###
Number: 327
From: "Jeff Griswold" <jgrizzz@msn.com>
To: NTIADC40.NTIAHQ40(dns)
Date: 8/18/97 1:24am
Subject: Domain Name Service
I just wanted to throw my two cents into the hat. I think that we
should seriously consider a regional approach to name resolve. If the
address's took on a regional identifier it might help ease some of the log
jamming the internet experiences. I would look at at least a state level
code for the US.
"www.business.fl.com" or "www.business.ny.com"
Just a thought
J. Griswold
###
Number: 328
From: <Nlordi@aol.com>
To: NTIADC40.NTIAHQ40(dns)
Date: 8/18/97 12:47pm
Subject: Filing of Comments on Internet Domain Names
RECOMMENDATION
The issue of Internet domain name registration and administration is but
a subset of a much broader issue with far reaching consequences, ie.,
the future structure(s) and mechanisms for global Internet governance.
We need to fully appreciate that whatever path we pursue we are not only
addressing management of Internet domain names, but are in fact establishing
a precedent for a private self governance system for the Internet.
Therefore, the US government should work within international circles
to discuss the establishment of a multi-national panel with a compensated,
full time staff with the necessary resources to focus on and
address the issue of global Internet governance. Recommendations should be
provided to the Internet community within 6 to 9 months.
The US government should also consider the upcoming 1 - 3 October 1997
conference (http://www.ispo.cec.be/standards/conf97/welcome.html)
"Building the Global Information Society for the 21st Century"
sponsored by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International
Organization for Standards (ISO), and International Electotechnical
Commission (IEC), as a possible venue to initiate discussions
on the topic global Internet governance.
DISCUSSION
Internet domain names is but the first of many issues to surface.
A partial list of other issues which may effect the openness and
universal connectivity of the Internet, and may need to be addressed in
an appropriate forum in the very near future include:
- intellectual property rights regarding the content one posts to
the Internet,
- settlement fees between Internet Service Providers,
- the establishment of rules for peering and exchanging traffic between
Internet Service Providers,
- regulation of gambling over the Internet,
- regulation of pornography over the Internet,
- regulation of taxation,
- the use of "cookies" and ones rights to privacy,
- the establishment of legal jurisdictions and boundaries
regarding the Internet
- management and assignment of IP address space,
- governance and structure of the RIPE, APNIC and ARIN registries,
- ownership of IP address space,
- regulation of email spam,
- intellectual property rights surrounding the use of third party cache
and replication servers,
- governance of Internet telephony, and
- a concern that non-US Internet users pay an inordinate cost for
international connections between the US and other continents.
Any one of these above issues could effect the global stability and
connectivity of the Internet just as easily as the domain names issue.
We must therefore ask ourselves "given the existing set of proposals
regarding Internet domain names, are we establishing a mechanism and
precedent for Internet governance under which new Internet governance
issues will likely be addressed ?"
Our answer to this question is yes, as new Internet governance issues
surface, common sense would dictate to try to address these issues in
an already established framework.
Consequently, we must also ask ourselves, "are the processes and set of
participants in the IAHC / gTLD-MoU sufficient enough to address new
and emerging issues which effect the connectivity of the Internet
and global Internet governance ?".
Our answer to this question is no, the IAHC / gTLD-MoU processes
were not designed to support and are not sufficient to support
global Internet governance.
In fact, in the charter of the IAHC (http://www.iahc.org/iahc-charter.html)
no mention or mechanism is made of how to
address new emerging issues of Internet governance.
Therefore, the US government should consider sponsoring a session to
discuss the establishment of a multi-national panel with a compensated,
full time staff with the necessary resources to address the issue of
Internet governance, with recommendations provided to the
community within 6 months.
The US government should also consider the upcoming 1 - 3 October 1997
conference (http://www.ispo.cec.be/standards/conf97/welcome.html)
"Building the Global Information Society for the 21st Century"
sponsored by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International
Organization for Standards (ISO), and International Electotechnical
Commission (IEC), as a possible venue to initiate discussions
on global Internet governance.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE ISSUE OF DOMAIN NAME
MANAGEMENT
First, the system is stable, and contrary to the popular press there
does not appear, upon examining the Securities and Exchange Commission
Form S-1, filed July 3, 1997 for Network Solutions Inc.,
any exorbitant profits. In fact, it appears after reading the S-1 that
NSI is investing a majority of its fees in hardware, software, and
third party vendors in support of back office operations to deliver
its services.
The US government, specifically the National Science Foundation,
should be commended for actively managing the NSF/NSI cooperative agreement
for the betterment of the entire Internet community.
The real winner of this cooperative agreement is the Internet community.
The initiative of NSF in establishing an Intellectual Infrastructure Fund
with millions of dollars on account will eventually benefit the entire
Internet community.
The system established under NSI has provided a stable system for a fair
price. Where else can one request a service (the issuance of a domain name)
and have it "delivered" without first paying for the service, and without
any prior credit history ? In fact, the net fee of $35, besides supporting
the assignment of an Internet domain name, also supported, without cost to
the end user, the management and assignment of IP address space.
There are still many unanswered questions regarding the IAHC / gTLD-MoU plan.
For example, will the processes defined by the IAHC / gTLD-MoU provide a
comparable level of stability ? What fee(s) will end users have to
pay under the IAHC / gTLD-MoU plan for domain names ? Are 7 iTLDs enough ?
Where is the full time staff to provide a transition to the
processes defined in the gTLD-MoU ?
We are concerned that the IAHC / gTLD-MoU is moving forward
too quickly and fails to address several issues, such as those
outlined in Digital Equipment Corporation's Attachment to the gTLD-MoU
(http://www.itu.int/net-itu/gtld-mou/decadd.htm), ie.,
a concern for consensus building, stability of existing top level domains,
stability of name registration, and preserving intellectual property rights.
Furthermore, we are particularly concerned with the failure to address
the recommendations raised by the IAHC regarding the .US top level domain.
THE .US DOMAIN
The US Domain is an official top-level domain in the DNS of the Internet
community. It is administered by the US Domain Registry at the
Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California
(ISI), under the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
(above per http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/usdnr/usdom-overview.html)
The "Final Report of the International Ad Hoc Committee: Recommendations
for Administration and Management of gTLDSs" (available at
http://www.iahc.org/draft-iahc-recommend-00.html) states that:
"Current difficulties with gTLDs are highly exacerbated by inadequate
use of the .us TLD and the IAHC requests that scaleable and functional
Second-Level Domains (SLDs) for .us be defined and used, in the spirit
of those that already exist for many other ISO 3166-based TLDs."
Furthermore, the IAHC report states:
"The IAHC suggests that the domain administrator for .us undertake
further delegations along the lines of the functional SLD structure,
suitably modified to account for large-scale delegation and management,
and suggests this type of functional structure to other ISO 3166
national name space administrators as a widely understood structure."
Why has this issue not been discussed further either by the
US Domain Registry and IANA (both at the Information Sciences Institute
of the University of Southern California) and/or gTLD-MoU Policy
Oversight Committee ?
Would dealing with the .US top level domain provide the community
with additional time to deal with the issues of domain name
management under the broader umbrella of global Internet governance ?
This is but one example that we may be moving too fast without fully
discussing previous recommendations.
###
Number: 329
From: Gordon Irlam <gordoni@base.com>
To: NTIADC40.NTIAHQ40(dns)
Date: 8/18/97 8:24am
Subject: Comments of Gordon Irlam
Document available at:
http://www.base.com/gordoni/thoughts/ntia-dns-comments.html
Before the
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
Washington, DC 20230
In the Matter of ) ) REGISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF ) Docket No. 970613137-7137-01 INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES )
Comments of Gordon Irlam.
gordoni@base.com
Gordon Irlam
2310 Rock St. #10
Mountain View, CA 94043
18 August 1997
Gordon Irlam respectfully submits comments in this proceeding. Gordon Irlam
is employed as a software developer. He is a domain name registrant and
operator of a DNS server. He has been using the Internet for 12 years,
participates in the IETF, is a member of the W3C Advisory Council, the
Association for Computing Machinery, and the American Economic Association.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table of Contents
A. Appropriate Principles
* Additional principles
B. General/Organizational Framework Issues
* Questions 1-8
C. Creation of New gTLDs
* Questions 10-13
D. Policies for Registries
* Questions 15, 16, 19, 20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Appropriate Principles
The Government seeks comment on the principles by which it should
evaluate proposals for the registration and administration of
Internet domain names. [...]
The following additional principle is suggested:
Domain name registrants should acrue the wealth they have created.
Domain name registrars should merely be able reap the value of the
registration services they perform.
It is the domain name registrant that performs the vast majority of
investment resulting in the creation of wealth associated with a particular
domain name. It is important that domain name registrants be able to reap
the value of this wealth. Any policy that enables domain name registrars to
reap the wealth associated with investments made by domain name registrants
would create economic inefficiencies. These economic inefficiencies would
manifest themselves as under-investment in the creation of domain name
content, and an over-investment in domain name registration services.
Two implications of this principle are:
* For the duration of use of a particular domain name, the domain name
should essentially be viewed as the property of the domain name
registrant.
* Domain name owners should not be held captive to particular registrars.
Registrants should be able to switch registrars at will. This is
necessary to ensure the registrant and not the registrar can captures
the wealth created by the registrant.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. General/Organizational Framework Issues
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of current domain
name registration systems?
The registration system for the .COM, .ORG, and .NET domains have the
advantage of being part of a single system, with a single common set of
procedures for the registration of domains, payment of bills, and querying
the status of registrations.
The registration system for the .US domain is highly fragmented rendering it
effectively unusable. Different sub-domains are administered by different
authorities. These different authorities have different policies and
procedures. There is no central database that can be searched to access
information on registrations within the US domain. For many subdomains it is
not even possible to determine which domain names are already allocated. It
is even difficult to determine the appropriate procedures and authority to
contact to register within a particular domain.
The registration systems for most of the other ISO country code domains
besides .US also have various problems. However each of these registration
systems is ultimately under the control of the respective national
governments, and it considered important that national governments are
offered the opportunity to play a role in the provision of domain
registration services.
All the present registration systems have the disadvantage of a lack of
competition in the provision of registration services for the underlying
domain names. This lack of competition results in registration services
being provided inefficiently. A second problem resulting from the lack of
competition is prices need not being set based on the cost of the underlying
services provided. Today this is not as serious problem. Most of the domain
registration systems are under some form of regulations that limit the
prices that can be set. However, were such regulations to be removed,
without provisions for competitive registration within these domains,
serious problems would result. Domain name registrars for particular TLDs
would be able to set almost arbitrary prices for the continuance of
registration within particular TLDs. The structure of the World Wide Web
makes it impossible for a registrant to switch to a different domain name
without loss of almost the entire value built up around a preexisting
domain. Consequently, registrants would have little alternative but to pay
what would essentially be arbitrary monopoly fees set by domain name
registrars. This situation can only be prevented through either the
continued regulation of prices, or the introduction of competition in the
provision of registration services within TLDs.
2. How might current domain name systems be improved?
The provision of registration services could be improved by having multiple
competitive registries for the provision of registration services within
existing domains. This would increase the efficiency of the registration
process. More importantly, it would ensure registrants, rather than
registrars, are able to capture the value of the wealth created by the
registrants investment in a particular domain. This is especially important
if the existing regulatory limits on the fees charged for domain name
registration were to be removed.
The operation of the root name servers could be improved through a
competitive biding process to determine the operators of the root name
servers. An example scenario follows. Registrars could be required to pay an
annual fee based on the number of domains for which they are currently the
registration agent. This fee would be passed on to domain name registrants,
and should be of the order of $1-2 per domain per year. The fees collected
would be used to pay the costs associated with the operation of the root
name servers. Contracts to operate a subset of the root name servers for a
three year period could be competitively bid on a yearly basis. This way,
only a third of the root name servers would undergo operational transitions
each year, ensuring high operational stability of the DNS infrastructure.
For operational reasons, IP addresses associated with the root name servers
need to pass from one contractor to the next, and must not be considered the
property of the incumbent contractor.
3. By what entity, entities, or types of entities should current
domain name systems be administered? What should the makeup of
such an entity be?
We don't feel any existing entity is presently ideally suited. However,
given the overwhelming importance of operational stability, and the urgency
of the present matter, we feel the framework provided by the gTLD MOU that
was created by the IAHC represent by far the best of the available options.
Desirable aspects of the gTLD MOU include the provision of competitive
commercial services acting under a framework of public trust, effective self
governance by bodies including IANA with a proven track record in operating
the Internet infrastructure, and ultimately this governance overseen by
appropriate international bodies.
4. Are there decision-making processes that can serve as models
for deciding on domain name registration systems (e.g., network
numbering plan, standard-setting processes, spectrum allocation)?
Are there private/public sector administered models or regimes
that can be used for domain name registration (e.g., network
numbering plan, standard setting processes, or spectrum allocation
processes)? What is the proper role of national or international
governmental/non-governmental organizations, if any, in national
and international domain name registration systems?
The role of the FCC in regulating the provision of long distance phone
service serves as a reasonable model of the necessary role for governmental
or non-governmental organizations in creating the framework for the
provision of DNS services. Desirable features of the regulation of long
distance phone service include:
* Long distance service is provided by commercial organizations within a
competitive framework established by the government and administered by
the FCC. Similarly, DNS registration should be provided competively,
but under a framework established and regulated by appropriate
governmental or non-governmental organizations.
* Phone subscribers have the ability to change long distance providers at
will. Analogously, domain name registrants should have the ability to
change registrars at will.
* Long distance companies do not have monopoly ownership of the right to
provide long distance service to particular blocks of phone numbers.
Similarly, registrars should not have a monopoly on the provision of
registration services to those domains within a particular TLD.
* It is possible to keep the same phone number when changing long
distance providers. Analogously, domain name registrants should be able
to keep the same domain name when changing registrars. A phone numbers
are treated as belonging to the subscriber, not to the long distance
company.
* The competitive provision of long distance phone service is not all
encompassing. It interoperates with the regulated local phone services,
and the phone services regulated by foreign governments. Similarly, the
competitive provision of services for the .COM, .ORG, and .NET domains,
should be able to coexist with regulated provision of the .EDU, and
.GOV domains, and the various different ISO country code domains.
5. Should generic top level domains (gTLDs), (e.g., .com), be
retired from circulation? Should geographic or country codes
(e.g., .US) be required? If so, what should happen to the .com
registry? Are gTLD management issues separable from questions
about International Standards Organization (ISO) country code
domains?
The generic top level domains should be preserved. The regulatory and
administrative issues at hand have nothing to do with whether domain names
exist within a gTLD or an ISO country code domain. The present issues are
most significant for the gTLD domains simply because the gTLD domains are by
far the largest and most heavily commercialized of the TLDs. Therefore, it
is in the gTLD domains that the pressures for transition to competitive
market based registration services, as well as the risks of monopoly
control, are the greatest.
On a long term basis, as ISO country code domains grow, they too would
likely benefit from a competitive management structure. Consequently, it
would be best to develop a general purpose system for the competitive
registration of domain names. Initially this system would only contain the
.COM, .ORG, and .NET domains. However, in the future we should imagine the
possibility of national governments wishing to delegate registrations for
their ISO country codes through this same system. The system should be
designed to allow for this. Doing so does not pose any technical problems.
6. Are there any technological solutions to current domain name
registration issues? Are there any issues concerning the
relationship of registrars and gTLDs with root servers?
A clear distinction needs to be made between administrative and operational
activities. The provision of registration services is an administrative
function. The operation of the root name services is an operational
function. There is a serious danger of monopoly control of the Internet when
a single party is free to perform both administrative and operational
activities.
Domain name registrars should be prohibited from operating root name
servers, and vice-versa.
Fundamentally, it is the operators of the root servers that have control of
the Internet name space. To ensure that they don't abuse this power it is
necessary to ensure that the operators of the root name servers treat the
data provided by each registrar equally. If the root name servers only used
data provided by a particular registrar, that registrar would be able to set
monopoly prices for domain name registration services.
7. How can we ensure the scalability of the domain name system
name and address spaces as well as ensure that root servers
continue to interoperate and coordinate?
To ensure the scalability of DNS, continued investment in the development of
the BIND DNS software should occur. Additional root name servers should also
be deployed. These investments could might be funded from the NSF
Infrastructure Fund established under the cooperative agreement.
Rather than occurring on an ad hoc voluntary basis, operation of the root
name servers could be performed under competitive contract, with contractual
requirement to ensure root name servers continue to interoperate and
coordinate.
8. How should the transition to any new systems be accomplished?
The NSF needs to act in a timely fashion to ensure the complete contents of
the existing domain name databases are publicly available on the expiration
of the cooperative agreement. Article 10(E) of the cooperative agreement
provides the NSF can request the necessary information from Network
Solutions as part of the final report to be submitted by Network Solutions
to the NSF. It is important that the NSF request this information because it
will be required by any successor organization.
The initial registrars for each existing domain name should be allocated
evenly and randomly between the initial set of qualified competitive
registries.
This entire transition process needs to be performed very quickly, in a
period of no more than 5-10 days. Consequently it is vital that operational
planning for the transition be occurring between all relevant parties today.
Under the terms of the existing cooperative agreement Network Solutions is
permitted to collect a fee of $50 per year payable in advance for each
registered domain, with an initial two year payment being required when a
domain is first registered. This fee is intended to cover the cost of
providing registration services for the following year, or two years.
Network Solutions is presently collecting the full amount of this fee
despite the cooperative agreement being scheduled to expire in 6 months
time. The unearned portion of these fees should either be returned to the
domain name registrars, or passed on to the successor registration body.
With over 1 million domains registered, the amount of money at issue is
substantial.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Creation of New gTLDs
10. Are there technical, practical, and/or policy considerations
that constrain the total number of different gTLDs that can be
created?
No hard restrictions on the number of gTLDs exist. However, great care and
prudence should be exercised. Once created, it is very difficult to change
or remove a gTLD. Consequently, gTLDs should only be created if there is a
pressing need.
11. Should additional gTLDs be created?
It is our perception that at the present time no new domains need be
created. This is not however a strongly held opinion.
Right now the primary focus should be on the management of the existing
gTLDs, and their transition to a competitive registration system. The
creation of new gTLDs is likely to only serve as a distraction to this
effort.
12. Are there technical, business, and/or policy issues about
guaranteeing the scalability of the name space associated with
increasing the number of gTLDs?
So long as all of the new gTLDs are administered within a single
registration system there are no problems of scalability associated with the
creation of new gTLDs.
If different gTLDs are administered under different administrative regimes,
then the number of different regimes should be kept to a minimum. End users
of the registration system can't be expected to know about and understand
all the different regimes, policies, and procedures. Creating multiple
regimes would likely result in problems similar to the present confusion
that exists regarding registration in the .US domain.
13. Are gTLD management issues separable from questions about ISO
country code domains?
Yes, gTLD management issues can be separated from the management of ISO
country code domains. Similar problems to those facing the gTLDs exist for
the ISO country code domains, but they are presently far less severe, and do
not require solving simultaneously. At a future date, the same mechanisms as
used to solve the problems associated with the registration of gTLD domains,
might be applicable to the ISO country code domains.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Policies for Registries
15. Should a gTLD registrar have exclusive control over a
particular gTLD? Are there any technical limitations on using
shared registries for some or all gTLDs? Can exclusive and
non-exclusive gTLDs coexist?
None of the gTLDs should be under the exclusive control of a single
registrar. Unless subject to government regulation of the fees charged for
registration services, the registrar would be in a position to abuse this
situation by imposing monopoly fees on domain name registrants. Such fees
would result in economic inefficiencies.
There are no technical problems to using shared registries for all gTLDs.
There are minor organizational, managerial, and deployment issues that still
need to be solved, but these issues are readily solvable.
Exclusive and non-exclusive domains could coexist, but the creation of
exclusive domains would be bad public policy. If for some reason exclusive
domains should continue to exist in the future, transition plans for their
eventually maturing and becoming shared should be drawn up, and regulations
should also be imposed to limit fees in the interim.
16. Should there be threshold requirements for domain name
registrars, and what responsibilities should such registrars have?
Who will determine these and how?
There should be a set of requirements on domain name registrars. These
requirements should be focussed on ensuring the stability of the domain name
registration system. Registrants should be contractually required to be able
to guarantee a set of operational requirements, and have appropriate funding
to underwrite this guarantee.
It is reasonable for the bodies established under the gTLD MOU, the PAB,
POC, and CORE, to determine such requirements.
19. Should there be a limit on the number of different gTLDs a
given registrar can administer? Does this depend on whether the
registrar has exclusive or non-exclusive rights to the gTLD?
All gTLDs domains should be a part of a single shared database. Registrars
should be able to administer all domains within all of the gTLD domains.
Allowing all registrars to act as registrars for all gTLDs will maximize
competition in the provision of registration services within each gTLD.
Exclusive domains should be phased out.
20. Are there any other issues that should be addressed in this
area?
It is important that appropriate contractual language exist to require
registration information be shareable between registrars. Registrars need to
disclaim all rights to the underlying registration information they have
collected, including all selection and compilation based copyrights, and any
future rights under the recently proposed database treaty. Registrars must
agree to provide the complete registration information for a particular
domain to a competitor in response to an authentic request from the domain
name owner to switch registrars.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
###
Number: 330
From: "Lawrence W. Hillman" <sofar@compuserve.com>
To: "'Temp'" <dns@ntia.doc.gov>
Date: 8/18/97 7:12am
Subject: Domain Name Changes
I think the number of domain name "extensions" (.com, .gov, etc) should be
kept to a minium. Otherwise, we'll end up with many very similar names and
this will make them difficult to remember and reduce the identity value of
"trademark" names.
Larry Hillman
LHillman@HillcoRealty.Com
###
Number: 331
From: "Dave A" <daveanin@netlabs.net>
To: NTIADC40.NTIAHQ40(dns)
Date: 8/18/97 9:43am
Subject: Keep with Network Solutions
I believe the Internet's naming should stay under one company, for
simplicity's sake...
Think about it, if I had 10 companies to choose from each offering different
services for DNS, such as .games, .home, .biz, .rec, etc... it would get way
out of hand... It should stay with .com, .net, .org, etc... it's easy, it's
established, and it works. Let's face it, other companies are just getting
greedy they can't enjoy profits from this system.. The Internet wasn't
designed for profits in its root structure anyway.
Leave NSI alone... Just because a lot of the good .com's are taken, doesn't
mean new businesses can't think of something creative for a domain name.
Dave Aninowsky
BNL Enterprises Inc.
31 Washington St.
Matawan, NJ , 07747
webmaster@pcwares.com
###
Number: 332
From: <Marktrade@aol.com>
To: NTIADC40.NTIAHQ40(dns)
Date: 8/18/97 12:25pm
Subject: internet issues
FROSS ZELNICK LEHRMAN & ZISSU, P.C.
633 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 953-9090
Facsimile: (212) 953-1037
August 18, 1997
VIA E-Mail
dns@ntia.doc.gov.
Office of Public Affairs
National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA)
Room 4898
14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20230
Attention: Ms. Patrice Washington
Reference: Request for Comments on Internet Issues
Dear Sir:
I am writing on behalf of the Intellectual Property
Law Section of the American Bar Association.
The Section will not be submitting written comments
in response to the request for comments published on July 2,
1997. However, the Section strongly believes that the issues
raised are of the utmost importance for intellectual property
owners and members of the intellectual property bar. Accord-
ingly, and in view of the summer season during which many
interested persons are away for periods of time, the Section
respectfully requests that public hearings be conducted to
insure full public review and analysis of these issues.
Respectfully submitted,
MDE/gf Mark D. Engelmann
Chair - ABA IPL Section
Committee 203
PTO Affairs - Trademarks
###
Number: 333
From: "proteus" <proteus@tpa.net>
To: NTIADC40.NTIAHQ40(dns)
Date: 8/18/97 12:25am
Subject: TLD FILTERING SOLVES YOUR DILEMNA
Subject: TLD FILTERING AND WHAT IT DOES FOR ALL OF US
To: The Internet Community and every human on the planet
Cc: vice.president@whitehouse.gov, president@whitehouse.gov,
first.lady@whitehouse.gov
TLD FILTERING AND HOW IT WORKS FOR ALL
OF US TO PROTECT OUR CHILDREN ANDPROTECT OUR RIGHTS.A NEW IDEA
FOR
AMERICA
AND
THE INTERNET COMMUNITY
TLD filtering is a simple and effective answer to a dilemma facing our
society.
The two conflicting issues are:
1. Should parents have the right to determine what content reaches their
children during their formative years.
2. Do adult Americans have the right to freedom of expression and
access
to ideas and content of their choice, as guaranteed by the First
and Fourth
Amendments of the Constitution?
With the unanimous ruling by the Supreme Court that the Communications
Decency
Act was unconstitutional and unenforceable in any event, there have
emerged a number of proposals to deal with this conflict.
These haveincluded rating systems, watchmen organizations, and
possible Federal involvement with some other aspects under their
jurisdiction.
At the same time, the internet community itself has responded to these
concerns with a desire to "police themselves" without Uncle Sam getting
involved
in censorship. Other countries are also not satisfied with recent United
States
gestures toward control of TLD (top level domain) and naming conventions,
that
they feel are questions that should be put to the world community instead of
being pre-empted by us.
The way TLD filtering works is simple.
ISP's can develop methods of offering their customers a menu of TLD's that
they
want to see or that theydo not want to see. Business corporations might want
to
filter out any TLD involved with sexual content. Adults wanting access to
sexual
materials could select FULL TLD * i.e., any and all TLD's that the ISP
might have. The advantages are obvious. Everyone wins. Parents can control
what
their kids see, adults can say and do what they wish.
The BBS community *ancestors of the Internet * always controlled access to
adult content by requiring proof of age. Many *. But not all .. ISP's do
this now.
Certainly one of the leaders in this area is MCS (Macro Computer
Solutions,http://www.mcs.net), lead by Karl Denninger who is
one of the proponents of an extended EDNS (Enhanced Doman Name System) .
Currrently not all ISP's carry the alternate domains, i.e., those presently
carried by the InterNIC. (Those very recognizable TLD's are .COM, .ORG,.EDU,
and
.NET. The other "official" TLD's are MIL and GOV, under Federal
control). But there are other registration authorities and other countries'
telecommunications agencies who oppose the InterNIC and its recently
proposed
expansion plans. The Internet community has largely rejected these
recommendations, and the issue is really up in the air. Two websites that
discuss this are http://www.edns.net andhttp://www.alternic.net and there
are others
as well. There are also a number of well-intentioned public service-oriented
organizations who are trying to address the problem with ratings and even
chip-controlled access. But these are not standardized, and one of the jobs
that
any kid has had has been finding a way to get around parental controls.
With this method, TLD filtering, it is impossible for any child to access
a TLD not on the list provided by his ISP. With this method, an adult could
also
filter out some groups, let in others, based on his ownsense of what is
right
and wrong being on the web.
TLD filtering is a way for us to have our cake and eat it too.
It is a win win for everyone.
Larry BuckmasterPresidentConsulTech of Chicago
Proteus@tpa.net
312/902-2776
As of July 29, 1997, at 3:55 pm CST, the phrase "TLD Filtering" did not
exist
on the AltaVista Search Engine in either the Web or Usenet. This document, I
believe, is the first discussion of it, and I am sending it to various
correspondents
to catalog it as a message with a timestamp.
No claim or credit or the concept is claimed; only a desire to chronicle
what
may be a simple idea with vast consequence to many people.
###
Number: 334
From: Geoffrey Atkin <lmga@millcomm.com>
To: NTIADC40.NTIAHQ40(dns)
Date: 8/18/97 7:08am
Subject: comments on Internet Domain Names
My comments are in answer to section B, questions 1, 2, and 5, section
D, question 15, and section E, questions 22, 24, and 28.
Thank you for the opportunity to voice these opinions.
Geoffrey Atkin
The IAHC memorandum is not perfect, but it is the best solution anyone
has been able to come up with. I agree with its philosophy that generic
top-level domains should be administered by multiple registrars on the
public's behalf. I might quibble with their choices for new top-level
domains, but I understand that there was considerable debate on this
point. I agree that both Internet and international standards bodies
should be involved in the administration of generic top-level domains.
It is vital that the current NSI monopoly be ended, and the expiration
of their contract in March 1998 may be the only opportunity to do so.
Replacement registrars must be in place well in advance to ensure a
smooth transfer of power.
The major problems with the current system are (1) many people are
dissatisfied with the service provided, fees charged, and/or policies
set by NSI, and there is little recourse since NSI has a monopoly on the
most popular top-level domains; and (2) the explosive commercial growth
of the Internet has led to contention for "good names" in .com. The
latter is because domain names are absolutely unique world-wide, while
company names are not, even when trademarked. Also, NSI assigns names
without regard to trademark status; when disputes arise, a common
outcome is for the name to become unavailable to anyone.
I think the IAHC plan can solve the first problem, but it will not solve
the second. The rest of my comments are on the subject of trademarks.
Some have argued that trademark law does not apply to domain names. I'm
no lawyer, but I believe this view is totally without merit.
Domain names are intended to be mnemonic identifiers for a group of
computers owned or administered by a specific entity or organization.
Thus, the main practical use of domain names is to help Internet users
identify to whom they are sending information and from whom they are
receiving it. This is also one of the purposes of trademarks (as
applied to company names) and this is why domain names come into
conflict with trademarks.
I think the .com domain needs to be overhauled. In its place we need a
name space which is strictly for names of corporate entities, available
only to holders of national trademarks for those names, subdivided by
business and by country. For example,
chiquita.ag.us
It is necessary to separate by country because two unrelated companies
in different countries can have the same name, and can hold trademarks
to the name in their respective countries. The existing two-letter
national domains are an obvious starting point. We then need to
subdivide the .us domain by industry or business, because two companies
in the U.S. can hold national trademarks to the same name so long as
they are in different lines of business.
Here is one possible set of replacements for .com, based on Standard
Industrial Classifications (SIC) headings:
.ag.us Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (SIC 0xxx)
.cs.us Mining and construction (SIC 1xxx)
.mf.us Manufacturing (SIC 2xxx and 3xxx)
.tr.us Transportation (SIC 4xxx)
.pu.us Public utilities (SIC 4xxx)
.wh.us Wholesale trade (SIC 50xx and 51xx)
.rt.us Retail trade (SIC 52xx to 59xx)
.fn.us Finance, insurance and real estate (SIC 6xxx)
.sv.us Services (SIC 7xxx and 8xxx)
These subdivisions could also be applied at the state level, for
companies that do not hold a national trademark on their names. For
example, if Chiquita was not a national trademark, but merely a local
banana grower in North Carolina, it might be chiquita.ag.nc.us.
Ideally, the same registrars should be able to assign names in either
ag.nc.us or ag.us.
Whatever second-level names are chosen, I think the list needs to be
short enough to be understandable and long enough that most companies
with the same name wind up in different domains. (And of course, it has
to avoid conflicting with two-letter state abbreviations.)
We don't need to worry about other countries; they have their own
registries. As a point of interest, most have second-level domains such
as .co.uk and .co.jp, which serve as national versions of .com.
If such an overhaul is made, it would be sensible to encourage greater
use of the two-letter national domains, and it might be reasonable to
close .com to new registrations. But there is no reason to eliminate it
altogether, and it would be highly disruptive to do so.
The Department of Commerce could certainly play a helpful role. For
example, it could provide domain registrars with the data necessary to
check for national trademark conflicts before assigning a domain name.
This would help prevent trademark disputes, which would benefit everyone
except possibly the trademark lawyers.
Geoffrey Atkin
###
Number: 335
From: "Christopher Hadden" <webmaster@jasc.com>
To: "'dns@ntia.doc.gov'" <dns@ntia.doc.gov>
Date: 8/18/97 11:12am
Subject: Comments on Domain Names
To whom it may concern:
Inter-network communications is a very open thing by design. I do not believe that Network
Solutions, Inc. should retain it's monopoly as the domain name registrar for top level domains
such as .com and .net.
I welcome some of the ideas contained in the International Ad Hoc Committe's proposal
including
the addition of top level domains. I also believe that problem resolution of domain name disputes
should be handled at an international level.
If I may be of any help in this discussion process, please let me know.
Sincerely,
Christopher Hadden
Webmaster, Jasc Inc.
webmaster@jasc.com
http://www.jasc.com
###
Number: 336
From: <BDarcy@lga.att.com>
To: NTIADC40.NTIAHQ40(dns)
Date: 8/18/97 1:34pm
Subject: AT&T's Response to NOI on Domain Names
Attached is AT&T's response to NOI on Domain Names
CC: NTIADC40.SMTP40("rosenblu@lga.uucp","kleinman@lga....
Before the
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D.C.
Request for Comments on the ) Registration and Administration ) Docket No. 970613137-7137-01 of Internet Domain Names )
COMMENTS OF AT&T CORP.
Pursuant to the Public Notice released July 2, 1997, AT&T Corp. ("AT&T") respectfully submits its Comments to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA") on the questions presented concerning the registration and administration of Internet domain names. AT&T commends NTIA's leadership on the these issues and welcomes the opportunity to provide its comments. AT&T also reaffirms its willingness to work actively with the U.S. Government, the International Ad Hoc Committee("IAHC"), Policy Oversight Committee ("POC"), Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), and the industry at large to help define an approach that can achieve broad domestic and international consensus, and be implemented in a practical and timely way.
AT&T responds below to each of the questions posed in the Public
Notice, as enumerated in that Notice.
A. Appropriate Principles
a. Competition in and expansion of the domain name registration system
should be encouraged. Conflicting domains, systems, and registries
should not be permitted to jeopardize the interoperation of the Internet,
however. The addressing scheme should not prevent any user from
connecting to any other site.
AT&T supports this principle.
b. The private sector, with input from governments, should develop
stable, consensus-based self-governing mechanisms for domain name
registration and management that adequately defines responsibilities and
maintains accountability.
AT&T supports this principle.
c. These self-governance mechanisms should recognize the inherently
global nature of the Internet and be able to evolve as necessary over
time.
AT&T supports this principle. In addition, any new mechanism must be scalable and thus be able to grow with the Internet.
d. The overall framework for accommodating competition should be open,
robust, efficient, and fair.
AT&T supports this principle. AT&T recognizes the importance of clearly defined transition plans and operations plans in evolving to a new framework.
e. The overall policy framework as well as name allocation and
management mechanisms should promote prompt, fair, and efficient
resolution of conflicts, including conflicts over proprietary rights.
AT&T supports this principle.
f. A framework should be adopted as quickly as prudent consideration of
these issues permits.
AT&T supports this objective. AT&T urges the U.S. Government to
ensure that appropriate protections for trademark owners are thoroughly considered
and included in the framework.
B. General/Organizational Framework Issues
B.1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of current domain
name registration systems?"
The main advantage is that it works. There have been complaints about the current registrar, and some of the complaints have merit. On the other hand, the current registrar has grown the system from a small start to a system that has now registered well over one million names in ".COM," and it has built up expertise and support systems to handle the current load of new requests. Any replacement must be able to handle the current load as well as the expected rapid growth without major disruption.
The main disadvantage is the monopoly position of the current provider. Once the current NSF Cooperative Agreement ends, there are no checks on the registrar. The ".COM" domain is very well known to Internet users and it is thus at this time the "place to be" for anyone wanting to do business on the net. If the registrar changed the rules to exclude arbitrarily some businesses or greatly increased the rates, most name holders would have no alternative but to live with the change.
B.2. How might current domain name systems be improved?
Because of the potential for abuse of NSI's monopoly position to the detriment of Internet service providers and their customers worldwide, as noted above, AT&T recommends evolving from the current monopoly system to a structure that accommodates multiple domain name registrars. However, there are a number of operational and trademark issues that arise under any new proposal for multiple domain name registrars distributed throughout the world. AT&T thus recommends significant further dialogue with key stakeholders prior to the implementation of any specific proposal.
There are several other improvements that AT&T recommends be undertaken within the current or any new structure. For instance, one of the major improvements would be increasing the security of the system. The recent situation where the AlterNIC redirected requests so that people who wanted to access the InterNIC were sent to the AlterNIC instead shows the vulnerabilities of the current system. The IETF has done work on Secure DNS; these features should be implemented on root servers and other DNS operators should be encouraged to use them as well. The code exists, is exportable, and is free of restrictions on its use. Use of this technology is vital to prevent further hijackings.
B.3. By what entity, entities, or types of entities should current domain
name systems be administered? What should the makeup of such an
entity be?
AT&T believes there is merit in the concept contained in IAHC's proposal for multiple domain name registrars throughout the world. Any organization effecting its implementation has to be broadly based. Such organization must include representatives of the user community including trademark owners, the providers, and the server sites. Furthermore, it must be international. The current DNS works because most sites agree that it should. If too many ISPs disagree, there won't be a single DNS, which would be catastrophic to the Internet. The technology differs in a major way from the telephone numbering system, where the numbering plan is implemented in an inherently centralized fashion.
B.4. Are there decision-making processes that can serve as models for
deciding on domain name registration systems (e.g., network numbering
plan, standard-setting processes, spectrum allocation)? Are there
private/public sector administered models or regimes that can be used for
domain name registration (e.g., network numbering plan, standard setting
processes, or spectrum allocation processes)? What is the proper role of
national or international governmental/non-governmental organizations, if
any, in national and international domain name registration systems?
There are lessons to be learned from certain aspects of telephone number administration process, though we must be conscious of significant differences as noted above. Examples of processes from which we can gather some insights are US 800/888 number assignment, assignment of new NPAs in the US, the current local number portability processes being discussed at NANC (North American Numbering Council), assignment of telephony country codes and assignment of two- and three-letter country codes by ISO. Any learning from these processes can not be simply replicated for the Internet. New processes that benefit from the learning should then be tailored to the different environment of Internet domain names.
B.5. Should generic top level domains (gTLDs), (e.g., .COM), be retired
from circulation? Should geographic or country codes (e.g., .US) be
required? If so, what should happen to the .COM registry? Are gTLD
management issues separable from questions about International
Standards Organization (ISO) country code domains?
While a proposal that all domain names be under a specific country code has appeal, such a system would pose numerous problems. The main one is that it may be too late. There are over 1.3 million names in ".COM" already, and approximately 60,000 more in each of ".NET" and ".ORG." Many of these names are well known to Internet users, and in many cases businesses have spent significant amounts of money promoting recognition of their name. To change all these names at this point would cause massive confusion among users and inhibit the growth of commerce on the Internet. In all events, eliminating ".COM" is not a practical or realistic alternative. Even if it were possible, many of the same technical and administrative issues would arise in the ".US" domain, because ".COM" consists overwhelmingly of U.S. entities today.
Furthermore, there are multinational companies that are not easily associated with any one country code. For example, it is not obvious that Nestle would be associated with ".CH" (Switzerland), or Shell Oil (Royal Dutch Shell) with ".NL" (Netherlands). These companies would have to register in almost every country code if they were permitted to do so by the registrar for that country code domain. Such a process would be unnecessarily costly and inefficient.
B.6. Are there any technological solutions to current domain name
registration issues? Are there any issues concerning the relationship of
registrars and gTLDs with root servers?
The registration issues are not primarily technical. The root name servers can handle millions of TLDs if necessary (the ".COM" domain is currently held by the root name servers and has over a million entries). The technology to support shared registries exists; many commercial relational database management systems have the required features. Work would have to be done to implement the system, but it is technically feasible.
The relationship of registrars and gTLDs is not constrained by technical limitations. The formal relationship between multiple registrars and multiple root name server operators would have to be worked out in several dimensions. Significant substantive work needs to be done on many related legal and organizational issues.
B.7. How can we ensure the scalability of the domain name system name
and address spaces as well as ensure that root servers continue to
interoperate and coordinate?
There are technical limits to the number of possible servers for any single domain, including the root and ".COM." These arise from packet size constraints in the current DNS, and limitations on the bandwidth necessary to download backup copies of the zone files.
These Comments specifically apply to addresses as well as domain names. There are some fundamental technical concerns about the current IP address space. First, it's limited, and will remain limited until IPv6 becomes widespread. This is already posing problems for many companies. The only long-term solution is deployment of IPv6.
A second issue is "provider-based addressing." This is more properly known as "topology-based addressing" -- your IP addresses must be given to you by your upstream provider. Although there are unfortunate consequences of this scheme -- in particular, it's hard for a site or ISP to connect to multiple providers, or to change upstream providers if necessary -- the requirement is due to limits on the memory sizes of today's routers, and the amount of CPU time necessary to calculate paths through ever larger routing tables than are used today. The industry requires automatic renumbering technology.
B.8. How should the transition to any new systems be accomplished?
Any proposed new system should have an associated transition plan that spells out how the migration from the current system will be carried out. The plan should include schedules, milestones, contingencies if dates cannot be met, test plans (including capacity tests), and criteria for meeting the milestones. The plan should specifically address the scale of the current registry and show how all current domain name registrations will be handled. The plan must indicate what is expected of the current registrar during the transition. Because the current registrars have indicated that they feel they have ownership rights to the current data, the plan must indicate the terms and conditions pursuant to which the new registrar will be able to obtain and use the data. As part of the plan an ongoing test system should be maintained to provide rigorous testing of new registrars and new versions of software that may affect the central database of TLDs.
The plan should be made available to the Internet community and substantive comments should be addressed.
B.9. Are there any other issues that should be addressed in this area?
Other issues will certainly arise; this series of questions is adequately comprehensive at this time.
C. Creation of New gTLDs
C.10. Are there technical, practical, and/or policy considerations that
constrain the total number of different gTLDs that can be created?
There are no significant technical limits; i.e., the technology can probably handle any number that is operationally feasible. There are clearly trademark-related implications as new gTLDs are created (for example, ".COM" and ".STORE" for the same company name).
C.11. Should additional gTLDs be created?
Yes. To support the growth of the Internet and electronic commerce, the industry must ensure that domain names capacity is increased.
C.12. Are there technical, business, and/or policy issues about
guaranteeing the scalability of the name space associated with increasing
the number of gTLDs?
There is no significant technical limit. The business and policy issues require further exploration.
C.13. Are gTLD management issues separable from questions about ISO
country code domains?
Yes, and they should be separated.
C. 14. Are there any other issues that should be addressed in this area?
The recent NSI outage shows the dangers of a single point of failure. Research and engineering should be done to add redundancy to the generation of all gTLDs, including ".COM," ".NET" and others, and eliminate single points of failure wherever possible. The planning effort should address both software and operational processes.
D. Policies for Registries
D.15. Should a gTLD registrar have exclusive control over a particular
gTLD? Are there any technical limitations on using shared registries for
some or all gTLDs? Can exclusive and non-exclusive gTLDs coexist?
All gTLDs must be served by multiple registrars, to promote competition. There are no inherent technical limitations on using shared registries, but implementation options need to be well tested.
D.16. Should there be threshold requirements for domain name
registrars, and what responsibilities should such registrars have? Who
will determine these and how?
AT&T suggests certain threshold requirements applicable to domain name registrars. For example, all registrars should be bound by a common set of rules, submit to the jurisdiction of a single, pre-determined court and post a bond to satisfy judgments. Measures should be taken to ensure the smooth operation and transition to other registrars, particularly where a registrar has become bankrupt or has ceased to do business. Underlying these obligations would be full disclosure of the registrar's credentials and compliance with these requirements, so that the holders of domain names have the information needed to make a reasonable choice of registrar.
D.17. Are there technical limitations on the possible number of domain
name registrars?
Any reasonable number of registrars can be supported technically, subject to limitations noted in the answer to B.7. The operational and policy issues will dictate limits before the technical considerations will.
D.18. Are there technical, business and/or policy issues about the name
space raised by increasing the number of domain name registrars?
Trademark issues are a major concern as the number of registrars increases. See AT&T's response to the questions in Section E. Operational impacts of increasing the number of registrars must be well understood and resolved prior to implementation.
D.19. Should there be a limit on the number of different gTLDs a given
registrar can administer? Does this depend on whether the registrar has
exclusive or non-exclusive rights to the gTLD?
At this time, AT&T does not foresee the need for a limitation on the number of gTLDs that a given registrar can administer. AT&T does anticipate a need to revisit and examine the issue based on the registrar qualification process and the robustness of operational and trademark protection processes that need to be in place for effective sharing of registration for multiple gTLDs.
D.20. Are there any other issues that should be addressed in this area?
Other issues will certainly arise; this series of questions is adequately
comprehensive at this time.
E. Trademark Issues
E.21. What trademark rights (e.g., registered trademarks, common law
trademarks, geographic indications, etc.), if any, should be protected on
the Internet vis-a-vis domain names?
All trademark rights, including service and certification mark rights, trade dress rights and company name rights, should be protected on the Internet vis-a-vis domain names. Moreover, sufficient measures should be taken to avoid public confusion.
E.22. Should some process of preliminary review of an application for
registration of a domain name be required, before allocation, to determine
if it conflicts with a trademark, a trade name, a geographic indication,
etc.? If so, what standards should be used? Who should conduct the
preliminary review? If a conflict is found, what should be done, e.g.,
domain name applicant and/or trademark owner notified of the conflict?
Automatic referral to dispute settlement?
There should not be a requirement of preliminary review of an application for registration of a domain name other than review by an entity such as the proposed Administrative Challenge Panels (ACP).
E.23. Aside from a preliminary review process, how should trademark
rights be protected on the Internet vis-a-vis domain names? What
entity(ies), if any, should resolve disputes? Are national courts the only
appropriate forum for such disputes? Specifically, is there a role for
national/international governmental/nongovernmental organizations?
AT&T has developed a continuum of concepts and proposals. AT&T is prepared to discuss these (and other parties') proposals in future fora before the U.S. Government and industry groups.
An entity such as the Administrative Challenge Panels would decide whether the domain name should be registered. The standard which should be applied by the panels is "identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of any demonstrable trademark right". The principles of stare decisis, res judicata and collateral estoppel should apply. Moreover, the losing party should be allowed to file a de novo action locally. In addition, a reasonably long period of time (five years) should be set aside in which any party that believed it was being damaged could petition to cancel a domain name.
E.24. How can conflicts over trademarks best be prevented? What
information resources (e.g., databases of registered domain names,
registered trademarks, trade names) could help reduce potential
conflicts? If there should be a database(s), who should create the
database(s) ? How should such a database(s) be used?
It is unrealistic to believe that conflicts over trademarks are preventable. However, if there is a legitimate conflict, AT&T supports the individual parties being offered the opportunity to craft a workable solution. For example, if a trademark registrant of ACME for food services applies to register a domain name of ACME and another trademark registrant or owner of demonstrable trademark rights of ACME for toys opposes, the parties could use the Dispute Mediation Procedures so that the first party registers "ACME-FOOD.COM" and the second party registers "ACME-TOYS.COM." This is consistent with the current settlement of trademark disputes parties limit their use of a trademark to their respective goods or services by agreement. However, where there exists a well-known, strong mark such as AT&T, no third party other than the trademark owner should be able to use that mark. Principles of dilution and unfair competition should be used to determine the scope and breadth of a mark's protection.
It is AT&T's view that the creation and maintenance of trademark databases would be overly burdensome, costly and difficult to administer.
E.25. Should domain name applicants be required to demonstrate that
they have a basis for requesting a particular domain name? If so, what
information should be supplied? Who should evaluate the information?
On the basis of what criteria?
No. Domain name applicants should not be required to have a basis for requesting a domain name. However, the number and nature of domain name registrations owned by an individual or entity should be considered and should be a strong factor in determining the good faith of a potential domain name applicant. If, for example, an applicant holds scores of other domain names which are identical or confusingly similar to the names or marks of various third parties, that factor alone should create a strong presumption, in any litigation or dispute resolution procedure, that the applicant is attempting to traffic in trademarks, is not acting in good faith and thus not entitled to domain name registrations.
E.26. How would the number of different gTLDs and the number of
registrars affect the number and cost of resolving trademark disputes?
As the number of different gTLDs increases, so too does the risk of having to challenge a domain name applicant. The number of disputes and costs will increase substantially as the number of gTLDs and registrars increase. Moreover, trademark owners will face the daunting and expensive task of monitoring domain name registrations for each gTLD. Also, registrars might require that challenges be conducted in a country across the globe. This will certainly increase costs to a domain name challenger and will be particularly burdensome to owners of well-known marks and to small companies that are really primarily national or regional in scope of business, but to whom their brand is of significant value.
E.27. Where there are valid, but conflicting trademark rights for a single
domain name, are there any technological solutions?
Directory servers can help people find Web sites in ways other than guessing at "www.company-name.COM." But that solution is not workable for other uses of domain names, such as e-mail. In other words, the industry can ameliorate the contentiousness of the trademark battle by deploying directory servers, but the industry cannot eliminate it -- uses of the DNS by programs (as opposed to humans typing the names) are not compatible with any sort of vague, interactive lookup process.
Requiring the use of geographic and/or subject area qualifiers in domain names, to parallel the legal separations, is unworkable. Apart from the fact that most people can't and won't remember such information, the resulting domain names would be far too long to be used.
E.28. Are there any other issues that should be addressed in this area?
Yes. AT&T discusses below specific issues with IAHC/MOU proposals:
1. The major problem confronted by trademark owners is "cybersquatting", or the extortion and piracy of domain names that are identical or confusingly similar or dilutive of a prior valid trademark right. (For example, a third party other than AT&T registers "1800CALLATT.COM" and offers to sell the domain name to AT&T.) Another major problem is the use of domain names that are identical or confusingly similar or dilutive of a trademark. (For example, a third party other than AT&T registers "AT-T.COM" or "AT-TWEB.COM." The current IAHC/MOU proposals do not adequately address these problems. It has been stated that the ACPs have a limited function. However, litigating in court is extremely expensive, especially with a proliferation of cybersquatters. This problem needs to be addressed by IPOC and a compromise solution found that is acceptable to all interested parties.
2. Disputes would be determined by Administrative Challenge Panels international experts in the field of intellectual property law and Internet domain names. It is not clear who would serve on these panels, how panelists would be compensated or what their qualifications would be. There is a need to address this issue in greater detail.
3. The IPOC Guidelines indicate that to be "internationally known" a mark must be registered in a least 35 or more countries in at least four geographic regions for the same goods or services; to be "globally known," the mark must be registered in 75 or more countries for the same goods and services. These are extremely high thresholds, and will not protect a majority of trademark owners. Enormous amounts of money are invested in promoting trademarks that do not meet these thresholds. Such trademarks may have significant commercial appeal, and thus their owners would enjoy brand equity in such names. However, there is nothing in the current proposals to protect the interests of these trademark owners. For example, a medium size business has one trademark in the U.S. that is well-known in its industry and in the U.S. and all European Community countries. (This business also owns a U.S. trademark registration that is incontestable and trademark registrations throughout the European Community.) The current proposals do not afford protection to this trademark owner.
4. As proposed, the Administrative Challenge Panels will not have jurisdiction to decide disputes beyond the narrow question of preventing in appropriate circumstances, the registration of "a second-level domain name in any of the CORE gTLDs which is identical or closely similar to an alphanumeric string, that for purposes of this policy is deemed to be internationally known, and for which a demonstrable intellectual property right exists . . ." (Articles 2 and 3 of the MOU, emphasis supplied). Industry has revised the question of deciding disputes respecting all valid trademark rights. There is sentiment that all entities who have rights should be allowed to challenge, not just the owners of internationally known marks. Also, significantly, some domain names could be considered an infringement of a trademark and still not be considered identical or closely similar. The litmus test should be the internationally accepted standard: likelihood of confusion.
5. Difficult jurisdictional issues arise. The domain name registrant is located in Country A, the trademark owner in Country B, the registrar in Country C. The problem is the domain name registrant may "forum shop." To alleviate this problem, domain name applicants should agree to be subject to jurisdiction in a specified choice of venues.
6. The IPOC Guidelines indicate the Administrative Challenge Panel process is subject to be reopened by any person, and unknown parties may thus have the right to intervene. If an infringer is dissatisfied with the outcome of the Administrative Challenge Panel, it would initiate an action in a country whose laws may be favorably disposed to such party and force trademark owners to engage in exposure for such litigation. This and other issues related to the finality of arbitration rulings require further discussion.
7. The 60-day publication period is not mandatory and there is no procedure for opposing a domain name. There should be a 60-day mandatory publication period in which any party who believes it would be damaged by the domain name could oppose. This would also be favorable to the domain name registrant, because obstacles to use of the domain name would be identified prior to the domain name holder investing time and money in such domain name and corresponding website. AT&T recognizes that the mandatory waiting period was removed from the Memorandum of Understanding due to opposition, but believes the concept has value.
8. Sui generis protection for domain names, essentially creating a wholly new form of intellectual property protection to protect domain names, is unnecessary and will prejudice existing trademark owners. It has been proposed the use of a domain name for a two-year period on the Internet will create a right in the domain name. This is unacceptable. Trademark rights are only created by substantive law.
9. There should not be an opt-out clause in the domain name application that permits domain name holders to opt-out of binding arbitration. This would effect a clear and significant prejudice to trademark owners.
10. The Administrative Challenge Panel may, on its own initiative, decide to modify an TLD in lieu of excluding it. This may weaken a trademark owner rights in a mark and should not be permitted.
11. It is AT&T's view that the IPOC, which governs policy issues in the domain
name
process, has insufficient representation by trademark owners. While other
organizations (like ISOC, CORE and IAB) are represented by two members, INTA
and WIPO, ostensibly the only representatives of the trademark community, are
allotted one member each. This must be remedied in order to result in balanced
representation.
CONCLUSION
AT&T appreciates the opportunity to provide its views on this important subject, and looks forward to continuing participation in this and other fora dealing with the critical issues involving proliferation of new technology-based services in the U.S. and worldwide.
Respectfully submitted,
AT&T CORP.
By /s/ Ava B. Kleinman
Mark C. Rosenblum
Ava B. Kleinman
Its Attorneys
Mahal Mohan
295 North Maple Avenue
Room 3252J1
Basking Ridge, New Jersey 07920
(908) 221-8312
August 18, 1997
###
Number: 337
From: Glenn B. Manishin <glenn@technologylaw.com>
To: NTIADC40.NTIAHQ40(dns)
Date: 8/18/97 9:17am
Subject: CPSR Comments on Internet Domain Names
On behalf of the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility,
attached in Microsoft Word 6.0 format is CPSR's electronic submission in
response to NTIA's request for public comment on registration and
administration of Internet domain names. A hard copy of the same is
being delivered today to Patrice Washington of NTIA's Public Affairs
office.
Please contact me at this e-mail address or by telephone at 202.955.6300
if you have any questions in this regard
Sincerely,
Glenn B. Manishin
Counsel for CPSR
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ Glenn B. Manishin glenn@technologylaw.com Tel/Vms 202.955.6300 gbm@clark.net Fax 202.955.6460 gmanishin@earthlink.net ------------- Washington, DC, USA ------------- Firm: http://www.technologylaw.com/ Personal: http://www.clark.net/pub/gbm/ F1: http://www.clark.net/pub/gbm/F1/f1intro.html +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
CC: "Glenn Manishin" <glenn@technologylaw.com>
Before the
UNITED STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D.C. 20230
In the Matter of )
)
Request for Comment on Registration ) Docket No. 970613137-7137-01
and Administration of Internet )
Domain Names )
COMMENTS OF THE
COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Aki Namioka, President Glenn B. Manishin
Harry Hochheiser Michael D. Specht
Andy Oram Christine A. Mailloux
Computer Professionals for Social Blumenfeld & Cohen - Technology Law Group
Responsibility <http://www.technologylaw.com>
<http://www.cpsr.org/home.html> 1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 700
P.O. Box 717 Washington, D.C. 20036
Palo Alto, CA 94302 202.955.6300
415.322.3778
Counsel for CPSR
Dated: August 18, 1997
The Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) <http://www.cpsr.org/
home.html>, by their attorneys, submit these comments in response to the Notice
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dn5notic.htm> released by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov>
soliciting public input on the present and future systems for registration and administration of
Internet domain names.
SUMMARY
The current controversy over the Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) raises
important questions about how the Internet, as a decentralized, global medium, should be
administered and governed. While much of the Internet was invented and originally funded by the
US Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation (NSF) <http://www.nsf.
gov/>,
and although its governing institutions were initially established and sanctioned by the American
government, the Internet's technical standards and basic policies have in fact been set by a
number of ad hoc, consensus-based consortia comprised of Internet service providers,
engineers
and users. This system worked for a long time because of the shared goals and technical
sophistication of the Internet's original academic-based user community. See And How Shall
the
Net Be Governed?, by David R. Johnson & David G. Post <http://www.cli.org/
emdraft.html>.
But increasing commercialization and explosive growth have begun to strain the
consensus-driven process of Internet administration. The strong and widely publicized reactions
of many providers and users (and foreign governments) against the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) developed by the Internet Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC)
<http://www.iahc.org>
for revisions to Internet domain name registration and administration
<http://www.gtld-mou.org/> show that the stakes are high and that more open, considered
and perhaps formal
mechanisms for Internet self-governance -- and for evaluating alternative DNS proposals -- are
called for in the present environment. In these comments, CPSR focuses on proposals for
reforming DNS with a view toward maintaining open Internet self-government,
introducing
competition into Internet domain name administration, separating DNS management from
trademark protection, and supporting the continued growth of the Internet itself.
(CPSR
addresses each section of the NTIA Notice, and as requested our comments in Sections II-VI
follow the organization of the Notice.)
As discussed more fully below, CPSR -- a public interest alliance of information
technology professionals and others concerned about the impact of computer technology on
society, founded in 1981, with over 1,400 members and 22 chapters nationwide -- believes that
DNS is too important to the structure of the Internet for DNS "reform" to proceed in a
hasty or ill-conceived manner, particularly without adequate input from consumers and
other users of the Internet. Whatever its merits, the IAHC process was closed, rushed
and
unbalanced, leading to a proposal that should not be endorsed by the US government. CPSR
commends NTIA for commencing this open, thorough public airing of DNS issues, and
for its
express acknowledgment that DNS reform, like other aspects of Internet governance, should
remain a matter for the Internet community itself, not national or international government
agencies.
CPSR proposes that changes to the current DNS model must reflect the twin goals of
maintaining Internet self-governance, thus minimizing government's substantive role in Internet
administration, while avoiding the continuation of de facto DNS monopolies in the
increasingly
commercialized Internet. We also emphasize, however, that there is no present "crisis"
in
DNS administration that requires hasty implementation of any system for DNS reform,
including those proposed by IAHC, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) <http://www.netsol.com/
papers/internet.html> and others. Unlike IAHC or NSI, CPSR believes that the twin aims of
competitive Internet services and non-governmental Internet administration can and should be
applied to the DNS system. A sensible plan for DNS reform combines the better elements of both
the IAHC and NSI proposals, while jettisoning others. In this light, CPSR proposes the following
principles for reform of the Internet DNS system:
A. The Internet domain name registration process should be opened to competition for all existing and newly created generic top-level domains (gTLDs).
1. Shared gTLDs should be administered by competing registrars, with restrictions imposed only based on any technical limitations.
2. No registrar (NSI or others) should enjoy a proprietary interest or
commercial "ownership" of any gTLD, including ".com".
B. Domain registration should be separated from trademark issues.
Registrars should not be involved in trademark dispute resolution, but rather should refer all trademark issues to appropriate national and international judicial bodies.
C. The Internet's "root" server administration responsibilities should be coordinated
and centralized in order to assure reliability and scaleability of the Internet.
D. The DNS reform process and ongoing DNS administration should be handled in an open, balanced and non-governmental manner, with full participation by consumers and small commercial entities, in addition to trademark owners.
1. International quasi-governmental organizations (ITU, WIPO, OECD, etc.)
should have no formal role in Internet governance or domain name
registration. The extensive new bureaucracy for domain name
management and oversight proposed by IAHC, including a Swiss-based
Council of Registrars (CORE), a Policy Advisory Board (PAB)
<http://www.pab.gtld-mou.org> and a higher level interim Policy
Oversight Committee (iPOC), is unnecessary and counterproductive.
2. National governments (Commerce, DOD, etc.) have no necessary role in DNS administration except for ISO 3166 TLDs (e.g., ".us," ".de," etc.) and maintaining fair, open and competitively neutral Internet self-governance organizations.
3. The IAHC process was inconsistent with open Internet self-governance and biased towards trademark owners. With encouragement from NTIA, the Internet Society (ISOC) should be required to open up the process to permit full debate by the global Internet community on DNS practices. The absence of any "crisis" in domain name resources allows for thoughtful and deliberate consideration of DNS issues.
4. Hasty implementation of the IAHC approach will continue to splinter the
Internet community and would unnecessarily involve international quasi-governmental
organizations in Internet governance. The DNS reform
process should be slowed in order to permit achievement of a consensus
approach that all interest groups (including Internet users/consumers) can
support. No "rush to reform" is necessary.
5. The US government should not endorse, and should actively oppose,
intervention by ITU and WIPO in the DNS administration process. The
government should not attempt to unilaterally dictate any specific domain
name registration process for gTLDs, which are global Internet resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
1. The domain name system (DNS) provides a key service in the global
Internet. In translating Internet 'host' names into Internet Protocol (IP)
numbers needed for transmission of information, DNS shields network
users and administrators from the complexities of using IP numbers to
identify computers, routers and networks on the Internet. Without a
reliable, efficient and robust DNS system -- including registration of
domain names and management of DNS servers -- the Internet as currently
configured could not function in the user-friendly manner available for such
current Internet applications as electronic mail and World Wide Web
(WWW) browsing. DNS administration also plays an important role by
maintaining 'root' servers that operate as the highest-level Internet
databases for translating domain names into IP addresses, without which
domain name-based Internet communications would not be possible.
2. Many governmental, quasi-governmental and private groups, along with
users and Internet service providers, are currently examining the limitations
of the current DNS and domain name registration models, including
questions related to introducing competition to domain registration,
oversight mechanisms for DNS administration, opening of new generic top-level domains
(gTLDs), and the role of registrars in resolving trademark
disputes regarding domains.
3. One of these groups, the so-called Internet Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC),
has proposed and is implementing a plan for establishing new gTLDs, with
significant input from and the endorsement of international multilateral
organizations, such as the World International Property Organization
(WIPO) <http://www.wipo.int/> and the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) <http://www.itu.ch>, as well as major trademark holders.
After signing of its MOU in Geneva, the IAHC was dissolved on May 1,
1997 and replaced by the iPOC <http://www.gtld-mou.org/docs/ipoc-members.html>.
4. The IAHC proposal has drawn opposition and criticism from parties
ranging from Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) <http://www.netsol.com>, the
current US government-selected contractor responsible for registrations in
the '.com,' '.gov,' '.org,' and '.edu' domains, to the Domain Name
Rights Coalition <http://www.domain-name.org/dnrc-comments.html>, the
World Internetworking Alliance <http://www.wia.org/pub/dns-brief.html>,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
<http://www.oecd.org/>, Directorate General XIII (telecommunications)
of the European Union <http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg13/13home.htm>,
and major US-based Internet service providers. Alternate DNS models
have also been developed by other providers of domain name services, such
as eDNS <http://www.edns.net/> and AlterNIC <http://www.
alternic.net>, and in draft form by the Internet Engineering Task Force
<http://www.iahc.org/contrib/draft-iahc-higgs-tld-cat-03.txt>. At least one
entity has filed suit against the IAHC plan in the United States
<http://www.wia.org/dns-law/pub/stef-io-declaration.html>.
B. CPSR's Concerns
1. CPSR is a public interest alliance of information technology professionals
and others concerned about the impact of computer technology on society,
founded in 1981, with over 1,400 members and 22 chapters nationwide.
CPSR believes that the Internet is a potentially revolutionary medium that
has flourished, and grown exponentially over the past several years, in large
part due to marketplace competition and the absence of restrictive
government involvement. We believe these same objectives should be
applied to efforts to 'reform' DNS administration. Given its central role
in the development of the Internet, the US government has judged well
when to lead the process of Internet management and when to cede
authority to the Internet community and private organizations. In the case
of DNS administration, it is time for more decentralization, competition
and private initiative, although governments can and should serve as
'stewards' of the Internet to ensure open and inclusive processes, prevent
anticompetitive practices, and complete the final step in the transition from
a government-managed to a private sector, community-administered
Internet.
2. While CPSR agrees that monopoly domain registrars are a poor substitute
for a competitive DNS model, we caution that DNS is too important to the
structure of the Internet for DNS 'reform' to proceed in a hasty or ill-conceived manner,
particularly without adequate input from consumers and
other users of the Internet. Whatever its merits, the IAHC process was
inconsistent with consensus-based Internet policymaking and is biased
towards the rights of trademark owners. The IAHC plan should therefore
not be endorsed by the US government. CPSR applauds NTIA for
commencing this open, thorough public airing of DNS issues, and for its
express acknowledgment that DNS reform, like other aspects of Internet
governance, should remain a matter for the Internet community itself, not
national or international government agencies.
3. The current proposals for DNS reform have been advanced by groups with
commercial and institutional objectives that do not necessarily reflect the
broader interest in a competitive, non-governmental Internet structure.
ISOC is a respected organization, with an important role to play in the
Internet community, that to its credit, has correctly recognized that
problems exist with domain name administration. However, the outcry
provoked by IAHC's gTLD-MOU shows that its process was not open
enough. By unilaterally implementing its proposal through quasi-governmental international
organizations (ITU and WIPO), IAHC has
sought to legitimize a role in Internet governance it simply does not enjoy,
at a time when its controversial proposal was still undergoing critical
examination by the Internet community at large. Substantively, although it
proposes competitive provision of domain registration in a series of new
gTLDs, the IAHC plan is geared largely to the creation of international
rules (and mandatory, non-judicial arbitration) for trademark protection of
domain names, including a new bureaucracy within WIPO for the
resolution of domain disputes. The NSI response, in contrast, proposes to
protect its private commercial interests by extending its de facto monopoly
on '.com' registrations into a competitive DNS environment, without
sharing of TLDs, and has advocated that national and/or international
governments should be involved in 'oversight' of certain
'administrative' DNS functions <http://www.netsol.com/papers/
internet.html>.
4. Unlike IAHC or NSI, CPSR believes that the twin goals of competitive
Internet services and non-governmental Internet administration can and
should be applied to the DNS system. To do so, however, requires
recognition that (1) as NSI has explained, there are some functions, known
as 'root' server management, which need to remain centralized and
coordinated in order to promote reliable and scaleable Internet routing, and
(2) 'rationalization' of trademark law (the pursuit of what IAHC terms
'efficient' dispute mechanisms as an alternative to court litigation for
trademark protection) for DNS purposes is inconsistent with the
traditional, and successful, non-governmental approach to Internet
administration. (While the US government for years subsidized certain
Internet facilities and still contracts for DNS and IP-number allocation
functions, Internet policies, standards and operating arrangements have
been set with little if no government involvement since the
'commercialization' of the NSFNet backbone in 1994.)
C. CPSR's Proposal
A sensible plan for DNS reform combines the better elements of both the IAHC
and NSI proposals, while jettisoning others. In this light, CPSR proposes the
following principles for reform of the Internet DNS system:
1. The domain name registration process should be opened to competition for all existing and newly created gTLDs.
a. Shared TLDs should be administered by competing registrars, with restrictions imposed only based on any technical limitations.
b. No registrar (NSI or others) should enjoy a proprietary interest or commercial "ownership" of any gTLD, including ".com".
2. Domain registration should be separated from trademark issues.
Registrars should not be involved in trademark dispute resolution, but rather should refer all trademark issues to appropriate national and international judicial bodies.
3. The Internet's "root" server administration responsibilities should be
coordinated and centralized in order to assure reliability and scaleability of
the Internet.
4. The DNS reform process and ongoing DNS administration should be handled in an open, balanced and non-governmental manner, with full participation by consumers and small commercial entities, in addition to trademark owners.
a. International quasi-governmental organizations (ITU, WIPO,
OECD, etc.) should have no formal role in Internet governance or
domain name registration. The extensive new bureaucracy for
domain name management and oversight proposed by IAHC,
including a Swiss-based Council of Registrars (CORE), a Policy
Advisory Board (PAB) <http://www.pab.gtld-mou.org> and a
higher level Interim Policy Oversight Committee (iPOC), is
unnecessary and counterproductive.
b. National governments (Commerce, DOD, etc.) have no necessary role in DNS administration except for ISO 3166 TLDs (e.g., ".us," ".de," etc.) and maintaining fair, open and competitively neutral Internet self-governance organizations.
c. The IAHC process was inconsistent with open Internet self-governance and biased towards trademark owners. With encouragement from NTIA, ISOC should be required to open up the process to permit full debate by the global Internet community on DNS practices. The absence of any "crisis" in domain name resources allows for thoughtful and deliberate consideration of DNS issues.
d. Hasty implementation of the IAHC approach will continue to
splinter the Internet community and would unnecessarily involve
international quasi-governmental organizations in Internet
governance. The DNS reform process should be slowed in order to
permit achievement of consensus approach that all interest groups
(including Internet users/consumers) can support. No "rush to
reform" is necessary.
e. The US government should not endorse, and should actively
oppose, intervention by ITU and WIPO in the DNS administration
process. The government should not attempt to unilaterally dictate
any specific domain name registration process for gTLDs, which
are global Internet resources.
II. PRINCIPLES
NTIA has sought comment on a set of principles by which the Administration can
"evaluate proposals for the registration and administration of Internet domain names." The
proposed NTIA principles are:
"(1) Competition in and expansion of the domain name registration system should be
encouraged. Conflicting domains, systems, and registries should not be permitted
to jeopardize the interoperability of the Internet, however. The addressing scheme
should not prevent any user from connecting to any other site.
(2) The private sector, with input from governments, should develop stable,
consensus-based self-governing mechanisms for domain name registration and
management that adequately defines responsibilities and maintains accountability.
(3) These self-governance mechanisms should recognize the inherently global nature
of the Internet and be able to evolve as necessary over time.
(4) The overall framework for accommodating competition should be open, robust,
efficient, and fair.
(5) The overall policy framework as well as name allocation and management
mechanisms should promote prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of conflicts,
including conflicts over proprietary rights.
(6) A framework should be adopted as quickly as prudent consideration of these issues
permits."
CPSR Comments
A. The basic thrust of the NTIA principles are appropriate in light of the needs for
competition in gTLD domain registration and for Internet self-governance.
B. The international role of gTLDs is a crucial aspect of the principles. Neither the
US nor any other national government has authority to dictate unilaterally policies
or rules for gTLD creation or administration. While the vast majority of '.com'
domain registrations certainly remain in the United States, the US government can
best promote the global expansion of Internet access -- to the resulting commercial
benefit of American-based Internet software, hardware and content companies --
by ensuring that it is not viewed internationally as attempting to secure a favored
position for US-centric domain holders in the gTLD scheme.
C. The IAHC and NSI proposals raise administrative, legal, financial and business
issues far beyond the technical focus and scope of the ISOC. ISOC and the other
members of IAHC (such as ITU and IANA), have no clear charter to dictate gTLD
policy and little if any experience in legal procedure or public policy. A need exists,
therefore, for the establishment of new 'consensus-based self-governing
mechanisms' that allow balanced, fair and open participation on these Internet
policy issues by all segments of the Internet community. This includes Internet
users, who have essentially been excluded from the IAHC process. Given the
crucial nature of end-user participation, the Internet community deserves legitimate
public interest, non-profit input into decision making processes. The needs of the
Internet community should not be subordinated to profits or control issues. The
US government can thus act as a catalyst in assisting the creation of the new self-governance
organizations (open and balanced consortia of Internet professionals,
providers and users) that will be necessary to complete the transition to a fully
non-governmentally administered Internet.
D. Although the US government has fostered the growth of the Internet and laid the
framework for its current expansion and commercialization, its future role should
not include oversight of DNS administration or the selection of registrars and other
DNS-related entities (InterNIC, IANA, etc.). Rather, the US and other national
governments should encourage open, consensus-based Internet self-governance,
intervening (as in this proceeding) only to assure public debate and to prevent any
single segment of the Internet community from asserting its special interests above
those of all Internet users. As in its oversight of the North American Numbering
Plan Administrator (NANPA), the US government can also act to guarantee that
vital Internet communications resources are managed impartially by the affected
industries and to prevent disruptive efforts by other governments and inter-governmental
organizations to assert authority over Internet administration.
E. Conflict resolution for domain name registration need not and should not include
resolution of disputes over trademarks or other proprietary rights. DNS policies
should be based on technical efficiency, reliability and competitive considerations,
without regard to the relative legal rights of trademark owners and domain
holders. As discussed in Section VI, 'efficient' trademark dispute resolution is a
code word for supplanting judicial decision-making with DNS registrar-imposed
trademark rules. Particularly in the IAHC proposal -- which provides the basis for
WIPO to establish new international common law of trademarks applicable solely
to DNS and without resort to national courts -- combining DNS administration
and trademark dispute resolution is poor public policy.
III. GENERAL/ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK ISSUES
In this Section, NTIA asks for comment on a number of issues related to the operational
model for domain name registration and the technical basis for alternatives to the current model,
including retirement of gTLDs from circulation, the relationship between root servers and gTLDs,
and interoperability among registrars.
CPSR believes that the current model for DNS administration -- monopoly registrars for
both gTLDs and ISO (country code) domains -- is anticompetitive and will, in the long run,
present substantial risks to the scaleability of the Internet. We believe that the disadvantages of
the monopoly model clearly warrant a shared registration approach to gTLDs, but that certain
functions, namely root server administration, should remain centralized and coordinated in order
to preserve the basic reliability and 'transparent' functionality of the Internet itself.
A. Existing gTLDs should not be retired. In addition to the transaction costs and
confusion surrounding such an approach, the existence of 'supra-national'
domains is inherent in the global nature of the Internet, helping to maintain the
Internet as a geographical and politically indifferent medium. Instead of
eliminating the .com and other gTLD registries, competition should be introduced
into domain name registration.
B. Shared gTLDs are a workable and efficient approach to introducing competition to
the DNS system. Much as in the US system for administration of '800'
telephone numbers, common standards and technical interfaces can be created --
based on non-governmental industry standards processes -- to allow shared use of
the .com resource. Competing registrars would assign available domains in all
gTLDs on a first-come, first-served basis, with real-time querying of the
appropriate gTLD database. Internet users would in this way be accorded, for the
first time, real choice of domain name registrars, with the consequent competitive
pressures leading to reduced prices, improved service and innovative registration
options.
C. The IAHC proposal for the establishment of new gTLDs is a good approach, in
that it permits use of identical domain names in different gTLDs for different
purposes (e.g., mcdonalds.com and mcdonalds.nom). The specific new gTLDs
selected by IAHC, however, raise questions about global transparency and
potential duplication and user confusion that merit additional study. IAHC's
proposal, now rescinded, to limit the number of registries to 28 (four per WTO
region) is unnecessary, as there should be no limits on the creation and operation
of domain registries except as may be required for technical reasons. Rather than
mandating financial and other registrar qualifications, 'quality control' of domain
registration should be a function of the marketplace. So long as a registrar follows
any technical standards established for assignment of a domain name from a shared
TLD, there appears to be no reason why prior "authorization" from any
governmental or Internet-governance entity should be required for entry into the
domain name registration market.
D. Root server administration (and related "population" of zone server databases) is
a key DNS function that should remain centralized, under the control of a single
entity worldwide, and coordinated through a technically reliable and integrated
process. Root servers must maintain interoperable, updated databases in order to
ensure that all IP networks can communicate across the Internet. As NSI has
correctly noted, the IAHC proposal is deficient because it does not reflect this
need for root server (what NSI terms "the .dot") centralization and "risks the
fragile stability of the Internet" by "increasing the likelihood of failure of the
administrative functions and services of the Internet." Competition in root server
administration would therefore -- absent some new technical approach to Internet
architecture -- appear to represent an exception to the general principle of
competition for DNS. (Of course, competition could still exist as part of the root
server administrator selection process.)
E. The US government has traditionally been the "first-mover" on issues related to
Internet architecture and administration, but in this instance should refrain from
selecting the entity responsible for root server administration. Backbone Internet
carriers and other entities, commercial and governmental, responsible for IP
transport have the technical background to select a responsible root server
administrator and (as in ARIN <http://www.arin.net/>, RIPE <http://www.
ripe.net/>, etc.) establish compensation mechanisms under a non-governmental
structure.
1. End users and domain holders have no substantial interest in root server
administration since root servers are "transparent" to them. NSI's
proposal that the US government assume "interim authority" over root
server administration -- and then transfer such authority to an international
legal entity -- is unnecessary. Absent some fundamental breakdown in the
Internet's technical standards development process, the shared mutual
interest of backbone and major Internet transport providers in maintaining
functional, high-quality root server management (and ensuring their ability
to route domain-based messages to all other IP networks) is sufficient to
guarantee a responsible root server administration.
2. Root server centralization does not guarantee error-free administration or
coordination (synchronization), as the events of the past month (NSI's
snafu) have illustrated. Nonetheless, with the increasing reliance of
individuals and businesses worldwide on the Internet, any benefits from
competitive provisioning of root server management would appear to be
outweighed by the risks of network collapse (and overhead requirements)
arising from multiple root server administrators.
F. Oversight of shared gTLD administration should remain a non-governmental
function. It should not be placed under the auspices of quasi-governmental
organizations like WIPO or the ITU, as IAHC has proposed. So long as registrars
comply with consensus-based technical requirements for domain name registration,
there is no need for the creation of CORE, iPOC and the related new bureaucratic
bodies IAHC has proposed. Thus, as it has already indicated, the US government
should not endorse the IAHC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and should
oppose the use of ITU and WIPO as oversight bodies for the DNS system.
G. Administration of gTLDs and ISO country code domains is completely separable.
Although the same principles of competition and self-governance should also apply
to ISO-domain registrations, these resources have traditionally been considered to
be subject to the rules and policies of national governments. There is no technical
reason why competitive, shared gTLD administration cannot co-exist with the
many monopoly ISO-domain registrars. Indeed, the creation of a competitive
system for efficient, worldwide administration of gTLDs would have the
commensurate benefit of creating marketplace pressures that would encourage
national governments to open their own ISO-domain registries to competitive
entry. As the OECD has recommended to EU-member nations for their own
country code domains, the US government should consider opening the ".us"
domain to competing registries and should actively promote similar procompetitive
policies by other national governments for ISO country code domains.
H. The "transition to any new systems" for domain name registration should be
accomplished with the full, open and considered participation of all stakeholders in
the Internet. The IAHC proposal, in contrast, raises serious questions about the
authority of ISOC and the other members of IAHC to impose their chosen solution
for DNS reform and the essential openness of Internet self-governance.
(1) IAHC does not have sufficient input from the Internet community; the
Internet Society is not a member oriented group, and its decisions cannot
legitimately claim to be based on Internet community "consensus."
(2) IAHC's aggressive timelines are unjustified, especially given the lack of
urgent technical problems. As recently as August 1996, it was deemed
unlikely that the growth of the .com domain would pose any technical
problems.
(3) IAHC's comment period was very short (2 weeks), and its extremely rapid
implementation timeline does not allow for sufficient debate and generation
of proposals for registrars.
(4) According to a brief filed by the World Internetworking Alliance
<http://www.wia.org/pub/dns-brief.html>, the participation of international
groups in the IAHC raises concerns regarding the legal nature of the IAHC
proposal as an intergovernmental agreement.
(5) Despite the participation of ISOC, IAHC did not include substantial input
from the community of Internet end-users. Furthermore, the IAHC's
proposed bureaucracy is similarly lacking in community representation.
(6) IAHC is proceeding as if its proposal was thoroughly and completely
accepted, including a Geneva MOU signing ceremony in early May 1997
and the continuation of plans to implement CORE-managed shared gTLDs
in October 1997. However, this purported Internet consensus is not all
clear. For instance, the Commercial Internet Exchange (CiX)
<http://www.cix.org>, a consortium including members such as AT&T,
CompuServe and MCI, has expressed reservations regarding the IAHC
plan, and a new organization known as the Open Internet Congress (OIC)
<http://www.interactivehq./org/oic/> has similarly raised objections to the
closed, hasty and "top-down" nature of the IAHC process.
IV. CREATION OF NEW gTLDs
In this Section, NTIA specifically seeks comment on whether new gTLDs should be
established and whether there are any technical, practical and/or policy considerations that
constrain the number of different gTLDs or the management of gTLDs.
CPSR believes, as discussed in Section III above, that IAHC has developed a reasonable
approach to the creation of new gTLDs, with different gTLDs signifying different uses of
domains. Although this approach was driven more by the demands of existing registrars and
trademark owners for TLD-based alternatives to domain-name disputes in the .com registry, in
order to reduce pressures for litigation over .com domains, the concept of creating
"special-purpose" gTLDs is an attractive one from the perspective of both Internet users and
commercial
businesses. (Whether or not the specific gTLDs developed by IAHC are appropriate or optimal is
open to question, however.)
A. Creation of new gTLDs is not a necessary predicate to the introduction of
competition into the DNS system. Existing gTLDs registries could be
administered on a shared basis. There is no technical reason to create new gTLDs,
but there is also no technical constraint (except the capacity of root servers and IP
space) to the number of gTLDs that the Internet can support. Unlike the situation
in the North American Numbering Plan for telephone numbers, IP resources,
although finite, do not appear to be as anywhere near in such short supply as
telephone numbers and area codes. The creation of new gTLDs should not, at least
in the short run, create any undue stress on available IP resources.
B. Competitive provisioning of DNS is not sustainable if only new gTLDs are opened
for shared administration. As discussed in Section V, the .com and other NSI-administered TLD
registries are the product of the historic, US-government
monopoly over gTLDs and NSI's status as the "sole-source" government
contractor for domain registrations in gTLDs. Extending this monopoly into an
era of competitive DNS would allow one private, commercial entity to obtain the
most currently valuable gTLDs. Competition in DNS is accordingly inconsistent
with exclusive control of any gTLD, whether .com or a newly created gTLD.
V. POLICIES FOR REGISTRIES
In this Section, NTIA asks whether registrars should have exclusive control of a particular gTLD, whether shared and "exclusive" gTLDs can co-exist, whether there shoul