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To: <dnssec@ntia.doc.gov>
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To:
Fiona Alexander
Associate Administrator
Office of International Affairs
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce

RE: Docket Number: 0810021207--81308--01

To whom it may concern:

Secure operation of the domain name infrastructure is vital to the global Internet community. Significant compromise of this infrastructure could adversely effect national security and the global economy.

Over the years, several vulnerabilities to the domain name infrastructure have been demonstrated. This summer, one particularly dangerous vulnerability was demonstrated by Daniel Kaminsky. Although exploitation of this vulnerability was not wide-spread, the Internet was at risk until it was mitigated.

In order to protect the domain name infrastructure from vulnerabilities like Kaminsky's, the Internet community must deploy DNSSEC as soon as possible. While it is tempting to defer DNSSEC deployment until we have refined and optimized the root zone signing procedure, this luxury is not available to us. We must sign the root zones and deploy DNSSEC before the next vulnerability leads to significant compromise.

Therefore, I support the proposal submitted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). In my opinion, this proposal strikes an appropriate balance of responsibilities among the United States Government, ICANN and VeriSign.

While I support the ICANN proposal and believe that it must be implemented as quickly as possible, would like to add the following comments:

ICANN should make clear that it is the custodian, and not the owner, of the key-signing and zone-signing keys. While ICANN generates, uses and protects those keys, it makes no claim to ownership. Therefore, it cannot use those keys for any purpose other than that described in its proposal to NTIA.

Furthermore, at some time in the future, the Internet community may revisit the root zone signing procedure and determine that the ICANN proposal no longer meets its needs. At that point, responsibilities and key custodianship may need to be reassigned.

Ron Bonica

DISCLOSURE and DISCLAIMER: Ron Bonica is currently employed by Juniper Networks and currently serves as co-director of the IETF Operations and Management Area. The opinions stated in this memo are his, and do not necessarily represent those of his employer or the IETF.