From: June Portch <admin@cix.org>

To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)

Date: 10/13/98 5:00pm

Subject: Domain Name Comments

The Commercial Internet eXchange Association (CIX) is pleased to submit a statement indorsing in principle the transfer of the IANA functions to the new ICANN Corporation.

The transfer of the administrative functions is the second - and final - step in the privatization of the commercial Internet. The first involved ending government restrictions on commercial use and transferring greater control over certain operations and their funding to the private sector. That process took place over a two and a half-year period beginning in 1992 and ending in 1995. Ideally, it would have been desirable for this current phase to have begun sooner to enable the incorporation and organization of the new entity to take place over a more reasonable period. However, it is necessary to respond to the new commercial environment as quickly as possible.

CIX has been involved in the administrative infrastructure privatization debate over the last two and a half years. Consequently, we are familiar with many of the issues, personalities, and business, governance, and technical disagreements. We direct our remarks to two areas: the proposed ICANN Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation; and specific changes to those documents to ensure that this transfer meets the highest standards of democratic corporate governance.

CIX was involved in helping to establish the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP), a private sector initiative to help establish the non-profit corporation that will, when successfully established under the "White Paper" guidelines, eventually take control of the Internet's addressing and naming functions.

Background

The Department of Commerce's "White Paper", The Management of Internet Names and Addresses issued on June 5, 1998, identified four core principles for the transfer of DNS authority to the new private administrative entity.  They are network stability; bottoms-up representation; private sector leadership; and competition. These principles are soundly conceived and commendable and should be incorporated into an analytical framework for assessing the transfer.

Analysis of the Proposed ICANN Documents and Initial Transitional Steps.  How do the proposed Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, and Interim Board recommendations measure up against the White Paper's basic principles? We recognized that many parties have labored hard on this effort to develop the drafts, and they are to be commended for these exertions. However, in our view, they are important steps, but more needs to be done to improve these initiatives. The major points of CIX's analysis are:

1. Greater board accountability and independence are needed. There is a danger that the board of directors, in particular members from the supporting organizations (SOs), will be self-perpetuating, with insufficient accountability to the Internet community as a whole.

2. The proposed nominations to the Interim Board should be expanded through improved regional and commercial representation.

3. There should be oversight and monitoring of the new corporation and board performed by the private sector.

4. The transitional process needs to proceed expeditiously as there have already been unavoidable delays that have unduly slowed incorporation.

Comments

1. The current bylaws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers do not provide for an elected board but a self-perpetuating board accountable to the State of California rather than a membership. To be sure, the fifth revision provides for a possible membership corporation to which the board would be responsible and accountable, but at this time such a relationship is not guaranteed. The absence of true accountability and responsibility is a fundamental deficiency that vitiates transparency and openness, for these qualities are meaningless without accountability.  This defect affects more than the structure of the corporation's board of directors. An independent board is desirable because it ensures that the entity will receive responsible managerial advice from directors who do not have a direct financial stake in the enterprise. However, the current draft bylaws would allow employees of the supporting organizations or other parties with a direct or indirect financial stake in its decisions to serve.  While rhetorical acknowledgement is paid to diversity,in fact there is nothing to ensure that substantial interest groups - most importantly the world's business community of Internet users - will be appropriately represented on the board. Diversity at all levels - from the supporting organizations' nominations to the entire board - must be required.

2. If independent judgment and diversity are crucial to the board members' qualifications, how do the proposed nominees satisfy these criteria? While the nine proposed at-large board members are all distinguished citizens with admirable professional qualifications, CIX is unaware of how these individuals were chosen. We note, however, that commercial interests are under-represented, especially from commercial users and the crucial Internet service provider sector that provides access to the Internet for institutions, businesses, and individual consumers.

Important geographical regions, notably Latin America,or non-OECD representatives, are not represented on the suggested Interim Board. These deficiencies, along with the structural problems identified above, can and should be remedied prior to formal incorporation and the seating of the interim board.

3.As noted, one of the critical principles in this privatization is that the private sector rather than government should provide leadership. Just as the board of directors must originate in the private sector, it is important that oversight of the new corporation should also be primarily a private sector function, particularly since private citizens from the Internet community are uniquely qualified to provide candid, experienced analysis of the new corporation's performance. Congress' continuing interest will be important in safeguarding the public's interest - as will be the activities of the European Commission and other governmental bodies - but private sector monitoring rather than direct governmental involvement would be a preferable course.  While it is undoubtedly true that the IFWP had its fair share of problems, it did symbolized an important kernel of truth regarding the Internet space, namely that the private sector must take the leading role in developing procedures and principles to coordinate and self-manage. 

Recommendations.

CIX recommends that the following steps be taken:

1. The at large Interim Board should be expanded to 11 members to allow for greater commercial representation and representation from the Latin American and Caribbean regions. .

2. The proposed bylaws should be amended to prohibit employees of the SOs from serving on the board of directors.

3. The nominating process must be opened up, and no SO names should be accepted until that occurs.

4. The bylaws should be amended to require that the new corporation should be a membership corporation with the final election procedures and membership entails to be determined by the permanent board.

5. The private sector should have the primary role in Internet resource monitoring as it is most qualified and best positioned to perform this function. It can be done with the assistance from, and in cooperation with the public sector.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to submit these comments.

Barbara A. Dooley

Executive Director

Commercial Internet eXchange Association

CC: NTIADC40.SMTP40("bdooley@cix.org","cix-board@cix.o...

###

Before the

National Telecommunications and Information Administration

Department of Commerce

Washington, DC 20230

In the Matter of

Private Sector Proposal for New Domain Name Corporation

Comments of the Commercial Internet Exchange Association (CIX)

Robert Collet

Chairman of the Board

Barbara A. Dooley

Executive Director

Eric Lee

Public Policy Director

1040 Sterling Road Suite 103A

Herndon, VA 20170

(703) 709-8200

http://www.cix.org

Dated: October 13, 1998

COMMENTS OF COMMERCIAL INTERNET EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION (CIX.)

Before the

Department of Commerce

National Telecommunications and Information Agency

The Commercial Internet eXchange Association (CIX) is pleased to submit a statement endorsing in principle the transfer of the IANA functions to the new Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).

The transfer of the administrative functions is the second - and final - step in the privatization of the commercial Internet. The first involved ending government restrictions on commercial use and transferring greater control over certain operations and their funding to the private sector. That process took place over a two and a half-year period beginning in 1992 and ending in 1995. Ideally, it would have been desirable for this current phase to have begun sooner to enable the incorporation and organization of the new entity to take place over a more reasonable period. However, it is necessary to respond to the new commercial environment as quickly as possible.

CIX has been involved in the administrative infrastructure privatization debate over the last two and a half years. Consequently, we are familiar with many of the issues, personalities, and business, governance, and technical disagreements. We direct our remarks to two areas: the proposed ICANN Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation; and specific changes to those documents to ensure that this transfer meets the highest standards of democratic corporate governance.

CIX was involved in helping to establish the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP), a private sector initiative to help establish the non-profit corporation that will, when successfully established under the "White Paper" guidelines, eventually take control of the Internet's addressing and naming functions.

Background

The Department of Commerce's "White Paper", The Management of Internet Names and Addresses issued on June 5, 1998, identified four core principles for the transfer of DNS authority to the new private administrative entity. They are network stability; bottoms-up representation; private sector leadership; and competition. These principles are soundly conceived and commendable and should be incorporated into an analytical framework for assessing the transfer.

Analysis of the Proposed ICANN Documents and Initial Transitional Steps.

How do the proposed Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, and Interim Board recommendations measure up against the White Paper's basic principles? We recognized that many parties have labored hard on this effort to develop the drafts, and they are to be commended for these exertions. However, in our view, they are important steps, but more needs to be done to improve these initiatives. The major points of CIX's analysis are:

1. Greater board accountability and independence are needed. There is a danger that the board of directors, in particular members from the supporting organizations (SOs), will be self-perpetuating, with insufficient accountability to the Internet community as a whole.

2. The proposed nominations to the Interim Board should be expanded through improved regional and commercial representation.

3. There should be oversight and monitoring of the new corporation and board performed by the private sector.

4. The transitional process needs to proceed expeditiously, as there have already been unavoidable delays that have unduly slowed incorporation.

Comments

1. The current bylaws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers do not provide for an elected board but a self-perpetuating board accountable to the State of California rather than a membership. To be sure, the fifth revision provides for a possible membership corporation to which the board would be responsible and accountable, but at this time such a relationship is not guaranteed. The absence of true accountability and responsibility is a fundamental deficiency that vitiates transparency and openness, for these qualities are meaningless without accountability.

This defect affects more than the structure of the corporation's board of directors. An independent board is desirable because it ensures that the entity will receive responsible managerial advice from directors who do not have a direct financial stake in the enterprise. However, the current draft bylaws would allow employees of the supporting organizations or other parties with a direct or indirect financial stake in its decisions to serve.

While rhetorical acknowledgement is paid to diversity, in fact there is nothing to ensure that substantial interest groups - most importantly the world's business community of Internet users - will be appropriately represented on the board. Diversity at all levels - from the supporting organizations' nominations to the entire board - must be required.

2. If independent judgment and diversity are crucial to the board members' qualifications, how do the proposed nominees satisfy these criteria? While the nine proposed at-large board members are all distinguished citizens with admirable professional qualifications, CIX is unaware of how these individuals were chosen. We note, however, that commercial interests are under-represented, especially from commercial users and the crucial Internet service provider sector that provides access to the Internet for institutions, businesses, and individual consumers.

Important geographical regions, notably Latin America or non-OECD representatives, are not represented on the suggested Interim Board. These deficiencies, along with the structural problems identified above, can and should be remedied prior to formal incorporation and the seating of the interim board.

3.As noted, one of the critical principles in this privatization is that the private sector rather than government should provide leadership. Just as the board of directors must originate in the private sector, it is important that oversight of the new corporation should also be primarily a private sector function, particularly since private citizens from the Internet community are uniquely qualified to provide candid, experienced analysis of the new corporation's performance. Congress' continuing interest will be important in safeguarding the public's interest - as will be the activities of the European Commission and other governmental bodies - but private sector monitoring rather than direct governmental involvement would be a preferable course.

While it is undoubtedly true that the IFWP had its fair share of problems, it did symbolized an important kernel of truth regarding the Internet space, namely that the private sector must take the leading role in developing procedures and principles to coordinate and self-manage.

Recommendations.

CIX recommends that the following steps be taken:

1. The at large Interim Board should be expanded to 11 members to allow for greater commercial representation and representation from the Latin American and Caribbean regions. .

2. The proposed bylaws should be amended to prohibit employees of the SOs from serving on the board of directors.

3. The nominating process must be opened up, and no SO names should be accepted until that occurs.

4. The bylaws should be amended to require that the new corporation should be a membership corporation with the final election procedures and membership entails to be determined by the permanent board.

5. The private sector should have the primary role in Internet resource monitoring as it is most qualified and best positioned to perform this function. It can be done with the assistance from, and in cooperation with the public sector.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to submit these comments.

Barbara A. Dooley

Executive Director

Commercial Internet eXchange Association

October 13, 1998

###

From: Andy Oram <andyo@oreilly.com>

To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)

Date: 10/13/98 4:44pm

Subject: Filing by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility

The history of the domain name system (DNS) reform controversy is repeating

itself. The Commerce Department must make sure that this second occurrence

is not a tragedy.

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) recommends that the

Commerce Department should reject the unilateral, unaccountable, and

non-consensus approach of IANA -- styled now as the Internet Corporation

for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) -- in favor of the proposal of the

Open Root Source Consortium (ORSC). Only in this way can the values of

openness, Internet self-governance, and balance among all Internet

stakeholders (including users) be achieved in the formation of what Rep.

Chip Pickering has appropriately called "the constitution for the Internet."

The purpose of forming a non-profit corporation to take over the IANA and

related root server functions, which CPSR has fully supported, is to

establish a mechanism for transferring the last formal involvement of the

U.S. government with administration of the Internet. The Commerce

Department's Green Paper/White Paper process was initiated because broad

segments of Internet users were deeply unsatisfied with the process

conducted by IANA, which was criticized as closed, unfair, and resulting in

an unaccountable organization. A contrasting process -- open, fair,

balanced, and dedicated in creating an accountable organization -- was

begun by Green Paper/White Paper and shepherded by the International Forum

on the White Paper (IFWP). If it is to retain the support of the Internet

community and foreign governments, the Commerce Department must insist that

this open process, and the values it represents, be continued. (Harvard Law

Professor Lawrence Lessig made these same points at CPSR's One Planet, One

Net conference last Saturday, in a speech that is available on the Web at

http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/cpsr.pdf.)

The IANA proposal for the new domain name corporation did not adequately

follow the open, balanced process envisioned by the Green Paper/White

Paper. IANA acted essentially in a unilateral manner, negotiating with

Network Solutions and the Commerce Department instead of allowing the wide

range of stakeholders in the IFWP to approve their document. Among other

things, the structure of the ICANN differs in important respects from the

IFWP consensus, the ICANN-nominated interim Board members were never

discussed or confirmed by any public process whatsoever, and the ICANN was

incorporated in California at the unilateral direction of IANA. Although

IANA claims it acted to reflect what it terms "the IFWP consensus," the

reality is that the IANA proposal represents little more than an effort by

the existing individuals and organizations responsible for DNS

administration to extend their influence into the new era of open Internet

self-governance that the Green Paper/White Paper process was intended to

inaugurate.

It is critical for the U.S. government to use its leverage to ensure that

the new corporation follows the core values of openness, fairness, and

accountability. These values are demanded not just by U.S. participants,

but by members of the public from around the world who have expressed their

concern with domain name administration. The choices we make on DNS will

provide a model for future administrative issues on the Internet. Although

we commend IANA for submitting drafts for public review, the final IANA

proposal is very weak in the critical areas of openness, accountability and

balance required for healthy Internet self-governance.

CPSR believes that the proposal from the Open Root Server Confederation is

much more in keeping with the White Paper goals and reflects the broadest

possible coalition of those who have participated in discussions around

domain names. While CPSR does not feel it is appropriate for us to pick and

choose parts of each proposal and submit the hodgepodge as our own

proposal, we suggest simply that the Commerce Department adopt the spirit

of the ORSC proposal and use it as a model for formation of the "new

corporation," while continuing to solicit input from many sectors. We will

also mention in this comment some of the key points we wish to see enacted.

CPSR is not ignoring the work of other groups and individuals, such as the

Boston Working Group, which have made thoughtful submissions on this

complex subject. We are concentrating on the ORSC proposal because it has

tried to be a unifying and synthesizing force, which is just what the

process of setting up a new corporation needs.

Initial Board

-------------

The key decision at the beginning of the new corporation's history is the

choice of the initial Board. We reject the IANA strategy of picking a

slate. We also note that initial Board members should evince a history of

following the many complex DNS issues, whereas many of the IANA choices are

made for supposed "neutrality" and do not demonstrate sufficient background

to handle the intense politicking and technical hair-splitting that is sure

to beset them when they begin their deliberations.

A broader input for the initial Board is required. Voting is unfeasible

given the amorphous state of global participation in the IFWP. But

certainly the Commerce Department can identify the most respected

individuals and organizations from the various factions that have arisen,

including Internet users and public interest advocates, and put together a

Board where every significant faction has some representation. At the very

least, whether or not proportional representation is required, a minimum

representation of all stakeholder interests is necessary in order for the

new corporation's interim Board to command the respect of the Internet

community necessary to forge a consensus on the substantive policy issues

left unsettled by all the current proposals.

Including a good number of public-interest, non-commercial members will

help to ensure that the corporation represents the values of openness and

fairness.

Membership

----------

After the selection of the initial Board, the other key determinant of the

core values expressed in the White Paper is a provision for membership in

the new corporation. No proposal has completely solved this problem, but

the ORSC makes a step in the right direction. CPSR values the participation

of small stakeholders, such as non-profit domain names holders and Internet

users. A low barrier to membership will help to preserve openness,

fairness, and accountability. On the other hand, there should be safeguards

to prevent capture of the corporation by large, well-funded organizations,

perhaps subverting democracy by stuffing the membership.

Role of supporting organizations

--------------------------------

CPSR supports the proposal of the Boston Group and the ORSC that supporting

organizations not select Board members. The reason for this choice is that

supporting organizations are expected to represent communities of technical

experts. The Board's purview, however, is policy decisions rather than

technical ones. To give the supporting organizations seats on the Board, as

the IANA proposal does, would be to risk politicizing supporting

organizations and weakening their competence to advise the Board

technically. It would also place too much control in the hands of a few

organizations responsible for technical administration, to the detriment of

the vastly wider communities of domain holders and Internet users.

Accountability

--------------

The ORSC proposal addresses a key deficiency of the IANA/ICANN approach,

namely that the ICANN Board and interim Board would be accountable only to

themselves. This is a matter of some seriousness, as without the U.S.

government to act as ultimate arbiter, there must be some mechanism for

those dissatisfied with policy decisions of the new corporation to air

grievances. The ORSC proposal incorporates hearing procedures and

financial accountability clauses related to business planning, budgeting

and fee structure. CPSR believes these sort of accountability mechanisms

are crucial to the success of the new corporation.

Guarantees of free speech

-------------------------

The concern of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for free speech is

salutary. At present, the structure of the Internet facilitates the spread

of ideas from any originator to any recipient. However, it is possible that

governments or large Internet providers will try to skew the system to

facilitate censorship or the tracking of users. The corporation should be

set up to ensure as much as possible that it does not create a structure

for content control.

Conclusion

----------

If the Commerce Department accedes to the IANA/ICANN proposal, it will make

a charade out of the forward-looking principles of the Green Paper/White

Paper process. The values of openness, fairness, balance, and

accountability are inherent in Internet self-governance, but these values

are scarce, if not missing entirely, from the IANA/ICANN approach.

Furthermore, as a participant in the Green Paper/White Paper and IFWP

processes, CPSR resents IANA's self-proclaimed, unilateral assertion that

it has either the legitimacy or authority to fashion a new corporation, on

its own, to control the important issue of DNS reform. If, as many

believe, DNS is just the first of many issues of Internet policy that the

new corporation will b required to address, the US government must ensure

that the fundamental and publicly announced principles for the transition

to private sector Internet DNS administration are respected. The ORSC

proposal comes closest to meeting these principles, and should be used as

the model for formation of the new corporation.

(A Word 6.0 version of this document is attached to this mail message, and

CPSR will put the document on our Web site at

http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/nii/cyber-rights/web/dns-ntia-newcorp.html.

Questions can be sent to Andrew Oram, andyo@cpsr.org.)

Filing on the Private Sector Proposal for New Domain Name Corporation

by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility

The history of the domain name system (DNS) reform controversy is repeating itself. The Commerce Department must make sure that this second occurrence is not a tragedy.

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) recommends that the Commerce Department should reject the unilateral, unaccountable, and non-consensus approach of IANA¾styled now as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)¾in favor of the proposal of the Open Root Source Consortium (ORSC). Only in this way can the values of openness, Internet self-governance, and balance among all Internet stakeholders (including users) be achieved in the formation of what Rep. Chip Pickering has appropriately called "the constitution for the Internet."

The purpose of forming a non-profit corporation to take over the IANA and related root server functions, which CPSR has fully supported, is to establish a mechanism for transferring the last formal involvement of the U.S. government with administration of the Internet. The Commerce Department's Green Paper/White Paper process was initiated because broad segments of Internet users were deeply unsatisfied with the process conducted by IANA, which was criticized as closed, unfair, and resulting in an unaccountable organization. A contrasting process¾open, fair, balanced, and dedicated in creating an accountable organization¾was begun by Green Paper/White Paper and shepherded by the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP). If it is to retain the support of the Internet community and foreign governments, the Commerce Department must insist that this open process, and the values it represents, be continued. (Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig made these same points at CPSR's One Planet, One Net conference last Saturday, in a speech that is available on the Web at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/cpsr.pdf.)

The IANA proposal for the new domain name corporation did not adequately follow the open, balanced process envisioned by the Green Paper/White Paper. IANA acted essentially in a unilateral manner, negotiating with Network Solutions and the Commerce Department instead of allowing the wide range of stakeholders in the IFWP to approve their document. Among other things, the structure of the ICANN differs in important respects from the IFWP consensus, the ICANN-nominated interim Board members were never discussed or confirmed by any public process whatsoever, and the ICANN was incorporated in California at the unilateral direction of IANA. Although IANA claims it acted to reflect what it terms "the IFWP consensus," the reality is that the IANA proposal represents little more than an effort by the existing individuals and organizations responsible for DNS administration to extend their influence into the new era of open Internet self-governance that the Green Paper/White Paper process was intended to inaugurate.

It is critical for the U.S. government to use its leverage to ensure that the new corporation follows the core values of openness, fairness, and accountability. These values are demanded not just by U.S. participants, but by members of the public from around the world who have expressed their concern with domain name administration. The choices we make on DNS will provide a model for future administrative issues on the Internet. Although we commend IANA for submitting drafts for public review, the final IANA proposal is very weak in the critical areas of openness, accountability and balance required for healthy Internet self-governance.

CPSR believes that the proposal from the Open Root Server Confederation is much more in keeping with the White Paper goals and reflects the broadest possible coalition of those who have participated in discussions around domain names. While CPSR does not feel it is appropriate for us to pick and choose parts of each proposal and submit the hodgepodge as our own proposal, we suggest simply that the Commerce Department adopt the spirit of the ORSC proposal and use it as a model for formation of the "new corporation," while continuing to solicit input from many sectors. We will also mention in this comment some of the key points we wish to see enacted.

CPSR is not ignoring the work of other groups and individuals, such as the Boston Working Group, which have made thoughtful submissions on this complex subject. We are concentrating on the ORSC proposal because it has tried to be a unifying and synthesizing force, which is just what the process of setting up a new corporation needs.

Initial Board

The key decision at the beginning of the new corporation's history is the choice of the initial Board. We reject the IANA strategy of picking a slate. We also note that initial Board members should evince a history of following the many complex DNS issues, whereas many of the IANA choices are made for supposed "neutrality" and do not demonstrate sufficient background to handle the intense politicking and technical hair-splitting that is sure to beset them when they begin their deliberations.

A broader input for the initial Board is required. Voting is unfeasible given the amorphous state of global participation in the IFWP. But certainly the Commerce Department can identify the most respected individuals and organizations from the various factions that have arisen, including Internet users and public interest advocates, and put together a Board where every significant faction has some representation. At the very least, whether or not proportional representation is required, a minimum representation of all stakeholder interests is necessary in order for the new corporation's interim Board to command the respect of the Internet community necessary to forge a consensus on the substantive policy issues left unsettled by all the current proposals.

Including a good number of public-interest, non-commercial members will help to ensure that the corporation represents the values of openness and fairness.

Membership

After the selection of the initial Board, the other key determinant of the core values expressed in the White Paper is a provision for membership in the new corporation. No proposal has completely solved this problem, but the ORSC makes a step in the right direction. CPSR values the participation of small stakeholders, such as non-profit domain names holders and Internet users. A low barrier to membership will help to preserve openness, fairness, and accountability. On the other hand, there should be safeguards to prevent capture of the corporation by large, well-funded organizations, perhaps subverting democracy by stuffing the membership.

Role of supporting organizations

CPSR supports the proposal of the Boston Group and the ORSC that supporting organizations not select Board members. The reason for this choice is that supporting organizations are expected to represent communities of technical experts. The Board's purview, however, is policy decisions rather than technical ones. To give the supporting organizations seats on the Board, as the IANA proposal does, would be to risk politicizing supporting organizations and weakening their competence to advise the Board technically. It would also place too much control in the hands of a few organizations responsible for technical administration, to the detriment of the vastly wider communities of domain holders and Internet users.

Accountability

The ORSC proposal addresses a key deficiency of the IANA/ICANN approach, namely that the ICANN Board and interim Board would be accountable only to themselves. This is a matter of some seriousness, as without the U.S. government to act as ultimate arbiter, there must be some mechanism for those dissatisfied with policy decisions of the new corporation to air grievances. The ORSC proposal incorporates hearing procedures and financial accountability clauses related to business planning, budgeting and fee structure. CPSR believes these sort of accountability mechanisms are crucial to the success of the new corporation.

Guarantees of free speech

The concern of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for free speech is salutary. At present, the structure of the Internet facilitates the spread of ideas from any originator to any recipient. However, it is possible that governments or large Internet providers will try to skew the system to facilitate censorship or the tracking of users. The corporation should be set up to ensure as much as possible that it does not create a structure for content control.

Conclusion

If the Commerce Department accedes to the IANA/ICANN proposal, it will make a charade out of the forward-looking principles of the Green Paper/White Paper process. The values of openness, fairness, balance, and accountability are inherent in Internet self-governance, but these values are scarce, if not missing entirely, from the IANA/ICANN approach. Furthermore, as a participant in the Green Paper/White Paper and IFWP processes, CPSR resents IANA's self-proclaimed, unilateral assertion that it has either the legitimacy or authority to fashion a new corporation, on its own, to control the important issue of DNS reform. If, as many believe, DNS is just the first of many issues of Internet policy that the new corporation will b required to address, the US government must ensure that the fundamental and publicly announced principles for the transition to private sector Internet DNS administration are respected. The ORSC proposal comes closest to meeting these principles, and should be used as the model for formation of the new corporation.

(CPSR will put this document on our Web site at http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/nii/cyber-rights/web/dns-ntia-newcorp.html. Questions can be sent to Andrew Oram, andyo@cpsr.org.)

###

From: Brian E Carpenter <brian@hursley.ibm.com>

To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)

Date: 10/13/98 1:05pm

Subject: Comment from the Internet Architecture Board

Comment from the Internet Architecture Board (IAB),

a committee of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).

----------------------------------------------------------

The IAB is pleased to note the incorporation of the

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

and recommends that the draft by laws submitted by

Jon Postel, head of the existing Internet Assigned

Numbers Authority designated by the IAB, should form

the basis of the Corporation's by laws.

Two relevant earlier statements by the IAB are attached.

Brian Carpenter (IAB Chair)

October 13, 1998

------------------------------

Subject:

IAB actions concerning the IANA

Date:

Wed, 30 Sep 1998 17:46:05 +0100

From:

Brian E Carpenter <brian@hursley.ibm.com>

Organization:

IBM Internet Division

To:

Ira Magaziner <Ira_C._Magaziner@oa.eop.gov>,

Chris Wilkinson <Christopher.WILKINSON@bxl.dg13.cec.be>

CC:

Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>

[Mr Magaziner and Mr Wilkinson, this will be posted to the IETF

shortly; this copy is for your information, but I would appreciate

it being kept private until the IETF posting has taken place sometime

during the next few hours.]

IAB actions concerning the IANA

On September 4, 1998 the IAB issued a statement in general support

of the third published draft by laws for the "new IANA" corporation.

The IAB has briefly reviewed the fifth draft published on September

28, and finds it to be broadly compatible with the third draft.

However, since all the issues surrounding the new corporation have not

yet been fully resolved, the IAB has decided under the terms of

RFC 1601 to prolong for three months the current designation of the

team under Jon Postel at ISI as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.

We will work on an interim agreement with the IANA to define the

specifics of this.

Meanwhile the IAB will work with the IESG and the ISOC to prepare a

proposal for the Protocol Supporting Organization likely to be required

by the new corporation. We will also work on a proposal for open

procedures for the IETF appointments to this Organization and to the

Board of the proposed new IANA corporation. Finally we will work on a

proposal for a memorandum of understanding, or equivalent, between the

IETF and the IANA. IETF consensus will be sought for these proposals,

most likely via the IETF process working group (the POISSON WG).

Brian Carpenter (IAB Chair)

September 30, 1998

-------------------------------------------

Subject: IAB Statement on New IANA

Date: Fri, 04 Sep 1998 12:26:52 +0100

From: Brian E Carpenter <brian@hursley.ibm.com>

Organization: IBM Internet Division

To: Ira Magaziner <Ira_C._Magaziner@oa.eop.gov>,

Chris Wilkinson <Christopher.WILKINSON@bxl.dg13.cec.be>

CC: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>

[Note: the draft of this statement was approved by acclamation

at the IETF plenary meeting attended by approximately 1000 people

on August 26, 1998. It was subsequently approved by a one-week

electronic mail "last call" to the IETF, which generated more than

80% favorable comments.]

IAB statement on New IANA

In June 1998, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) reviewed

the US Government White Paper at

http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm

and welcomed it, especially the emphasis on self-administration

for the Internet. In particular, the IAB believed then and

believes now that for stability of operation, the technical work

of the new corporation must be initially built out from the existing

IANA technical team hosted by the Information Sciences Institute of the

University of Southern California under the direction of Jon Postel.

This week the IAB has considered the draft by-laws of the new

IANA corporation as most recently revised and posted at

http://www.iana.org . While the IETF recognizes deficiencies in

the present draft and wishes that they be remedied, the IAB and

the IETF endorse the draft as the basis for the final by laws,

on the basis that:

1. The IETF will be the "Protocol Supporting Organization"

for the new IANA.

2. The IAB, consulting with the IESG, will be the "Protocol Council"

for the new IANA.

3. The regular IETF nominations process will be modified to

incorporate the appointment of the three corresponding IANA Board

Members.

The IAB is an oversight committee of the Internet Engineering Task

Force (IETF), whose charter published as RFC 1601 includes the

desgnation of the IANA. For further details, please see the Web sites

http://www.iab.org/iab and http://www.ietf.org

Brian Carpenter (IAB Chair) September 4, 1998

in agreement with Fred Baker (IETF Chair)

(ends)

###

From: "Cantrell, Jean" <CantrellJ@dnb.com>

To: DNS POLICY <dnspolicy@ntia.doc.gov>

Date: 10/13/98 4:17pm

Subject: Dun & Bradstreet Comments

Karen:

Dun & Bradstreet's comments on the ICANN proposal are contained in the

attached Word 6.0 document. If you have any questions, please call me at

202 463 2154.

Thanks.

Jean Cantrell

<<comments on ICANN draft 1 10.10.98.doc>>

CC: "Fitzsimmons, Frank" <Fitzsimmon@dnb.com>

October 13, 1998

Secretary of Commerce

c/o Karen Rose

Office of International Affairs

Room 471

National Telecommunications and

Information Administration

United States Department of Commerce

14th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20230

Re: Comments on the Private Sector Proposal for New Domain Name Corporation

Dear Secretary Daley:

The National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the United States Department of Commerce has afforded the opportunity to comment on the Articles of Incorporation and proposed Bylaws for a new non-profit organization, called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which has been incorporated in California. Dr. Jon Postel submitted these documents for your review and approval. They respond to the June 5, 1998 statement of policy issued by NTIA entitled: The Management of the Internet Domain Name System.

These comments are submitted by The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, a $2.2 billion company operating in over 200 countries with over 16,000 employees. Its operating units include Dun & Bradstreet, the world's leading provider of business-to-business credit and marketing information and receivables management services and Moody's Investors Service, a global leader in rating debt.

Dun & Bradstreet was founded in 1841 to facilitate commerce by providing information about businesses to businesses. Although today's media by which such information is gathered and provided could not have been imagined then, the basic purpose of the enterprise remains the same. Today, we collect information on over 50 million business establishments worldwide and invest over $360 million annually in data collection activities. A single record in the Dun & Bradstreet database may include up to 1,500 data elements on each business, drawn from sources ranging from the owners or principals of the business itself to public records.

Because commerce cannot flourish without information and because providing that information has been our business for over 157 years, we have a fundamental interest in the potential of the Internet as a facilitator of commercial transactions.

We have previously submitted comments in response to invitations by the Department on a new Domain Name System on August 25, 1997 in response to a Request for Comments issued by the Department of Commerce on July 2, 1997 (62 FR 35896), and on March 23, 1998 regarding a proposed rule and request for comments concerning "Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses" that would have amended 15 CFR Chapter XXIII and that was published on February 20, 1998 by NTIA.

We very much appreciate the opportunities that the Senior Advisor to the President for Policy Development, Mr. Ira Magaziner, his staff, and officials at the Department of Commerce and the Office of Science and Technology Policy have afforded us and others to comment upon and understand the basis, purpose and direction of the Administration's efforts on this important matter. The openness and accessibility of these officials has been superior and formed the basis for the support for this proposal and this effort.

We believe that the proposal for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers is a good one. It is clearly superior to any other approach or proposal that has been offered, and we support it. Furthermore, we appreciate the difficult decisions that have been faced in developing this proposal arising from a situation that was not chosen, but that has arisen from the unprecedented and unanticipated growth and potential of the Internet. We wish to make it quite clear that we support the direction and the evident purpose of the enterprise as well as the process.

These documents submitted to you by Dr. Postel and the consensus that they represent among the Internet stakeholders deserve your approval and support. They are a faithful delivery in response to your Department's policy statement for transitioning the current Internet Domain Name System to a more global system administered by the private sector with appropriate governmental involvement. The challenges that this new corporation will encounter will be significant. Translating policy into operational procedures while ensuring the stability and facilitating the availability of the Internet to all who would use it will be demanding. As we have already seen, the Internet presents all of society's issues, from censorship to warfare, in a uniquely personal manner. How they are handled by the corporation and by the Internet stakeholders and governments will determine whether the Internet will approach the potential many have predicted.

We are encouraged when facing the daunting tasks ahead by the successes that have brought us to this point. As we have in the past, we applaud the work on this important undertaking and for the efforts of the Mr. Magaziner, Ms. Burr, Mr. Kahin and others at the Department of Commerce and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. We also applaud the work of Dr. Postel and those who contributed to the proposal for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposal to create the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and we look forward to participating further in these important issues concerning the future of the Internet.

Sincerely,

Jean Cantrell

Director-Government Affairs

The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation

(202)463-2154 (V)

(202)463-2163 (F)

cantrellj@dnb.com

###

October 13, 1998

Writer's Direct Contact

(202) 887-1500

ckennedy@mofo.com

jcasey@mofo.com

By Internet Mail

Karen Rose

NTIA/OIA, Room 4701

United States Department of Commerce

14th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20230

Re: Verio Inc. Comments on Private Sector Proposal For New Domain Name Corporation

Dear Ms. Rose:

Verio Inc. ("Verio"), through counsel, hereby submits its comments on the private sector proposals for a new domain name corporation.

Verio, which was incorporated in March, 1996 to meet the growing needs of business customers for Internet access and related services, offers turnkey business Internet solutions encompassing a wide range of Internet connectivity and enhanced Internet services throughout the United States. Verio is also a registrar and user of IP numbers and domain name resources, and through a pending acquisition will become the largest domain name based web hosting company in the world, and one of the largest domain name registrars globally. Accordingly, Verio has a substantial interest in ensuring that the new Domain Name System ("DNS") will be efficient and fair to all users and providers of domain name resources.

Verio's primary objective in commenting on the private sector proposals submitted in connection with the NTIA's Statement of Policy concerning the management of Internet names and addresses is to encourage the rapid implementation of a revamped system that increases competition in this critical sector of the Internet community. Until the new DNS Corporation is formed and operating, little of the up-front work necessary to achieve the milestone tasks that have now been established in the amended Special Award Conditions can be undertaken.(1) Also, until the new entity is formed and an Interim Board functionally established and empowered, the DNS cannot begin effectively to address such critical questions as establishment of new generic top level domains ("gTLDs"), a framework for addressing trademark disputes, establishment of a competitive registrar system and the transfer of certain Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") responsibilities to the new Corporation. Accordingly, Verio favors initial structural and governance arrangements that accommodate the legitimate concerns of all affected parties without requiring lengthy additional proceedings.

Introduction

As the Management of Internet Names and Addresses document (the "White Paper") properly notes, "[t]he Internet succeeds in great measure because it is a decentralized system that encourages innovation and maximizes individual freedom." Some of the operational elements of the Internet, such as the DNS, however, require a degree of centralization and coordination to ensure the functionality and stability of the Internet. An appropriate management system for the DNS must account for and balance these sometimes conflicting requirements of Internet management.

Comments

As the White Paper and the comments on that document point out, fair and effective Internet management requires international participation and accountability to the entire Internet community. All interested parties will suffer, however, if the DNS Corporation implementation process becomes embroiled in disputes over the details of the incorporation and initial structure and governance of the DNS Corporation. To avoid needless delay the formation of the new DNS Corporation must follow a strict and expedited timeline.(2) The corporate processes thereby established will permit necessary adjustments after critical initial issues are first addressed.(3)

With some modifications, the proposal of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ("IANA") will accommodate the need for Internet community participation and accountability without risking undue delay in the establishment of the new corporation.(4) Specifically, the IANA proposal should be modified to direct the Board to structure the DNS Corporation as a membership corporation -- a decision that the present IANA proposal leaves to the Board's discretion. Also, the IANA proposal should be modified so that the Supporting Organizations, which IANA would permit to dictate decisions of the Board, have the power only to advise the Board. Verio also urges that all policies and procedures proposed by the Board, including Board adoption of recommendations made by the Supporting Organizations, should be subject to public notice and comment. Finally, Verio recommends that the Initial Board include a director from a registrar of domain names that competes with NSI. The following proposed changes to the IANA proposal are intended to effect these recommendations.

The Articles of Incorporation

1. Membership. The Articles of Incorporation should be amended to provide that ""the Initial Board shall establish at the earliest possible date, and amend the Bylaws as necessary, the membership structure and charter membership for the Corporation and will take appropriate steps to consider nominations and cause the new membership to select a permanent Board of Directors by no later than September 30, 1999, unless by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Initial Board that date is extended. By no means will this date be extended beyond September 30, 2000."

It is critical to the fair and effective management of the DNS that the new DNS Corporation be governed at the earliest possible date by representatives selected by the Internet community at large. Accordingly, membership in the Corporation must be open and available to all interested parties. Establishment of the membership structure will be the first step in ensuring accountability to the entire Internet community.

The Bylaws

1. Selection of the Initial Board. The initial Board of Directors will have a substantial role in establishing the functionality and operations of the DNS Corporation. The procedure for selecting this board should provide for the same broad international and Internet constituency participation that will characterize the DNS Corporation itself. The IFWP nomination and election process that BWG recommends would serve this goal. However, the significant further nomination, comment, and endorsement period required by the BWG proposal would further delay the process, with no assurance that a more effective or qualified Board would result. Accordingly, recognizing the considerable expertise of the individuals that IANA proposes to serve as the members of the initial Board, Verio recommends, in the interest of expedition, that the initial Board of Directors recommended by IANA be accepted with one important modification.

Because one of the first duties of the Initial Board will be to implement the competitive registrar system, the Initial Board must include representation from competitive registrars to ensure that any representation of NSI on the board (direct or indirect) is appropriately balanced with representatives of its competitors. Representation on the board by one of the existing registrars with a significant stake in this process would be ideal. This representative could be selected as part of the Initial Board or through the additions to the Initial Board by the Domain Name Supporting Organization.

2. Notice and Comment Provisions. Verio submits that all policies and procedures proposed by any Board of the DNS Corporation, including the Initial Board, should be subject to notice and comment procedures.(5) Such a requirement will prevent the Board from establishing any procedures that could affect the rights of the Internet Community without appropriate notice and comment. In particular, fees and charges established pursuant to Article IV, Section 2 of the Bylaws should be subject to such proceedings to ensure that the DNS Corporation remains accountable for its fee structure and will not impose unreasonable, unnecessary, or discriminatory fees and charges. Where necessary to meet critical timelines, the Board should establish expedited comment procedures.

3. The Supporting Organizations. Verio generally supports the idea of Supporting Organizations. These organizations must, however, be limited to an advisory role. The Board must remain responsible, as the group directly accountable to all members of the DNS Corporation, for the ultimate establishment of Corporation policy and procedures. The Supporting Organizations should report directly to the Board of Directors and should be free to establish their own advisory committees and working groups to assist in development of policy recommendations. Recommendations to the Board of Directors must ultimately be put out for public notice and comment prior to adoption of a final rule. The DNS Corporation Board should adopt Supporting Organization recommendations only after review of all comments and only if the recommendation would serve the purposes of the Corporation and the Internet community at large. In addition to ensuring Internet community scrutiny of Supporting Organization recommendations, the membership structures selected by these organizations and approved by the Board should also be subject to notice and comment. Because these organizations will be primarily responsible for the development of certain Internet policies, they too must have some accountability to the entire Internet community.

An efficient DNS is a critical part of the Internet. As the Internet itself grows in size and importance to the world, management of the DNS must reflect the global nature of this important resource. The recommendations made in these comments, if adopted, will help to ensure global participation in the development of important policies governing Internet operations, and will make the DNS Corporation fully accountable to the entire Internet community.

Please contact the undersigned with any comments or questions regarding this submission.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Charles H. Kennedy

Charles H. Kennedy

James A. Casey

Morrison & Foerster llp

2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006-1888

Counsel for Verio, Inc.

cc: The Honorable Clarence L. Irving

###

International Chamber of Commerce

The world business organization

 

ICC Comments on Private Sector Proposals for the New Domain Name Corporation

 

The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposals for the new Domain Names Corporation that have been posted by NTIA. ICC is the world business organization representing all sizes of companies and commercial users from all sectors in over 130 countries. Since ICC’s founding in 1919, it has been serving international business by developing international consensus on business issues, drafting and implementing internationally recognized policies and guidelines, and providing dispute resolution services through the ICC International Court of Arbitration - the foremost international arbitral institution. ICC has set forth what it believes to be the essential principles which must be embodied in the administration of the domain name system and attaches those principles herewith as annex 1.

ICC has been involved in all phases of the process to create a new private sector corporation to administer the domain names system (the Corporation). ICC has participated in the International Forum for the White Paper (IFWP) meetings, and made presentations and suggested names for the Panel of Experts in the WIPO process. It has also actively participated in the IANA process by commenting on drafts of the bylaws, suggesting candidates for the Initial Board and exploring a broad-based international fundraising process for the new Corporation. ICC believes that each of these processes is, or will be, a significant input to our final goal: the development of an effective, stable and equitable system of Internet governance and domain name administration.

The IFWP acted as a catalyst and broad forum for interaction by all parties from individuals to collective stakeholder groups. The IFWP created a significant reference body of commentary that has been useful in providing the needed context for the other processes. The IFWP process, however, provided no articulated mechanism for developing consensus or arriving at closure. The WIPO process is only now beginning in earnest and is dealing with specific issues of intellectual property and dispute resolution. While of substantial importance, this too was not meant to develop broad consensus around the structure of the new corporation or its functions. The IANA process can, however, claim to have been an open, transparent process with respect to its efforts to achieve a consensus on the new structure and functions of the new Corporation.

 

ICANN Proposal

We are cognizant of the very real time limits within which the transition process must begin. We do not take this process lightly and believe that Jon Postel aptly characterized the importance of this endeavor, which is to create an international private sector-governed infrastructure for a critical, global resource. ICC supports the IANA bylaws, and continued processes outlined in the bylaws, as the only path forward which has been the result of an open and transparent process and which has, or has the potential of garnering, the support of a large cross-section of the Internet Community.

In his enclosure note to Secretary Daley, Jon Postel described the IANA process as one of compromise and consensus building to which all parties contributed, but in which none were totally satisfied at the end. ICC concurs in this conclusion, but believes that the process provided a fair hearing to all views and was gratified that a number of its concerns were addressed. There are a few important issues remaining that we believe need to be addressed or further clarified, and which we hope the Initial Board will resolve. We believe, however, that the bylaws, as they stand, do represent both the broad consensus of the Internet Community, as well as the best consensus which could be achieved within the time allotted.

In terms of the on-going process, ICC has taken note of concerns raised by various stakeholders regarding the breadth of international representation and the need for demonstrable experience with trademark issues among Initial Board nominees. A number of ICC members share in these and other concerns with the Board nomination process. ICC would like to stress to the Initial Board the need for continued open, inclusive and transparent processes in creating the implementation mechanism and nomination process for the Domain Name Supporting Organization to maximize stakeholder participation and endorsement.

 

The Other Proposals

While each of the other proposals raises some topics of concern which may be appropriate for the Initial Board to review, none can claim the broad level of participation and consensus achieved in the development of the ICANN by-laws. These proposals coupled with the comments received during the review period will provide the Initial Board members with a complete overview of existing concerns, which should help inform their decisions.

ICC intends the above comments to be a constructive contribution towards the smooth transfer of domain names administration to the private sector, and looks forward to continuing to present the perspective of the international business community in subsequent steps of the process.

13 October 1998

International Chamber of Commerce

The world business organization

Policy statement

Principles for an electronic commerce-friendly domain name system

Policy Statement prepared by the ICC Domain Names Taskforce

 

The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is the world business organization. It is the only representative body that speaks with authority on behalf of enterprises from all sectors in every part of the world. Founded in 1919, it represents today thousands of member companies and associations, both large and small, from over 130 countries. The ICC's purpose is to promote international trade, investment and the market economy. It is actively involved in formulating private sector rules and guidelines for electronic commerce, and operates the foremost international arbitration service for dealing with commercial disputes.

The ICC has a respected history of developing global, self-regulatory policies, guidelines and practices and a solid track-record of successfully introducing and promoting self-regulatory schemes. The ICC has been actively involved in developing global initiatives to facilitate electronic commerce and has set up a special broad-based Electronic Commerce Project (ECP) to define appropriate rules, in which over 500 companies world-wide are participating. Recent ECP and associated initiatives have included: GUIDEC, privacy model contracts and guidelines, Revised Online Advertising Guidelines, framework of rules for dematerialized trade, model electronic sales contract, E-terms1. The ICC International Court of Arbitration has extensive experience in developing and implementing alternative dispute resolution procedures and is currently studying its application in the field of electronic commerce.

 

The Internet

The phenomenal growth of the Internet as an electronic information medium is well documented. It is clear that this growth is increasingly being driven by mainstream businesses establishing an on-line presence and by ordinary consumers who want to take advantage of the increasing range of services and sources of information available. Datamonitor, the commercial research business, has recently estimated that in Europe alone, on-line retail sales will grow from just over $100m a year in 1997 to over $4.5 billion in 2002. Price Waterhouse has also suggested that worldwide e-trade over the Internet could reach over $400 billion in the same year2. In this environment, it is business which will provide the investment necessary to develop the underlying global information infrastructure and the global information services for the future. It is also businesses who are likely to be the principal users of domain names as they seek to create an Internet identity and on-line brand recognition.

 

 

1 Further details of these initiatives are available at www.iccwbo.org

2 Information from the Financial Times Guide - net.gain, June 1998

International Chamber of Commerce

38, Cours Albert 1er, 75008 Paris, France

Telephone +33 1 49 53 28 28 Fax +33 1 49 53 29 42

Web site E-mail icc@iccwbo.org

Domain Name Administration

The future of Internet domain name administration has been the subject of considerable debate over the last two years. The ICC previously issued a "Statement on trademarks and the Internet"3, in which it made a number of suggestions for features required for the domain name system to meet business needs. The ICC has also been represented at the various WIPO hearings on proposed changes to the domain name system and draft dispute resolution policies.

The US Administration, which has historically been indirectly responsible for overseeing DNS administration, has undertaken extensive consultation and issued requests for comment, including a "Green Paper", entitled "Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses"4 on proposals for changes to DNS administration. The need for changes to the current system has been driven by: a) dissatisfaction about the absence of competition in domain name registration; b) concern over conflicts between trademark holders and domain name holders; c) demands for a more formal and robust management structure; and d) demand for greater international participation in Internet administration to reflect the increasing proportion of internet stakeholders residing outside of the US.

The US administration has now concluded its consultations with the publication of a
so-called "White Paper" entitled "Management of Internet Names and Addresses" (Docket No: 9802120368146-02 dated 5 June, 1998) -which sets out its own final recommendations
5. The White Paper calls for the creation of a new private-sector, not-for-profit corporation to assume the responsibilities of the existing IANA as a self-regulatory, governing body to set policies for administration of the domain name system.

 

ICC Response

The ICC welcomes the publication of the White Paper and supports the Policy Statement that the domain name system should be administered by a not-for-profit corporation (now frequently referred to as "the new IANA") formed by private-sector Internet stakeholders. The ICC endorses the principles of stability, competition, private-sector coordination and international user representation. However, the White Paper leaves open the key issues of who should have responsibility for the creation of the proposed new corporation and how members of its Interim Board are to be selected. The Interim Board will have responsibility for taking fundamental policy decisions on contentious issues of domain name administration which will have profound consequences for business use of the internet. The ICC believes that it is essential for business interests to be appropriately and sufficiently represented at every stage - in the incorporation process, on the Interim Board and on the subsequently elected Board.

The administration of the domain name system (DNS) is itself an essential element in the broader context of Internet governance as a whole. The ICC's focus is obviously not limited to consideration of the DNS issues in isolation. As a truly international and cross-sectoral business organization representing commercial parties with an interest in the Internet, including business users generally, carriers and service providers as well as major trade mark owners, the ICC offers a much wider commercial perspective and is well-qualified to represent the business constituency at every stage on all issues of governance.

3 ICC Document 4501843 dated 15 May 1997

4 http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm

5 http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6-5-98dns.htm

- 2 -

- 2 -

 

 

 

To facilitate comprehensive stakeholder input into the process of formation of the new IANA, the ICC itself has supported and is represented in the ad hoc group of professional, trade and educational associations called the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP) - which has organised regional meetings in the US, Europe and the Far East specifically to provide stakeholders with an opportunity to discuss the key issues involved in transition of the DNS administration into the private sector.

In order for the Internet to become an effective and successful medium for electronic commerce, the domain name system must facilitate and increase business and consumer confidence in Internet transactions. It therefore has to be structured and administered to meet consumer and business needs.

The ICC accordingly supports those recommendations in the White Paper which are directed to that end. More specifically, the international business community believes the following principles should particularly apply:

 

Principles for an electronic commerce-friendly domain name system

1. The domain name system must have operational stability, integrity and security and be supported by a predictable legal environment (i.e. there must be confidence about how different stakeholder interests are secured.)

2. Business interests from the various regions of the world should have a sufficient voice in any entity administering the domain name system - and specifically at all stages in the incorporation and operation of the "new corporation" proposed in the White Paper-commensurate with the reality that it is business which will increasingly be the primary source of future investment in the Internet and which will comprise the most significant market for domain names6.

3. New gTLDs should be created where necessary to improve the functionality and utility of the DNS for businesses and consumers as a whole, rather than just to increase business opportunities for new registries themselves; new gTLDs should be adequately scalable to meet future demands; must facilitate fair competition and limit the potential for conflicts; must not jeopardize system stability; and should be phased in to allow time to review the benefits/effects of their introduction.

4. Brand names and trading styles must be protected, in particular, to reduce the scope for fraud and misrepresentation and the risk of confusion of the public. Consumers must have confidence in electronic transactions through a secure infrastructure and the ability to rely on established brand identities, trade marks, trade names and corporate reputations as guideposts of trust and reliability. Developing this level of consumer trust in transactions will spur electronic commerce and enable new markets to be opened with competition from new entrants by developing a critical mass of e-consumers. The importance of brand recognition for consumers and commercial operators must therefore be taken into account in the structure and operation of the domain name system7. Specifically:

 

6 see the White Paper proposals for Structure of the new corporation.

7 see the White Paper Revised Policy Statement on Trademark Issues.

 

- 3 -

-

 

 

 

· policies for the addition and operation of any new gTLDs must recognize business and consumer concerns regarding trade marks and trade names;

· within the constraints of technology, the domain name system should enable entities wanting a presence on the Internet to have a domain name by which the public can easily identify them;

· there should be sufficient flexibility to allow different legitimate claimants to the same trade mark, trade name or sign to exploit this as a domain name, while ensuring adequate means to differentiate between them ;

· registration policies should prohibit cybersquatting, warehousing, piracy and any such misappropriation of trade marks or trade names in domain names;

· "famous" trade marks should be accorded effective protection;

· the system should allow persons or entitles with intellectual property rights, trade marks, trade name or other distinctive signs, to intervene as early as possible to protect their interests; and

· appropriate jurisdictional options for trademark owners must be preserved; in particular, jurisdictional choices should not be restricted to the advantage or disadvantage of the businesses of one country relative to those of any other country.

5. As the Internet is an intrinsically global system of communication, there must be globally representative participation in the formulation of policy concerning the DNS, as well as in technical, operational and administrative functions, so that no one country has de facto control over those functions.

6. There must be international coherence between the different systems of allocation of domain names in different registries (for both generic top level domains (gTLDs) and country code-top level domains (ccTLDs)). Consistent procedures must be implemented by all registries and registrars, including baseline requirements for trade mark dispute resolution procedures and requirements for accurate and complete information in domain name applications8.

7. An internationally coherent and effective legal framework should be established to address problems arising out of the use of trade marks, trade names and other distinctive signs on the Internet, and potential conflicts with domain names. More specifically, the following issues should be addressed at an international level in a forum such as WIP09:

· jurisdictional conflicts between the territorial nature of trademark law and the international scope of the Internet;

· the protection of famous marks on the Internet;

· the effects of new gTLDs on trademark holders;

· the international prevention of cybersquatting, warehousing and hoarding of trademarks as domain names; and in the longer term, appropriate further international harmonization of trademark laws.

 

8 see the White Paper Revised Policy Statement on Trademark Issues.

9 See the White Paper proposals for THE TRANSITION

- 4 -

-

 

 

 

8. Effective and timely dispute resolution mechanisms are essential. Dispute resolution policies for all registries should be consistent and there should be a choice of fora for dispute settlement. The ICC Court of Arbitration could provide an alternative dispute resolution forum.

9. The White Paper recommendation that more effective use be made of the US country code domain should be extended to country code domains (ccTLDs) generally. Differences in allocation rules; failure to structure the domains to reflect the realities of the business environment and to facilitate general business use; anti-competitive and abusive monopoly practices; and other inefficiencies, which are exhibited to a greater or lesser degree by many country code administrations, mean that the ccTLDs are not being utilised as efficiently or effectively as they could. Internationally consistent, market-oriented organisation and operation of ccTLDs could reduce the pressure on gTLDs and reduce the potential for undesirable conflicts over domain names.

10. Initiatives to develop search systems allowing users to locate sites without relying primarily on domain names could help relieve pressure on the domain name system and reduce the potential for conflicts with trademarks and should therefore be encouraged.

The ICC looks forward to providing further input from the international business community on the future development of the domain name system.

 

 

Document n° 450/876

28 July 1998

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- 5 -

International Chamber of Commerce

The world business organization

 

Annex 2(to ICC response to NTIA posting of proposals)

ICC concerns with respect to the IANA bylaws (fifth iteration)

 

Board & SO Nominees: ICC remains concerned with the need for an effective business and commercial user representation which is commensurate with both the level of business investment in, and use of, the Internet and the Domain Name System. This concern applies to both methods of constituting and actual representation on the Initial and Permanent Boards as well as the Supporting Organizations, in particular, the Domain Name Supporting Organization. In keeping with ICC's engagement and participation in this process, we have put forward the names of highly qualified, well-respected business representatives who represent the broad scope of the business and commercial community.

Supporting Organizations: ICC continues to have concerns related to both the allocations of responsibility and authority between the Corporation and the SOs and the composition of the SOs. We believe that the allocation and composition issues are completely interrelated. Board members will be chosen based on trusted reputations and broad experience and will be charged to represent the interests of the Corporation over those of any stakeholder or constituency. SO members are chosen on the basis of their technical experience and represent a subset of interested stakeholders with no mandate to represent the Corporation’s broader constituency. The current allocation of responsibility between SOs and Board still places virtually all of the policy making/initiating power within the SOs. The composition of the SOs and the need for SOs to effectively and appropriately represent the interests of all legitimate, interested stakeholders is thus of paramount importance.

Clarifications of the minimum criteria and process for the creation of SOs have helped somewhat, but remain too ill defined for such an important process, in light of the current allocation of responsibility between the Board and SOs. We are also unclear as to the procedure by which SOs, that have not been formed, can themselves determine how they are to be composed (Article VI, Sec 3(a) (i, ii, iii)). We believe that further clarification of the process and assurance of appropriate representation of all legitimate, interested stakeholders is required.

While the role of the Board has been expanded to include mediation and some limited initiation of policy, we believe that a more clearly defined and influential role for the Board is appropriate. We are in complete agreement that the Board should consult and rely heavily on the expertise of the SOs. We also agree that the SOs should be able to propose policy and should be the engines behind most of the policy initiatives. We do not, however, believe that it is appropriate or beneficial to so severely limit the ability of the Board to initiate or prioritize policy. The SOs must ultimately be responsible to the Board, as Board Members are the only ones accountable to the broad constituency of the Internet.

 

Majority Vote: We believe that increasing the voting requirements of the Initial Board to a 2/3 majority of all the Board members is a positive step that will assist in assuring consensus decisions. We maintain our view, however, that various substantial decisions (especially related to amending the bylaws or changing the structure/allocation of board seats and Supporting Organizations) should require at least 3/4 majorities. At present, only the removal of a Director requires such a vote. Higher voting requirements for certain substantive decisions may also be appropriate for the Permanent Board. Requiring a 3/4 supermajority on critical issues further assures that the process is based on consensus and limits the ability of any stakeholder group(s) to co-opt the process.

Funding: We appreciate the clarification of the pre-eminence of the Board in setting fees, but still believe that, apart from an advisory role in setting the fees and charges, the Supporting Organizations should not act as the "primary source" of funding. We have concerns that reliance on subsidies from any source could prejudice the independence of the Corporation in the long-term. We therefore recommend that this section should be modified to provide for direct funding to the Corporation through a levy on fees payable by users of domain names and IP addresses, to avoid any continued need for subsidies after the initial start-up period.

###

From: Don Heath <heath@isoc.org>

To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)

Date: 10/13/98 5:37pm

Subject: Management of Internet Names and Addresses

Attached is an ASCII version of the Internet Society's comments in regards

to proposals submitted for the Management of Internet Names and Addresses

per <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/efiling-dns.htm>.

Donald M. Heath

President/CEO

Internet Society

October 13, 1998

Honorable William M. Daley

Secretary of Commerce

c/o Karen Rose

Office of International Affairs

Room 471

National Telecommunications and

Information Administration

United States Department of Commerce

14th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20230

Re: Management of Internet Names and Addresses

Dear Secretary Daley:

With regard to proposals submitted in response to the US government White Paper calling for the formation of a new corporation to manage and administer Internet addresses and domain names, the Internet Society is pleased to submit these comments.

The Internet Society strongly endorses the "Proposal for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)" as the basis of the new corporation proposed in U.S. government White Paper "Management of Internet Names and Addresses."

We do, however, recommend that the modifications outlined below be incorporated into the ICANN proposal, to further strengthen it.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

The At Large members of the initial board, as identified in the ICANN submission, reflect an unbiased diverse group of individuals who were not involved in the sometimes very partisan discussion that led up to the submission of proposals. They, therefore, bring less "baggage" into the important and complex responsibility for getting this new organization up and running - quickly and effectively while ensuring stability. The Internet Society supports the appointment of the individuals proposed by ICANN for the initial At Large board seats.

INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION

One important requirement of the process that will be developed to select the At Large Directors to follow the initial board is one of fair representation of all of the international stakeholders. We note that the initial set of At Large Directors do not include representation from Africa and Latin America and feel that any selection process must take into account these two emerging areas, whose importance will only continue to increase.

SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS

The Internet Society notes that at least one proposal has implied that the Supporting Organizations as defined in the ICANN proposal should not have the power to elect board members. We would object strenuously to the elimination of any policy authority by the support organizations through the curbing of their ability to have board representation. These organizations, by their very makeup, represent the institutions that are charged with the daily running and administration of the Internet. It is imperative that they be appropriately represented on the board. To do otherwise would potentially place decisions on policy into the hands of those without the detailed knowledge required for making sound decisions. The Internet Society believes that those charged with the operational integrity and stability of the Internet on a day-to-day basis must have a voice in policy decisions.

At the same time, to maximize operational efficiencies and effectiveness, Supporting Organizations should not have control over the ICANN budget, as the Proposal of the Open Root Server Confederation seems to suggest, other than through representation on the board.

We also disagree with the suggestion in the Boston Working Group and Open Root Server Confederation proposals to eliminate the board seats set aside for the Supporting Organizations. Many of the issues that this organization will face have, at their base, technical issues that must be fully understood. Board seats for the Supporting Organizations will help ensure that reasonable technical input will be brought into the discussions.

OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY

The ICANN bylaws should mandate that all board meetings are held in an open forum. The exception would be when an item to be discussed is likely to result in the disclosure of financial, personal, or other sensitive information that may prejudice ICANN contractual negotiations. It should be at the discretion of the Board to declare the session closed to participants other than Board members.

The ICANN bylaws should be changed so that summaries of all payments made to Directors must be published at least once annually, to ensure that compensation abuses (in the form of expense payments) do not occur. The ICANN bylaws already prevent payments other than expense reimbursements from being made to Directors.

The ICANN bylaws require the annual publishing of a budget and of audited financial statements. We believe this to be fair and reasonable, balancing the need for openness with the need to have functional management control. While the board must operate in a transparent mode, prudence dictates that this not be confused with an "open stadium" environment where factions and crowd noise will take the place of reasonable business deliberations. An example of this is with regard to financial planning.

We believe the ICANN proposal with these small but important changes will produce a result that meets the needs and desires of the largest possible set of Internet stakeholders while ensuring the ongoing stability of the Internet.

Sincerely,

Donald M. Heath

President/CEO

Internet Society

###

From: Ellen Rony <erony@marin.k12.ca.us>

To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)

Date: 10/13/98 11:43pm

Subject: Full Text Comparison of Bylaws Proposals for a New Internet Corporation

October 13, 1998

To facilitate your discussion regarding the proposals for a new corporation

to administer Internet numbers and names, I have prepared a full text,

side-by-side comparison of the three bylaws drafts you have received:

* Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

* Boston Working Group

* Open Root Server Confederation

The comparison is posted at http://www.domainhandbook.com/comp-bylaws.html.

I have attached the html file stripped of the website-related links.

The comparison is color-coded and word-for word. It uses the ICANN proposal

submitted by IANA as the baseline. Additions by the Boston Working Group

(BWG) are coded in blue. BWG used ICANN Iteration 4 as a framework.

Additions by the Open Root Server Confederation (ORSC) are coded in red.

ORSC used the BWG proposal as a framework. Deletions by either BWG or ORSC

are noted by strikethroughs.

This is an independent, unbiased, pro bono effort on my part to enable you

to focus quickly on the differences among the three proposals. The same

process is underway for the proposed Articles of Incorporation. The

comparison page is large, so please be patient if it takes some time to

load. I promise you, it will be worth the wait.

Respectfully submitted,

Ellen Rony

_______________________________________________________________________

Ellen Rony //

Co-author: The Domain Name Handbook *=" ____ /

http://www.domainhandbook.com \ )

erony@marin.k12.ca.us || ||

+1 (415) 435-5010

This message has also been sent to:

The Honorable Charles W. "Chip" Pickering, Acting Chairman

The Honorable Gil Gutknecht

The Honorable Jim Barcia

The Honorable Thomas Davis

The Honorable Connie Morella

The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner

The Honorable Jim Wilson

The Honorable George Brown

Mike Harrington

Richard Russel

United States House of Representatives.

Washington, D.C.

cc: Ira Magaziner

Beckwith Burr

Karen Rose

Jon Postel

Gabe Battista

Karl Auerbach

Eric Weisberg

Einar Stefferud

Jonathan Zittrain

###

From: Dan Steinberg <dstein@travel-net.com>
Date: October 13, 1998
Subject: Comments

Honorable William M. Daley
Secretary of Commerce
c/o Karen Rose
Office of International Affairs
Room 471
National Telecommunications and
Information Administration
United States Department of Commerce
14th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230

Subject: Management of Internet Names and Addresses - Comments

Dear Secretary Daley:

I am writing to express my comments on the several drafts which have been submitted in response to the White Paper process.

Background:

I am submitting these comments in an individual capacity. I make these comments despite having participated to a great extent in the preparation of the Open Root Server Inc. proposal and consulting to a limited extent with the BWG group. I have been involved with discussions on DNS issues since 1995. In general I am involved in issues of convergence between technology and law. The interface is constantly changing and currently includes Year 2000 legal/technical issues, domain name/trademark conflict and data warehouse issues. I am counsel to a number of organizations on Year 2000 legal issues and speaks on this topic to both public and private sector audiences. Recently I was asked to testify before Congress on Year 2000 International/Legal issues. In addition, I am active as a legal educator, providing MCLE-approved courses on Internet Legal Resources and upcoming workshops on Year 2000 legal issues. I formed SYNTHESIS: Law & Technology as a loose association of global multidisciplinary talent.

INVOLVEMENT WITH THE IFWP PROCESS:

I participated at many of the IFWP meetings and was a member of the IFWP Steering Committee. I was also the IFWP SC liaison with the Berkman Center during the planning of the now-cancelled wrap-up meetings.

PROPOSAL

At this juncture I am not confident that any of the proposals on the table can gain sufficient buy-in from the various stakeholders. Before the negotiations between IANA and NSI which resulted in draft IV, I formulated an alternative proposal. The proposal was based on the separation of powers between a policy organization and a technical/managment organization. It was developed based on a separation of ideologies that I perceived at the time, which can be roughly translated as "the ssuits vs. the geeks". My proposal for an alternate organizational structure can be found at:

http://www.vrx.net/dstein/

Should there be no way to merge the existing proposals into a workable compromise, I respectfully submit that the structures described herein would be a suitable starting point. I did not submit this proposal for formal consideration along the existing ones because I felt it would cloud the issues unnecessarily. If something useful can be created from among the existing proposals, all the better. This proposal should only be considered if nothing else works.

PROCESS TO RESOLUTION:

There have been many calls for a wrap-up conference to discuss the relevant issues and I echo these calls. What is required right now is for parties to make concessions. Parties will make concessions only if they explicity understand that others are making concurrent concessions. This is an explicit statement of the common negotiating process. What is not immediately obvious is that this process cannot take place on-line, much as it would save time and money. An online negotiation is doomed to failure. Online negotiations necessarily take place serially, with people commenting on a particular thread. This is simply not condusive to effecting compromises.

ONGOING PROCESS

It is unrealistic to expect any any new structure to spring to life fully-formed and fully functional. The new entity (or entities) must have a flexible amending formula, as it is highly possible that changes to the bylaws/structures will become necessary.

It is also unrealistic to expect that the new entity will exist without any complaints. The US government has committed to providing oversight for the initial period. I respectfully submit that a separate organization should be formed to administer complaints received by the US government. This will serve to insulate NTIA from the expected barrage of complaints. The separate organization would not have any power to resolve issues, but merely act as a gatekeeper to filter out issues that cannot be resolved at this level.

Respectfully submitted,

Dan Steinberg
MBA, LLB, BSc.

President
SYNTHESIS:Law & Technology
35, du Ravin
Box 532, RR1 phone: (613) 794-5356
Chelsea, Quebec fax: (819) 827-4398
J0X 1N0 e-mail:dstein@travel-net.com

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