

Healthcare SBOM Proof of Concept

2.0

UPDATE 2020-04-15

Summary / Status

<u>Goals</u>

Prove viability of Framing document's definition

Expansion beyond initial PoC

- Expanded use cases
- Expanded participant list
- \circ $\,$ Tooling and automation

"How-to" / playbooks for HDOs and MDMs

Approach

Collaborate with other working groups on definition

SBOMs produced for a predefined set of devices

Execute proposed use cases including procurement

Iterate to increasing complexity and speculative topics with published deliverables each iteration

Participants

HDOs finalized

- Cedars-Sinai
- Christiana Care
- Mayo Clinic
- New York Presbyterian
- Sutter Heath

MDMs finalized

- Abbott
- Medtronic[♠]
- Philips
- Siemens Healthineers
- Thermo Fisher Scientific⁴

Tooling Suppliers

• Not finalized

Tooling

The PoC welcomes additional tooling suppliers / vendors capable of speaking SBOM*

Usage

- Creation of SBOMs: integration into code analysis and build processes
- Consumption of SBOMs: integration into asset management and risk management
- Also possible: comparing (Diffing) documents, translating between formats

Vendors are encouraged to participate

- If not already in the PoC, contact Allan Friedman (<u>AFriedman@ntia.gov</u>) to sign up
- Participation may require execution of existing NDA, depending upon level of involvement

*At this point, we are targeting SPDX and SWID

Use Cases (Overviews)


Procurement: Cross-team exercise to explore how the SBOM impacts the purchasing decision, including the development of contract language.

Asset Management: Demonstrate the inventorying of application components using both manual processes and CMDB/CMMS technologies.

Risk Management: Leverage manual processes and automated eGRC technologies to identify new vulnerabilities and risks over time and implement risk mitigation techniques.

Vulnerability Management: Identify ways to supplement and integrate SBOM data into vulnerability identification and security scanning activities.

- Transmit the SBOM over the Internet and identify lifecycle management processes
- Develop contract language to coincide with procurement activities
- Identify vulnerable, end-of-life, and/or custom software components, as well as potential system conflicts and measure vulnerability vs exploitability
- Suggest compensatory or alternative controls to reduce the risk of vulnerable components
- Measure potential reduction of assessment artifacts (i.e. vendor questionnaires)
- Determine licensing agreements around support and patching and which anti-malware software type and version are able to be installed
- Determine if another product should be considered with less inherent problems due to the software lifecycle
- Identify roadmaps to improve MDM vulnerabilities




- Adopt a standard naming convention
- Establish workflows to support the intake and management of assets into the CMDB/CMMS
- Correlate vulnerability information (i.e. NVD) to perform initial and ongoing risk assessments
- Leverage SBOM data to provide insight into end of life identification and planning; determine if custom software can also be reasonably identified and inventoried
- Initiate invasive scanning and penetration testing (when the device is not in use) to measure and compare known vulnerabilities with SBOM information and potential clinical exposure
- Implement and document mitigation strategies and measure changes in risk
- Monitor vulnerability announcements, track patching activities, and assess device risk over time
- Measure and analyze SBOM inventory across a fleet of products and systems




- Utilize common database (i.e. NVD), data analytics tooling and CMDB/CMSS to identify vulnerabilities
- Explore eGRC processes and technologies to support automated, periodic risk analysis and reporting; potential utilization of an automation tool to build ISO 9001 standard rules to do risk assessment
- Develop mitigation strategies within the HDOs and in collaboration with the MDMs
- Supplement machine-readable MDS2 with SBOM software component information as part of a comprehensive risk assessment
- Leverage SBOM data to support risk mitigation and management across the fleet using type, make/model, etc.
- The POC will also explore utilizing vulnerability vs exploitability (VEX) information if available to facilitate risk management activities. Note: this is *not a requirement* for the minimally viable SBOM.



- Identify integration points with the SBOM and existing security scanning tools
- Determine appropriate scan configurations for BioMed and IoT devices to prevent crashes or denial of service
- Automate vulnerability management activities with SBOM information that me be imported into a CMDB/CMSS and capture this activity as a playbook deliverable
- Locate vulnerabilities that cannot be easily mitigation or patched and explore network controls to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Determine what other strategies are successful, from whitelisting and MDM initiated BIOS changes, to what can be written to the partition, to micro segmentation of a network and port blocking
- Establish a repeatable workflow with MDMs to mitigate vulnerabilities identified at the different software layers of SBOMs





Discussion

Questions? Comments? Suggestions? Volunteers?