X. The government should act expeditiously to restructure the management and operation of the ".us" domain.

Bell Atlantic Corporation welcomes the opportunity to submit comments about the Commerce Department’s draft proposal, Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses (referred to herein as the "Green Paper"). Bell Atlantic is a leading international telecommunications company, providing products and services that support the Global Information Infrastructure. It is one of the largest international telecommunications companies in the world, with a large and extremely valuable trademark portfolio, consisting of nearly 1000 trademarks for a wide variety of goods and services. As such, it has a significant stake in the growth and development of the Internet.

Bell Atlantic, therefore, applauds the United States Government for taking this major first step toward creation of a strong, private sector based, permanent structure for Internet governance. While it has serious concerns about the impact of certain of the proposal’s provisions on trademark rights and, in this regard, specifically commends to the Department the many constructive comments of the Private Sector Working Group, generally the Company supports the proposal’s conceptual framework. It believes that with appropriate changes, set out in our comments, the proposal can serve as a blueprint for the privatization and continued growth of the Internet.

Before commenting specifically on the domain name system management proposal itself, it is useful and important to address the question of the authority of the United States Government with regard to that system. Some undoubtedly will assert that the United States Government, in putting forward this proposal for transforming the Internet’s technical management, is demonstrating insensitivity, or even arrogance, vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Their argument, in essence, is that the Internet is an international communications medium and, as such, should not be subject to the domestic processes of the United States. This argument, although facially compelling, ignores the historical record and misinterprets the purpose and goal of the Green Paper proposal.

The Internet originated in 1969 as a United States-based research and experimental entity. For many years this experiment was funded entirely by, and operated under the auspices of, the United States Government, and specifically, of the United States Department of Defense. Over the last thirty years, the United States Government has permitted international interconnection and has facilitated international coordination that has allowed its experiment to metamorphose into a global communications medium. At various points, as it has done so, the United States Government, periodically, clearly, deliberately and voluntarily has revised and elected to relinquish its involvement with various aspects of its creation.

The United States Government, however, has never relinquished its responsibility for certain other custodial aspects of Internet management. As identified in the Green Paper, the "major components of the domain name system . . . still performed by or subject to agreements with agencies of the U. S. government" include:

• Assignment of numerical addresses to Internet users;

• Management of the system of registering names for Internet users;

• Operation of the root server system; and

• Protocol assignment.

Bell Atlantic concurs with the Green Paper’s assessment of the Government’s residual responsibilities and authority with regard to the Internet. The United States Government has consistently retained its supervisory authority over management and administration of the Internet’s name and address function. It has exercised that authority through the instrumentality of the IANA, which operates under written delegation of authority from the Government, and which is supported in those operations through government funding Accordingly, the United States Government possesses the legal authority to define the terms and conditions under which it elects to relinquish this authority.

Some efforts, notably the efforts of the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC), have sought to interpose alternative structures and processes for handling Internet address assignments. Among the critical difficulties with such efforts, however, is the fact that they lack both the legitimate authority and the objectivity required. By contrast, in the Green Paper, the United States Government, where supervisory authority does reside, proposes an orderly, transparent devolution of its authority to a new, permanent, accountable international institution based in the private sector.

Privatization of the Internet is both inevitable and desirable, and the Government’s support for this concept is clearly a move in the right direction. The argument that people from many nations have played, and increasingly will play, essential roles in the growth and development of the Internet is undeniably true. But that said, one cannot gainsay or minimize the special stewardship function played by the United States Government. Therefore, the underlying premise of the Green Paper is undoubtedly correct: the United States Government does bear a special responsibility to ensure that stable, permanent and accountable, international structures are put into place to take up the stewardship functions it now proposes to exit.

The United States Government proposal is grounded upon four principles. Summarily stated, they are:

• Stability -- United States Government seeks to "end its role in the Internet number and name address systems in a responsible manner" without disrupting current Internet operations or fragmenting future operations.

• Competition -- Technical management of the Internet should be driven by competition wherever possible. "Consumer choice" should be facilitated by any structures created.

• Private, Bottom Up Coordination – Any new structure should ensure that future coordination and management decisionmaking is in "responsible, private-sector" hands that can move rapidly and flexibly to meet needs.

• Representation -- Technical management of the Internet should reflect the diversity of its users and their needs. Mechanisms should be established to ensure international input in decision making.

Bell Atlantic believes the Green Paper omits a fifth and equally crucial principle: adequate protections for intellectual property rights -- and in particular for property interests in trademarks. The full potential of the Internet to provide a framework for global commerce realized only if businesses can develop trademark property interests, and if consumers, who make decisions premised upon the recognition of trademarks, can do so free from the confusion and fraud that ensues in the wake of trademark infringement.

With regard to the other principles, it is appropriate that maintaining the stability of the Internet be listed first. However, the stability principle is inextricably linked with the other three principles of representation, coordination and competition. Thus, as the United States Government seeks to exit its role, it is critical that it hand off its stewardship functions, in an orderly manner, to a genuinely representative entity. Only through the creation of such a genuinely representative body, and through some formal transitioning process, can legitimacy be conferred. The legitimacy created by such a body, can foster and provide support for stability which, in turn, can help ensure needed coordination, fair competition, and protection of intellectual property interests.

The Green Paper also suggests that the name and number functions should be grouped according to whether they are best accomplished on a "coordinated" basis, and/or whether they should be left to a "competitive system." While not disagreeing with this "competitive/coordinated" dichotomy as a useful analytical tool for simplifying analysis and discussion of these complex issues, it is our view that "coordinated" must not become a code word for "regulated." Critical to the success of the Internet thus far has been the relatively intrusive fashion in which the United States Government has handled its stewardship functions – a fortuitous legacy of the Internet’s origins as a research-oriented project. But the recent and rapid transformation of the Internet into a medium of global commerce has served to demonstrate the peculiar virtues of the "unregulated, but coordinated" approach with regard to stimulating innovation in a non-research, commercially oriented Internet. The Green Paper seems to be clear on this point, stating that "responsible private-sector action is preferable to government control." This principle, in particular, should be preserved, irrespective of any other changes made to the Green Paper.

The Green Paper proposes the creation of a not-for-profit corporation (NPC) to manage the coordinated functions of the Internet. The new entity would set policy for, and direct the allocation of number blocks to, regional number registries for the assignment of Internet addresses; oversee the operation of an authoritative root server system; oversee policy for determining, based on objective criteria clearly established in the new organization’s charter, the circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the root system; and coordinate the development of other technical protocol parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet. This private oversight body would, in essence, subsume responsibility for the various stewardship functions now the responsibility of (and performed largely by delegation, and with significant and admirable forbearance from direct interference) by the United States Government.

Given the recently emerged commercial character of the Internet, however, a new governmental entity, whether national or international, is not most appropriate for this function. Apart from concerns about parochial interests and political pressures to which a governmental entity would always be subject (or of which it would at least be suspect), governmental entities tend to be, in general, less agile and responsive to the needs of the commercial sector than is desirable. Given this reality, reliance upon a private sector-based governance model is clearly appropriate.

The Green Paper proposes to place responsibility for domain name system policy with the new NPC. This is crucially important. As has become abundantly apparent, a once innocuous, almost quasi-ministerial function in regard to the running of the Internet -- assignment of second level domains (SLDs) -- has become a matter of immense commercial importance. Moreover, policies and problems with regard to Internet domain names and trademarks present an object lesson in why it is important to place the important policy questions in the hands of individuals with commercial rather than technical backgrounds.

Most of the functions over which the NPC would gain control are now within the purview of the IANA. The IANA has played a crucial and constructive technical role in the creation and management of the worldwide Internet. Much of the success of the Internet can be attributed to decisions made by IANA, in concert with the wider Internet community, through its Request for Comment process. It is important to retain and to build upon the legacy of innovation represented by these institutions and processes as the Internet enters a new phase of its existence. Nonetheless, it is also clear that the current process needs to change.

In some circumstances, the "rough consensus" approach that heretofore has characterized IANA policies may continue to be sufficient for some situations presented in the new, commercially-oriented Internet. Such an approach will be significantly lacking in others, however. Without the imprimatur of the United States Government behind it, it will become increasingly important for the IANA to have some accountable entity formally vested with legitimate, representative oversight responsibility to reinforce its authority. This is what the United States Government proposes in the Green Paper to vest in the NPC. Bell Atlantic believes this is a step that is crucial for the continued development and reliability of the Internet.

Thus, Bell Atlantic supports the concept underlying this proposal. In the absence of the United States Government, there is no existing private entity legally competent and appropriately representative to perform this function. Accordingly, some representative, competent authority has to be created. Otherwise, with the departure of the United States Government role in coordinating the technical management of Internet domain names and addresses, and with the inevitably conflicting interests of private sector companies, there is a clear risk of fragmentation of the Internet.

It is appropriate that the creation of an NPC be viewed as a "transitional" step. The nature and the character of the NPC should have the flexibility to change over time, as the needs with regard to oversight of Internet policy change. Given the important and historical function that the United States Government has played with regard to Internet policy and the importance of the functions it proposes to turn over to this new organization, it is entirely appropriate that, in setting up the transitional entity, the United States Government should have what might, under other circumstances, seem an inordinate measure of involvement in specifying the makeup and the character of the NPC.

The Green Paper proposes that the NPC be based in the United States, and that its Board consist of fifteen members from around the world, including one director from each of ARIN, APNIC and RIPE; two designated by the Internet Architecture Board; two members designated by a membership association (to be created) representing domain name registries and registrars; seven members designated by a membership association (to be created) representing commercial Internet users, with at least one seat designated for a non-commercial, not-for-profit representative; and the CEO of the NPC. Bell Atlantic supports this proposal. In proposing the makeup of the initial NPC board, the Green Paper proposal, consciously and laudably, seeks to establish a balance between commercial and non-commercial interests. In so doing, the Green Paper has clearly touched the right constituencies and brought them appropriately into the decisionmaking process. Ensuring the adequacy of the commercial voice in the establishment of policy is essential if the Internet is to fulfill its potential.

Although there is no single "right" formula for the makeup of such an entity, the Green Paper is to be commended for its deliberate effort to reach out beyond the prototypical "Internet" community to reflect its wider constituency of users that has developed in recent years. This is a significant, positive and important step toward creating the kind of representative, legitimate private sector authority capable of performing the coordination role needed for the Internet. Moreover, the makeup of this board can, and probably will, change as the transition process makes the need for such change apparent. As an initial effort, however, this represents a good first step.

Wise policy decisions will be crucial to the Internet’s growth and success as a medium for commerce. Indeed, in its initial years, addressing the issues arising from the intersection of domain name policy and trademark protection requirements is likely to be a critical function for the NPC Board. Policy decisions such as these, rightly, belong not in the hands of any single interested user of the Internet, nor in the hands of the IANA itself, whose responsibility it must be to execute policy decisions. Rather, it should be entrusted to the NPC board, as is contemplated by the Green Paper. Only by vesting that entity with plenary policy and oversight authority can the Internet continue to be the robust, non-fragmented communications medium that it is today.

The NPC should ultimately have responsibility for the control of the Internet "A" root server, as well as for oversight of policy with regard to the root server system generally. Given the critical function that it plays with regard to the operation of the Internet, it is appropriate that during the transition period envisioned by the Green Paper the root server remain located within the United States. Worldwide interconnectivity, and avoidance of fragmentation are critically dependent upon the responsible management of these databases which are, in some sense, impressed with an international public trust. Only through formal, accountable, responsible oversight can the dependability of the root server, so increasingly vital to international commerce, be assured.

While the proposal to require competition and sharing of gTLDs addresses a genuinely important issue on the road to privatization of and competition within the domain name system, the proposal to create almost immediately up to five new gTLDs "during the transition to private management of the [domain name system]" is fundamentally flawed and ought to be reconsidered:

• First, it would be a mistake to assume that purported "widespread dissatisfaction" about the absence of competition in gTLDs presupposes a need to introduce new gTLDs. Rather, the concern about competition in the domain name registration business can be, and is proposed to be, remedied by introducing competition in the ".com," ".net" and ".org" gTLDs.

• Second, although the cause of introducing new gTLDs has led to considerable "stirring of the waters," there is, in reality, little hard evidence of a need for this innovation. The fact is that concern about a need for new gTLDs is most prevalent among a limited group of companies and individuals with vested economic interests in their creation, largely as a way to compete with NSI in the business of registering second level domains.

• Third, although the creation of new gTLDs would undoubtedly create opportunities to register SLD names identical to ones already registered within existing gTLDs, this "innovation" is not cost-free to the Internet itself, which would require substantial re-engineering to handle the new gTLDs alongside those already in existence.

• Fourth, what new gTLDs really create most effectively are vastly increased opportunities for "cyber mischief" with regard to trademarks.

The Green Paper asserts an intention to "provide trademark holders with the same rights they have in the physical world, to ensure transparency, to guarantee a dispute resolution mechanism with resort to a court systems . . .." Yet, at the same time, the paper incorrectly asserts that there are few trademark problems arising from the registration of domain names today. A quick survey into the legal departments of most major corporations will quickly prove otherwise. The trademark infringement problem has quickly grown out of control; most famous trademark holders are barely able to contain the growing infringement matters arising from domain name registrations in ".com," ".gov," and ".org" alone. It is clear, that the Green Paper proposal, with its proposal to increase considerably the number of new gTLDs, needs much more work to enable trademark holders to protect those rights effectively. Although it would require that registrars take some affirmative steps to assist the holders of trademarks in protecting their interests, including requiring registrants to provide name and specific contact information and, perhaps, certification of no knowledge of trademark conflicts, as a practical matter the proposal, as currently structured, does not provide the proper level of detail for the resolution of such conflicts.

Given the dramatic growth of substantial international electronic commerce, it is critical, from the perspective of holders of globally famous trademarks, to provide some formal, rational, accountable process for deciding when a new top level domain (with its attendant trademark implications) will be added. Such governance decisions, moreover, must be made through processes that are open and transparent, and into which affected parties can have genuine and effective input. It is exactly this sort of process that the proposal to create an NPC, with a Board to supervise domain name administration and management, would create. Yet the proposal then "trumps" this salutary idea by proposing, as a "transition" measure, a dramatic reshaping of the existing domain name system by almost trebling the number of generally used gTLDs. Rather than effect such a sweeping change during a period of transition, it would be preferable to preserve the status quo until after the NPC Board has been established; alternatively, it would be far better to introduce only one or two gTLDs in a go-slow, experimental period. This would allow to the private sector board the option to make major changes in the existing system after it has had a chance to assess fully the costs and the benefits of such a change.

With the introduction of new gTLDs, there will inevitably be a veritable "land rush" of cybersquatters, infringers, "entrepreneurs," and others who will quickly rush to register famous marks belonging to third parties. A review of the records of companies who are accepting domain name applications for "preregistration" may well indicate how many names of famous trademarks are already paid for and reserved by third party infringers. For this reason, trademark holders should also be granted "first in line" status to register their trademarks in any newly created gTLDs. This proposal would allow trademark holders who have a federal registration for a famous mark (evidence could be established by court decision, years of use, surveys, investment in the mark and a prima facie case established by being a target of more than one instance of cybersquatting) the opportunity to be "first in line" to register that mark as a domain name in each of the new gTLDs.

Any decision to add new gTLDs should be accompanied by the creation of a registry of internationally famous trade marks and names -- names which would be precluded from use by other than the trademark holder. There should also be some process whereby there could be temporary suspension or waiting period prior to an SLD name registration, if an adversely affected trademark holder objects in a short period of time. If the dispute were to be resolved in favor of the trademark holder, the SLD would be automatically blocked from use within any gTLD, absent the express consent of the trademark holder in whose favor it had been resolved. In addition, there should be a mechanism to permit trademark holders to apply for a pro-active exclusion in any or all of the new gTLDs to prevent third parties from registering marks that are confusingly similar to or dilutive of famous brands. Such a procedure should have easy, simple rules and would go a long way toward preventing third parties from exploiting the new gTLDs by infringing well known marks.

Delay in the introduction of new gTLDs is also warranted because substantial further work needs to be done on the issue of minimum dispute resolution procedures for trademark infringement. The Green Paper says each registry would be subject to minimal procedures, but does not elaborate beyond some suggestions in the application itself. Bell Atlantic supports the many suggestions in the comments of the Private Sector Working Group (PSWG) in this proceeding on this issue. With respect to strengthening the application processes, requiring renewal procedures and eliminating "deadwood," Bell Atlantic notes the many constructive comments of the International Trademark Association (INTA), the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), and the United States Council for International Business. Registries should share not only "minimum policies," but a uniform dispute resolution policy. That policy must require the registry to take affirmative steps to protect famous marks and discourage infringement from the beginning of the process. For example, it would not be acceptable for a registry to say that its "minimum dispute resolution policy" was simply to refer the complaining party to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for dispute resolution. Such a "policy" is the same as having none at all; trademark holders would bear the significant costs of litigating each and every matter, including the most egregious cases of infringement, in WIPO and in courts throughout the world.

Registries, at a minimum, need a uniform and strongly worded application that deters infringement (See comments of PSWG, AIPLA and INTA in this proceeding). The application should require the applicant to state the intent and business purpose behind the registration of the new SLD. If the applicant took a name for infringing purposes and did not have the intent to use the name for a legitimate purpose, the registry, upon petition from the trademark holder, should remove the domain name. Yearly renewal procedures including this requirement, moreover, would weed out infringers and dead wood. Registries will also need processes to ensure cooperation with famous trademark holders who find their marks infringed by cybersquatters and other parties. For famous marks, other processes must also be put into place to allow the registry or registrar to remove infringing marks without resort in every instance by the trademark holder to litigation.

Bell Atlantic views the role of WIPO in resolving dispute resolution as one constructive model, but not the only model that should be available to trademark holders. Until trademark laws are harmonized, WIPO may have trouble serving as the sole intermediary in trademark disputes because it is not clear what law or standards it will apply. At a minimum, WIPO should offer a unitary dispute resolution policy to the public and should not sell different process to different parties. For example, its recent proposal to offer Administrative Challenge Panel procedures under the plan proposed by the Policy Oversight Committee of the Council of Registrars (POC/CORE), and another proposal to resolve disputes under a separate process for an Internet directory called Internet One, will result in duplicative fees and confusing application of its rules for trademark holders.

Registries should be required to indemnify the NPC for legal costs arising out of trademark disputes. In theory, this could provide a small incentive to registrars to establish credible trademark infringement avoidance procedures, and to conduct some measure of "due diligence" with regard to registration of SLDs. As a practical matter, however, more effective and direct requirements should be placed upon registries and registrars to ensure that, with regard to registrations of SLDs, the intellectual property rights of trademark holders are not infringed.

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, Bell Atlantic endorses the critical provision of the Green Paper that would have registrants agree to jurisdiction "where the registry is domiciled, where the registry database in [sic] maintained, or where the "A" root server is maintained.". One such option should be the place in with the "A" root server is located. Of course trademark holders throughout the world would also be free to sue the infringer where the registry is domiciled and where the database is maintained. Jurisdiction also should lie in countries where one could establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant. However, jurisdiction where the "A" root server lies is of critical importance to United States trademark holders, and must remain in the United States during the transition period and while trademark laws regarding the Internet are harmonized.

Finally, the Green Paper proposes that a study "be undertaken of the effects of adding new top level domains and related dispute resolution procedures on trademark and intellectual property right holders." This will be undertaken by a body internationally recognized in the area of dispute resolution procedures. Who undertakes the proposed study, and how it is done, will be critical to the success or failure of the proposal in the long run. Bell Atlantic supports the idea of the study and endorses the study as introduced in the Senate by Senator Leahy (S.1727). The study, done in cooperation with experts from the trademark community, would examine the extent of the collision between trademarks and domain names. The study would propose a set of recommendations or criteria that must be met and adhered to by the Board to resolve trademark concerns. At a minimum, no new gTLDs should be added until trademark issues are resolved. A longer term, but equally important goal, must be the harmonization of world trademark laws. Just as the copyright laws were recently harmonized through WIPO treaties to conform to the digital age, an expedited process must begin immediately to harmonize world trademark laws to apply to a world of global electronic commerce.

The most legitimate, compelling concern for the Internet is with ending the NSI monopoly on SLD registrations, particularly in the ".com" gTLD. Addressing this issue, however, does not require the creation of gTLDs. Moreover, even if there were a perceived dearth of "desirable" domain names (an assertion not supported by any evidence of tailing off of domain name registrations), creation of a single gTLD should suffice to address this problem, pending an opportunity by the NPC Board to study and address this issue, and pending efforts to harmonize trademark law regarding treatment of domain names.

In sum, the Green Paper ought not to mandate, or to invite, new gTLDs, but ought to leave that decision to the new NPC Board to handle, based on a go-slow, experimental model of Internet growth and guided by the findings in the trademark study. This issue, moreover, is critical, from the perspective of holders of globally famous trademarks, to provide some formal, rational, accountable process for deciding when a new top level domain (with its attendant trademark implications) will be added. Such governance decisions must be made through processes that are open and transparent, and into which affected parties can have genuine and effective input.

Creating new gTLDs presupposes the creation of multiple new registries. Moreover, each new registry will be limited to one new gTLD. But as experience has demonstrated, the vast bulk of any new registrations will come from entities and individuals seeking, by their domain name, to identify themselves as being engaged in commerce. As a result, registries with commercial appeal (for example, a registry with the hypothetical ".firm" domain) would probably have substantial business prospects, while one with a non-commercial gTLD (hypothetically ".arts," for example) would probably have demand too small to support a business. Thus, the likelihood is for multiple new commercially oriented registries being created while others would go begging due to lack of willingness to make the infrastructure investment required. This again demonstrates why creation of new gTLDs ought to be foregone until after the creation of the NPC and after completion of the proposed study of the domain name issue.

Moreover, the Green Paper proposes that the "first five entities . . . to meet the technical, managerial, and site requirements" be allowed to establish a domain name registry. Bell Atlantic has some serious reservations with regard to these proposals.

• The approach laid out in the Green Paper could potentially have the effect of creating a de facto monopoly on new domain names for the POC/CORE organization. POC/CORE has already launched a business proposal under which it would, as an entity, administer seven new gTLDs. This would not be possible, of course, under the proposal put forward in the Green paper, but nothing in the Green Paper, however, would seem to prevent the POC/CORE group from simply "cloning" itself into a number of affiliated entities, with shared resources, and then snapping up all of the new gTLDs.

• A model where each new registry is awarded its own exclusive gTLD will likely ensure that there will be an uncontrolled introduction of new gTLDs, lest a potential registry operator be denied -- irrespective of any need for such gTLDs and without regard for the impact on intellectual property rights. If the United States Government is to allow introduction of new gTLDs, in the name of competition, then it should act to ensure that the system it creates does, in fact, foster genuine competition without injuring trademark concerns.

These difficulties will arise, of course, only if the Government elects to introduce the new gTLDs during the transition period – a proposal that should be reconsidered. If, however, new gTLDs are introduced, it should be clearly established, as policy, that multiple registries cannot be awarded to affiliated entities.

Bell Atlantic strongly endorses the requirement of the Green Paper that the new registries agree "to modify its technical capabilities based upon protocol changes that occur in Internet technology so that interoperability can be preserved." The effort to privatize and to open up the Internet will not have served any useful purpose, if the result of these efforts is fragmentation of the communications systems into competing fiefdoms, incapable of communicating with one another.

Bell Atlantic generally supports the provisions of the Green Paper that address the future of NSI. It is clear that, on a going forward basis, all aspects of the Internet that may usefully be privatized should be placed into a competitive framework. Clearly the Green Paper’s proposal for NSI to share its registrations of the ".com", ".net" and ".org" gTLDs is an appropriate move in this direction. However, the United States Government will need to do more than direct NSI to hand over "the management of the root server system." As recent events have demonstrated with alarming clarity, NSI may manage the root server system, but it lacks fundamental control over that system. The root server system is critical and crucial to the ability of the Internet to serve the millions of individuals, businesses and governments that utilize this valuable communications resource. Unauthorized "experimentation" with the system by any entity, individual or group, however well intentioned and benign, is simply unacceptable. This ad hoc tampering with established practices demonstrates graphically why creation of an effective policy oversight structure for the Internet, and establishment of safety mechanisms for its critical elements, is so essential.

The importance of securing both the physical and the intellectual integrity of the root server system cannot be overstated. Clearly, the current set of arrangements, wherein critical pieces of the Internet infrastructure are directed and managed on an ad hoc basis by "volunteers," cannot continue. Security concerns, in many guises, are fundamental to the continued success and growth of the Internet as an instrument of international communications and commerce. If the Internet is to achieve the full measure of its potential, it is clear that some form of control will need to be put into place to protect the system from physical tampering and from unauthorized processes and practices. Bell Atlantic applauds the recommendation that the United States Government, as a part of the transition, assure a measure of accountability with regard to enhancing the security interests of the Internet.

The Green Paper proposes to open up the system for registering SLDs by making the "registrar" function (i.e., the entity that acts as an interface between domain-name holders and the registry, providing registration and value-added services) completely competitive, and by requiring NSI to share registration of names within the ."com," the ".net" and ".org" gTLDs on a non-discriminatory basis. This is a useful proposal, addressing a frequently voiced concern that NSI operates as a monopoly registrar. Moreover, notwithstanding some apprehension about the "head start" that NSI enjoys in registrations, the continual growth in the number of Internet SLD registrations suggests that there will be substantial business opportunities for new registrars, at least with respect to commercial registrations, even without new gTLDs. This will be appropriately facilitated by the Green Paper’s requirement for NSI to separate its registry and registrar functions. It is a useful requirement to ensure non-discriminatory access by all competing registrars. In the long run, it may be that registry functions ought not to be performed by companies that also act as registrars. That, however, is a decision appropriately left for the new NPC board.

The United States Government proposes to study what should happen to administration of the ".us" domain, and whether it can be restructured into something that is more commercially viable and attractive. Given the fact that the Green Paper proposes to move the IANA under the control of a new entity with international governance, some provision will need to be made for continued administration of the ".us" domain within the United States. NSI is clearly not the appropriate entity for this role, as it will, under the proposal, become just one of a number of competitive registries and registrars. Thus, the proposal to undertake a notice and comment proceeding addressing this issue is timely, and should begin at once. A part of that proceeding, as well, should include an effort to restructure the entire ".us" domain to make it competitively more attractive for users. This must be done, however, with cognizance of, and in concert with, the examination of the intellectual property issues that impinge upon any top level domain that is likely to attach wide scale usage.

The proposal outlines a series of steps for the transition to a new, privatized management structure for the Internet. The steps, as outlined, form a logical transition process. It is not clear, however how many of the details will be accomplished. In particular, it is not clear how the membership organizations for Internet users will be created, who will create the NPC, or when these activities are expected to take place. The proposal seems to contemplate that they will all occur prior to September 30, 1998, at which time the "ramp down" arrangement with NSI is scheduled to take place. These details will need to be specified, and quickly, if the process is to move forward.

The United States Government has played a seminal role in the creation of the Internet. In the three decades since the antecedent of today’s Internet went online, it has provided crucial guidance, support and funding for this global "network of networks." During this time, the original network has evolved from a governmentally-sponsored scientific experiment into a largely private instrumentality of global communications and commerce. Bell Atlantic believes that the Green Paper’s proposal for an orderly transition of governmental responsibilities to the private sector is both timely and appropriate. With modifications along the lines suggested herein, it is one that establishes a useful, forward-looking framework to the Internet. Bell Atlantic looks forward to participating in the further development of this plan.

Respectfully submitted,

Bell Atlantic Corporation

By:

Haywood Torrence, Jr.

Suite 400W

1300 I Street, N.W.

Washington DC 20005

703-336-7870

23 March 1998