021

- ➤ Use Case Repository
- ➤ SBOM Starter Slides



- ➤ NTIA GitHub
- ➤ Additional SBOM Surveys
- ➤ Journeys & Playbooks
- ➤ Additional Explainer Videos
- ➤ Revisit Outreach Strategy →
- ➤ Proof of Concept Virtual Summit
- ➤ Other Virtual Conference Opportunities
- ➤ SBOM SWAG



TRUST & TRUSTWORTHINESS

Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2002 5:22 1 ... Every few years I have sent out a memo talking about the highest priority To: Microsoft and Subsidiaries: All FTE for Microsoft. Two years ago, it was the kickoff of our .NET strategy. Before Subject: Trustworthy computing that, it was several memos about the importance of the Internet to our future and the ways we could make the Internet truly useful for people. Over the last year it has become clear that ensuring .NET is a platform for Trustworthy Computing is more important than any other part of our work. If we don't do this, people simply won't be willing -- or able -- to take advantage of all the other great work we do. Trustworthy highest priority for all the work we are doing. We must lead the industry to a When we started work on Microsoft .NET more than two years ago, we set whole new level of Trustworthiness in computing. a new direction for the company -- and articulated a new way to think about oftware. Rather than developing standalone applications and Web are moving towards smart clients with rich user interfaces dors can share information, while












SBOM IS HERE

"The future is already here it's just not very evenly distributed."

– William Gibson



CRITICAL MASS

FEB 23,

product

they work with.



PRESS RELEASE

IoT Security: ENISA Publishes Guidelines on Securing the IoT Supply Chain



The US must adopt **Software Bill of Materials** to thwart cyberattacks

BY CHARLES CLANCY & RICK LEDGETT, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS — 03/15/21 09:00 AM EDT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL



POST-SBOM ACCELERATION

Ingredients

- Inventory
- Parts
- Lists
- 1...n Suppliers
- BoM (Bill of Materials)

Known Vulnerabilities

- CVEs ++
- Potentially exploitable
- Not "Attack Surface"


Exploitable Vulnerabilities

- Attack Surface
- Code Flow
- Other mitigations
- Direct Exploitation
- Chained attacks
- Deserialization



COMMUNITY ASK

- ➤ How you can help Awareness & Adoption:
 - ➤ We are seeking new participants and project leads for ongoing efforts
 - ➤ Provide feedback on SBOM Related Efforts document
 - ➤ Watch, share, and add to list of public recordings
 - ➤ Submit upcoming events to the SBOM Calendar
 - ➤ Introductions to creative colleagues and contributors (e.g. marketing, design, developer relations, etc.) + new industry participants
- ➤ How can Awareness & Adoption help you?
 - ➤ What other resources do you need?
 - ➤ How can we improve existing resources?
 - ➤ Do our future initiatives and priorities align with yours?



RESOURCES

- ➤ README:
 - https://bit.ly/sbom-awareness-readme

- ➤ Google Drive Folder:
 - http://bit.ly/sbom-awareness-google-drive

- ➤ Meeting Notes:
 - http://bit.ly/sbom-awareness-meetingnotes



JOIN US

- ➤ Awareness & Adoption Meeting
 - ➤ Fridays at 1:00 PM ET
 - ➤ Join the working group:

 https://lists.sei.cmu.edu/mailman/

 listinfo/ntia-sbom-practices
- ➤ Mailing List
 - ➤ ntia-sbom-practices@cert.org



THANK YOU!



Q & A