Before the
Department of
Commerce
National
Telecommunications and Information Administration
------------------------------------------------------
In the Matter of )
Request for Comment on the ) Docket No. 020514121-2121-01
Effectiveness of Internet Protection ) RIN 0660-XX14
Measures and Safety Policies )
)
COMMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY FOR TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION
The International Society for Technology in Education (ISTE) is a nonprofit professional organization with a worldwide membership of leaders in educational technology, promotes appropriate uses of information technology to support and improve learning, teaching, and administration in K–12 education and teacher education.
ISTE has supported and been engaged in developing the rules for the E-Rate program since its inception. ISTE has also supported and testified before Congress on many of the education technology grant programs covered by CIPA. Our members represent some of the most technologically sophisticated teachers and other school personnel in the United States and throughout the world. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the important issue of the specific role of filtering and blocking technology in the school environment, and applaud the NTIA for its leadership on this issue.
Part 1:
Section 1703(a)(1) of the Act requires NTIA to evaluate whether or not currently available technology protection measures, including commercial Internet blocking and filtering software, adequately address the needs of educational institutions.
Unless technological protection measures are accompanied by adequate training, allow for flexible usage, and are governed by local decision-making, they will never fully meet the needs of schools. First, we are convinced that technology alone will never prove to be a complete solution to preventing minors from gaining access to inappropriate material on the Internet. Any technological protection measures will only be successful if used in conjunction with appropriate training and instruction for both the children themselves, and for teachers and other appropriate school and library staff. Second, technological protection measures are not effective at every age or grade level, and indeed may hinder educational opportunities by blocking access to critical information. Therefore, we believe that realistic flexibility in the use of blocking and filtering software in classrooms and school libraries is both necessary and appropriate. Third, we maintain that decisions on the parameters for usage of blocking and filtering technology is best left in the hands of local decision makers, those with the greatest knowledge of the community.
In our experience, the transition to any new technology occurs more smoothly and more successfully when the expertise of the users is tapped and appropriate training is provided. The requirement that blocking and filtering software or services be used in schools, as mandated by CIPA, is no different. We certainly believe that filtering and blocking technology can be a useful tool for preventing minors from accessing inappropriate Internet content, but it is not a "silver bullet" solution that can replace education, judgment, and the supervision of children by teachers and other school staff. Filtering and blocking technology is most effective when teachers and educational institutions can customize it and use it in concert with other strategies and tools. It is less effective when implemented without giving due consideration to the judgment of classroom teachers, school library media specialists, and school technology coordinators. Consulting with and providing effective training to education professionals are prerequisites to the integration of effective technology protection measures into classrooms and school libraries.
Beyond working with teachers and librarians, we believe that it is vital that children also receive training and guidance on their use of the Internet. There has yet to be a technology devised that can prevent children from engaging in risky behavior or from being exposed to inappropriate material. We believe that programs that educate children to think critically and use the Internet safely and responsibly are the most effective measures to protect children from dangerous situations or inappropriate material on the Internet. As Attorney General Richard Thornburgh noted in the National Research Council's May 2002 report, "Youth, Pornography, and the Internet":
Swimming pools can be dangerous for children. To protect them, one can install locks, put up fences, and deploy pool alarms. All of these measures are helpful, but by far the most important thing that one can do for one's children is to teach them to swim.[1]
Technology protection measures should be defined broadly to include educational programs that teach children how to protect themselves from risky or inappropriate situations involving technology. We support providing children with training that covers effective Internet search skills, the importance of protecting their personal information online, how to avoid risky situations, and how to evaluate the veracity, educational value, and appropriateness of Internet content. We also recommend programs like the Consortium for School Networking’s Safeguarding the Wired Schoolhouse[2], the American Library Association's Families Connect[3] and Kids Connect[4] programs, sites like the Children's Partnership[5], SafeKids.com[6] and SafeTeens.com[7], and GetNetWise[8] as tremendous resources designed to help young people have safe, educational, fun, and age-appropriate online experiences.
In sum, we do not believe that software-based technology protection measures can now, or will in the future, be able to replace education and judgment. These are the most critical parts of protecting children. As the National Research Council's report forcefully concludes:
In short, a child who responsibly chooses appropriate materials to access and appropriate things to do on the Internet and who knows what to do about inappropriate materials and experiences should he or she come across them is much safer than a child whose parents and school teachers reply primarily on technology and public policy to solve the problem for them.[9]
Even with all the training and education in the world, we believe that there are simply times when the technology fails, either by missing inappropriate sites, or by depriving students and teachers of access to legitimate information. We are particularly concerned about the latter situation. For example we were disturbed to learn that the web site belonging to Jeffery Pollock, a Republican candidate for the 3rd Congressional District seat in Oregon in 2000, was blocked by CyberPatrol[10], and surprised by reports that biographies of several members of the Children's Online Protection Act Commission were also blocked by Cyber Sentinel.[11] We list these examples not to single out these products, but to illustrate the limitations even mainstream, widely used filtering and blocking products face. Nearly every product with which we are familiar includes similarly absurd examples of overblocking errors.
It is our impression that most filtering and blocking technology tools do a good job of preventing children from viewing sexually explicit material that is age inappropriate. However, our members have reported problems with both overblocking and underblocking. According to the National Research Council's report, "these two types of errors are inevitable."[12] Overblocking errors are particularly troublesome when teachers either lack the training to, or are prohibited by law from disabling the filtering software for minors to engage in research or other educational purposes. Teachers should have the training and flexibility to use common-sense solutions to ensure that children are able to have the most rich, engaging education available. Therefore, we believe that it is appropriate for schools to be empowered to disable the filtering or blocking technology when they believe it to be educationally appropriate to do so.
III. Local Communities Should Choose
The decision of when it is appropriate to allow unfettered access to information that technology tools block or filter should, in our opinion, remain a local one. Local communities are in the best position to comprehend the local resources (financial and human), values, and other community concerns that figure into the calculus of employing blocking or filtering technology.
Before the enactment of CIPA, nearly 75% of schools used filtering or blocking technology in at least some circumstances. While some schools and school districts used it for all grade levels, and in classrooms, libraries, and computer labs, others used it in more limited circumstances. For example, some school districts filtered only at the elementary grades, or only at terminals where their teachers or other staff might not easily see students' computer screens. Other districts opted to use filters, but disabled them for advanced biology, health, or medical science classes where necessary Internet sites were blocked by the filtering product. These choices, and the thousands of other choices made by schools and school districts throughout the United States reflected carefully considered local decision-making and encouraged flexible, innovative use of technology.
We do not know the penetration rates of blocking, filtering, or monitoring products overall because major vendors claim vastly different, and often incompatible, shares of the educational market. However, it is our impression that prior to the passage and implementation of CIPA approximately 75% of schools used filtering technology on some computers in the school or school district. Now that the use of such filters on all computers is mandated by CIPA in order for schools to participate in the E-Rate program and other federal educational technology funding programs, we expect that number to increase. We also believe that a small, but possibly growing, number are using monitoring or “packet sniffing” technologies in order to comply with the monitoring provisions of CIPA.
We also do not know whether specific methods of filtering and blocking technologies are more widely used than others. We have observed, though, that most major companies describe their products as using some combination of human review and categorization of web sites, so-called “context sensitive” keyword content analysis, and lists of URLs or IP addresses that have already been categorized by content. However, due to competitive concerns, most companies do not reveal precise market share figures, especially not in such a way that lends itself to easy comparison.
It is our belief that many educational institutions adopted and implemented a variety of different strategies to deal with inappropriate Internet content—some of which included technology and some of which did not. While it cannot be determined whether these strategies completely prevented minors from accessing inappropriate content, it is certain that most of these strategies satisfied the communities implementing them, in most cases, policies and practices were divided with input from the school community, and they addressed specific community concerns, including the allocation of resources. It is our opinion that locally generated decisions on Internet safety are usually the best measure of success.
Prior to E-Rate Year 5, which began on July 1, 2002, educational institutions throughout the country used a wide range of techniques to ensure that students had safe, educational, and age-appropriate experiences online, including acceptable use policies, technologies, monitoring and supervision, educational programs, and other procedures. Communities developed solutions that fit their unique circumstances, and which varied depending on variables such as: faculty and staff familiarity with technology, the level of patron and parent involvement, the values of the community, funding resources, size of the community and the educational institution, degree of supervision available, educational philosophy of the institution, and political will of library and school board members.
Two examples of community-driven Internet safety decisions, made after passage of CIPA, come from Georgia and Montana:
The Walker County School District in Georgia has chosen comply with CIPA in order to continue its participation in the E-Rate program. Their Acceptable Use Policy describes the type of material they have determined to be objectionable. Although they filter Internet access, they also note that filtering is an imperfect tool, and instruct students and staff on how to handle inadvertent exposure to objectionable material:
The Walker County
[Georgia] School District currently blocks the categories of Adults
Only, Alcohol, Chat, Drugs, Free
Mail, Free Pages, Gambling, Hate/Discrimination, Illegal, Lingerie,
Murder/Suicide, Nudity, Pornography, Profanity, School Cheating Information,
Search Terms, Sex, Tasteless/Gross, Tobacco, Violence, and Weapons.) However, no
software is foolproof, and there is still a risk an Internet user may be
exposed to a site containing such materials.
An Account user who incidentally connects to such a site must
immediately disconnect from the site and notify a teacher or supervisor.
The Roy School in Roy, Montana, did not filter Internet access before passage of CIPA. Instead, they used an Acceptable Use Policy which was itself an educational tool for students and families. The policy outlined specific acceptable and unacceptable behavior and use of Roy School computers and the Internet, and required both students and their parents to sign the policy. Parents were also required to affirm that they understood that the Internet included material, which might be seen by students, that the parent might consider controversial or offensive. The Roy School focus on Internet safety is well illustrated by its Acceptable Use Policy introduction and also its treatment of "chat" online.
Computers are used to
support learning and to enhance instruction. Computer networks allow people to
interact with many computers. The
Internet, a network of networks, allows people to interact with hundreds of
thousands of networks and computers. It
is a general policy that all computers used through the Roy School District are
to be used in a responsible, efficient, ethical and legal manner. Failure to adhere to the policy and the
guidelines for the use of networked computers as described below, at a minimum
may result in the revocation of access privileges.
Internet Relay Chat
(IRC). IRC provides the capability of engaging in "real-time"
discussions. The District will provide
access to IRC only for specifically defined educational activities.
1. Personal Safety (Restrictions are for students only)
a. Users will not post personal contact information about themselves or other people. Personal contact information includes address, telephone, school address, work address, etc.
b. Users will not agree to meet with someone they have met online without their parent's approval and participation.
c. Users will promptly disclose to their teacher or other school employee any message they receive that is inappropriate or makes them feel uncomfortable.
http://www.midrivers.com/~roy2/RSAUP.htm
Note that the Roy School now uses filtering software. This change to the Acceptable Use Policy is highlighted in red on their web site.
Blocking software. The District has installed CyberSitter filtering software on Internet connected computers as mandated by CIPA.
Part 1, Question 4
Although ISTE has some technology provider members, we are not able to answer this question in detail. We commend you to other studies that describe in detail the mechanics of filtering and blocking technology, including the COPA Commission Report, the National Academies study on “Youth, Pornography, and the Internet,” and expert witness testimony presented in the ALA/ACLU challenge to CIPA by computer scientist Dr. Geoffrey Nunberg, Ben Edelman of the Berkman Center at Harvard University, and Ph.D. candidate Christopher Hunter of the Annenberg School for Communication of the University of Pennsylvania.
Our members have reported significant levels of frustration with material that they consider educationally appropriate being inappropriately blocked. For example, a health sciences magnet school reported that in order to gain access to certain biomedical information sites, which may be graphic, the teacher must temporarily disable the filtering software for students in these specialty classes. These frustrations can be reduced, although not eliminated, by products that permit a system administrator or other local technology employee to permanently edit or override a list of blocked sites. However, this is seldom available as a real-time solution, and with some products, it is not available under any circumstances.
Even if a solution to the technology problem is achieved, the provisions of CIPA constitute another obstacle to students' access to legitimate information. CIPA's E-Rate provisions do not allow teachers to disable filtering software when minors are using the computers, even for research or other bona fide purposes. These provisions pose a serious burden on teachers and diminish the quality of the educational experience for students.
Finally, we are concerned that CIPA is having the effect of locking in filtering and blocking technology as the "technology protection measure" of choice, thereby stifling potential innovation in the marketplace. With a large block of the education market required to purchase filtering or blocking products, and most schools barred from disabling those products, CIPA provides blocking and filtering companies no incentives to develop new technological protection measures or improve the flexibility of existing software, for example, by developing simple overriding or disabling procedures for classroom use.
Based on publicly available information, such as testimony before the Commission on Children's Online Protection (the "COPA Commission") and on the actions of filtering and blocking companies in the ALA/ACLU challenge to the public library provisions of CIPA, it appears that many companies decline to provide access to the lists of blocked or filtered sites used by their product or products. They view this information as proprietary and express concern that release of such lists would either be abused by their competitors, or would be tantamount to providing the public with a list of pornographic web sites, in direct conflict with their corporate mission.
More companies are willing to provide some description of the criteria used to deny or permit such access. However, those descriptions vary considerably in scope, detail, and helpfulness. Particularly among the smaller service providers, detailed information may be unavailable.
We encourage the NTIA to recommend that technology companies provide greater information to schools and libraries, including lists of blocked or filtered sites, detailed criteria explaining how decisions to block or not block are made, and how to appeal an initial ruling that prevents a web site from being available in a classroom. If unblocking can be done by on-site system administrators, technology companies should work with school district procurement officials to ensure that teachers, school technology coordinators, and other relevant staff are properly trained.
Our members report that technology companies vary quite significantly in this regard. Some companies permit on-site override, rendering the question of their adding or deleting web sites irrelevant. Some companies provide an online process to check why a URL has been blocked, that is easy to use and may include a request to review the blocking decision. Others make it more difficult or are slow to respond.
The NTIA should encourage technology companies to work with school district technology coordinators to ensure that classroom teachers and other staff understand the process by which specific web sites may be added or deleted from the list or lists of those blocked in a given school or district. While most companies are willing to work with schools, the NTIA should also work to ensure that all technology companies receiving government contracts, including those from educational institutions, have in place a review process for such requests that is fair, non-ideological, rapid, and easy to use.
We also urge NTIA to carefully examine the issue of unblocking , to report on the current availability and usability of unblocking features and to urge more research and development in this area that would make these products more appropriate for “real time ”classroom use.
Our members consider all of the factors set out in the question as well as a number of others when selecting filtering and blocking technology and other software or services they purchase. They examine the ease of use, the ability to customize, the ability to override and unblock sites the school considers educationally useful, and the preferences of the community. Unfortunately, we have found that a number of districts must make product cost a primary consideration as schools struggle with limited budgets. As a result, school districts are choosing cheaper and likely less-sophisticated products because of economic necessity.
Fostering the Development of Technology Measures
Section 1703(a)(2) directs NTIA to initiate a notice and
comment proceeding to make recommendations on how to foster the development of
technology measures that meet the needs of educational institutions.
No technology provides a silver bullet for protecting children or limiting their access to prohibited Internet activity. Most filtering and blocking software effectively blocks access to sexually explicit material. However, both underblocking and overblocking errors take place in all technology. Even where educational institutions have attempted to use filtering and blocking tools that conform narrowly to the requirements of CIPA, the National Research Council study, “Youth, Pornography, and the Internet,” found that “Due to the nature of filtering, these two types of errors are inevitable.”[13]
Another drawback of CIPA is that it includes a "catch-all" category permitting schools to block any material "deemed inappropriate for minors." Many filtering products used in schools are now being configured to block access to free web pages, free e-mail accounts, graphic violence, hate sites, online gambling, sites promoting drug use, and in some cases, dozens of other categories. We were struck by one finding of the National Research Council study—that teachers and school technology coordinators reported that “avoiding controversy and/or liability for exposing children to inappropriate sexually explicit material was the primary reason offered for the installation of filters.”[14] We are dismayed that the laudable aims of CIPA have led to these types of constitutionally and educationally suspect consequences.
We do not believe, as some have suggested, that lack of familiarity or knowledge about the available filtering and blocking tools is a significant reason for their non-adoption. Our statistics bear that out. Even before CIPA's passage, schools and libraries were aware of blocking and filtering tools, and many had implemented them in various ways. Before CIPA became law, nearly 75% of schools[15] chose to filter Internet access. This number has likely increased since the passage of CIPA. After CIPA was enacted, for example, and additional 12% of libraries decided to filter or block Internet access, totaling 43% overall. The overwhelming majority of libraries filtering Internet access filter children's terminals; only half of those filter terminals used by adults. This represented a significant jump from the year before CIPA passed, in which only 31% used filtering at all.[16]
While there remain a substantial number of educational institutions electing not to filter Internet access, there are any number of reasons for such decisions, including: educational philosophy, cost, maintenance, training time and expense, concern over civil liberties, or a preference for other education solutions, acceptable use policies or teacher monitoring. Which of these is prevalent is impossible to know.
The number one feature needed by educational institutions is flexibility. Unfortunately, although there are tools with considerable flexibility encoded, use of these features is prohibited by CIPA for schools receiving E-Rate funding for Internet access and internal networking. The section of the statute in question reads:
(D) Disabling during adult use. An administrator, supervisor, or other person authorized by the certifying authority under subparagraph (A)(i) may disable the technology protection measure concerned, during use by an adult, to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purpose. [17] (Emphasis added.)
At a minimum, the NTIA should explain the importance of building flexibility into blocking and filtering software and recommend that E-Rate recipients covered by CIPA have the same flexibility as schools receiving only CIPA-covered Department of Education funding in disabling technology protection measures. Unlike E-Rate recipients, those schools are permitted to disable filtering software for minors as well as adults, a feature of the law which our members find makes more sense in schools. The segment of CIPA which addresses these Department of Education funds reads:
(3) Disabling during certain use. An administrator, supervisor, or other person authorized by the responsible authority under paragraph 1 may disable the technology protection measure concerned to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purpose. [18] (Emphasis added.)
It makes no legal sense to have two standards for schools based on the source of federal technology funds, and it makes no pedagogical sense to prevent schools from accessing educationally useful sites.
Our members who teach high school report considerably more difficulty using filtering and blocking software than those who teach young children, particularly in the area of overblocking. Older students, who are expected to use the Internet to conduct their own research, especially for health and medical-related courses, often run into difficulties with filters blocking explicit biomedical sites, sites related to the use of alcohol and illegal drugs, and sites related to teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.
As noted above, in many cases even where the tool could be disabled to accommodate bona fide research or other lawful purposes, our members are often uncertain if they may do so. Since many schools and school districts participate in the E-Rate program, the majority cannot disable the filtering or blocking technology for minors under any circumstances.
We understand that there are products on the market that can be disabled for a period of time, using a password. The ability to use such a feature would permit somewhat more flexibility and allow for a greater range of material to be used. However, even the liberal use of disabling options would still interrupt what Professor Donna Hoffman of Vanderbilt University calls the "flow" of the Internet experience.
Lastly, we do not believe that even if schools were permitted to dismantle these tools, it would prove easy to do. While several web sites, such as www.peacefire.org, include instructions for bypassing various filtering software packages, these instructions are complex and do not apply to all filtering and blocking tools. Most of the tools available today include hidden files that may require a password to fully "uninstall" or are housed on the Internet server, not the computer in the home. Although many parents feel that their children understand computers and the Internet better than they do, there is scant evidence that children are actually able to dismantle filtering or blocking technology.
Current Internet Safety Policies
Section 1703(a)(3) requires NTIA to evaluate the
development and effectiveness of local Internet safety policies currently in
operation that were established with community input.
Internet safety and acceptable use policies are highly effective at ensuring that young people have safe, age-appropriate experiences online if they are accompanied by educational efforts.
Just as we must teach children to look both ways before crossing the street, we must teach children appropriate behavior for using the Internet safely and appropriately. If a school district treats their Internet safety and acceptable use policy as “yet another form” that children and parents must sign in the beginning of the school year, but they are not reading, using, or enforcing it, it will not be not an effective deterrent.
However, an Internet safety and acceptable use policy can be an extremely effective if its principles are inculcated in students. For example, the Cleveland Municipal School District requires children to take a “Student Internet Test” before they can use the Internet. Students must score a perfect 100% on the test, which covers both safety and appropriate behavior. Only after a student has passed the test, and both a parent and the student have signed a permission slip acknowledging that they have read and understand the acceptable use policy, does the student receive his or her signed “Internet Driver’s License.” (http://www.cmsdnet.net/AUP/AUPformsltr.htm)
Similar programs have been developed commercially and are being sold to school districts by companies such as Education World (http://www.educationworld.com/internet_drivers_lic/idl.shtml).
We recommend that all school districts review Internet safety and acceptable use policies on a regular basis to ensure that they appropriately cover current technology and reflect the values of their communities. This is the best way to ensure that current policies meet the needs of the institution and the community.
According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, in the Department of Education, 91% of schools "used more than one procedure or technology as part of their policy," in 2000.[19] Specifically 98% of public schools with Internet access had an "Acceptable Use Policy" and of those:
· 94% had teachers or staff monitoring student access to the Internet;
· 74% used blocking and filtering software;
· 64% used an honor code;
· 28% used a school intranet;
Furthermore,
· 91% of the schools used more than one of the aforementioned procedures, and
· 15% used all of them.
Informal conversations with our members suggest that these numbers are an accurate reflection of the use of technology tools and acceptable use policies in schools.
As noted in the answer to Question 1, Part 1, and throughout our answers, our members believe that educational programs are the most effective measure an educational institution can take to protect children from dangerous situations or inappropriate material on the Internet. In fact, we fully agree with the National Research Council's conclusion that education is essential for children's online safety.
Parry Aftab, the Executive Director of CyberAngels put it best when she said:
[T]he best filter, and one that comes at no additional charge, is the one installed between our children's ears as we teach them how to make judgments. It needs constant updating, but if we take the time to help our children develop good judgment, we never have to worry about what happens when they face the real world, online or offline.[20]
[1] Youth, Pornography, and the Internet, a report of the National Research Council, May 2, 2002, prepublication copy page ES-6, 7.
[2] http://www.safewiredschools.org/
[3] http://www.ala.org/ICONN/familiesconnect.html
[4] http://www.ala.org/ICONN/kidsconn.html
[5] http://www.childrenspartnership.org/
[6] http://www.safekids.com/
[7] http://www.safeteens.com/
[8] http://www.getnetwise.org/
[9] Youth, Pornography, and the Internet, a report of the National Research Council, May 2, 2002, prepublication copy page 14-7.
[10] http://www.peacefire.org/blind-ballots/
[11] http://www.copacommission.org/papers/peacefire.org/censorware/Cyber_Sentinel/cyber-sentinel-blocked.html
[12] Youth, Pornography, and the Internet, a report of the National Research Council, May 2, 2002, prepublication copy page 2-18.
[13] Youth, Pornography, and the Internet, a report of the National Research Council, May 2, 2002, prepublication copy page 2-18.
[14] Youth, Pornography, and the Internet, a report of the National Research Council, May 2, 2002, prepublication copy page 12-11.
[15] National Center for Education Statistics, "Internet Access in U.S. Public Schools and Classrooms: 1994 – 2000" http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/internetaccess/
[16] Norman Oder, "The New Wariness," The Library Journal, January 15, 2002
[17] 47 U.S.C. 254 (h)(5)(D)
[18] 20 U.S.C. 6801 et seq.
[19] National Center for Education Statistics, "Internet Access in U.S. Public Schools and Classrooms: 1994 – 2000" http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/internetaccess/
[20] NetFamilyNews, May 21, 1999, http://www.netfamilynews.org/sl990521.html