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**To:** <dnssec@ntia.doc.gov>  
**Date:** Mon, Nov 24, 2008 5:10 PM  
**Subject:** Response to DNSSEC NOI

I'm writing this response to the NOI in a personal capacity. I've worked for the last 25 years in researching and building networks and in Internet governance in the UK, New Zealand and Australia and I'm acutely aware of the critical importance of the DNS to the security and stability of the Internet infrastructure.

This was highlighted early this year by the risk posed by the Cache Poisoning exploit (also known as the Kaminsky bug).

This NTIA initiative is a timely opportunity to help secure the integrity of the DNS system by signing the Root zone of the DNS.

I believe that the signing of the root zone should be done by an organisation that has public accountability and I believe that the ICANN proposal for signing the root meets that criteria in a way that the Verisign proposal cannot.

There are issues around the increased complexity of the process which may cause confusion and difficulty in the operations community I believe that these can be overcome by training and awareness raising and that the advantages of having a signed DNS system outweighs the downsides.

Signing the root zone will not solve DNS security issues in itself or overnight but it is a necessary step to allow the whole system to be secured.

I endorse the signing of the root zone as soon as is practically possible.

I am a member of the Board of New Zealand's Domain Name Commission which sets the policy for the .nz namespace and we have previously said that we see the signing of the root zone as a necessary requirement so that we can proceed with our plans to deploy DNSSEC for the .nz zone. I have copied them on this response so that they are aware of my statement on this issue.

Andy Linton

**CC:** <dncl-board@internetnz.net.nz>