From: <>
To: NTIADC40.SMTP40("")
Date: 10/9/98 7:21am
Subject: <none>

6th October, 1998

Secretary Of Commerce
C/0 Karen Rose
Office of International Affairs
Room 471
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
United States Department of Commerce
14th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20230

Dear Sir,

RE: International Not-For-Profit Corporation to Administer Policy for the
Internet Name and Address System

We are a reputable Law firm situated in Lagos, Nigeria specialising in Intellectual Property practice amongst other areas of practices in Nigeria and Africa in general.

We note with interest the tremendous progress made regarding the formation of the above- named corporation and that presently, a Board of Directors is yet to be elected.

We observe also that the list of persons recommended to serve on the Interim Board does not include a representative from Africa, nor are trademark owners duly represented therein.

This we believe is not in line with the recommendations contained in the White Paper issued by the United States Department of Commerce, which specifically stipulated that " . the Internet is a global medium and.....its technical management should reflect the global diversity of Internet users". It goes further to stipulate that "the new corporation's organisers include "representatives of .. International trademark holders .. respected throughout the international Internet community"

As the creation of the said organisation is fully responsive to the criteria and specific recommendations set forth in the White Paper, we believe that the above recommendations should be taken into consideration in the constitution of the Board.

In particular that an African representative be appointed on the Board as well as trademark holders.

We trust that you would use your good office to rectify this disappointing situation which does not augur well with the numerous users of the Internet in Africa.

Thanking you for your kind attention to this matter.

Yours faithfully,


Lookman Durosinmi-Etti

From: <>
To: NTIADC40.SMTP40("")
Date: 10/9/98 7:21am
Subject: <none>

6th October, 1998

Senior Advisor to the president for Policy Department
216 Old Executive Office Building.
17th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear Sir,

RE: International Not-For-Profit Corporation to Administer Policy for the
Internet Name and Address System

We are a reputable Law firm situated in Lagos, Nigeria specialising in Intellectual Property practice amongst other areas of practices in Nigeria and Africa in general.

We note with interest the tremendous progress made regarding the formation of the above- named corporation and that presently, a Board of Directors is yet to be elected.

We observe also that the list of persons recommended to serve on the Interim Board does not include a representative from Africa, nor are trademark owners duly represented therein.

This we believe is not in line with the recommendations contained in the White Paper issued by the United States Department of Commerce, which specifically stipulated that " . the Internet is a global medium and.....its technical management should reflect the global diversity of Internet users". It goes further to stipulate that "the new corporation's organisers include "representatives of .. International trademark holders .. respected throughout the international Internet community"

As the creation of the said organisation is fully responsive to the criteria and specific recommendations set forth in the White Paper, we believe that the above recommendations should be taken into consideration in the constitution of the Board.

In particular that an African representative be appointed on the Board as well as trademark holders.

We trust that you would use your good office to rectify this disappointing situation which does not augur well with the numerous users of the Internet in Africa.

Thanking you for your kind attention to this matter.

Yours faithfully,


Lookman Durosinmi-Etti

From: Jeff Williams <>
To: NTIADC40.SMTP40("")
Date: 10/8/98 7:55pm
Subject: Re: [ifwp] Re: Delicate balance

Karl and all,

First let me say that you pose some interesting thoughts here. Maybe it is possible for me in respect to the BWG and our proposal which share some similarities yet are significantly different as to be opposing in some significant areas.

Karl Auerbach wrote:

> > You're right that the name of the game is structural accountability of the
> > board--or, in the bicameral structure here, at least half the board--to the
> > internet community/communities at large. The right membership structure is
> > one way to try to ensure that. The only problem is that pretty much
> > everyone has punted on coming up with a specific membership structure, both
> > because it's hard to map out and because any given map won't readily gather
> > a steam of consensus around it at this stage.
> I absolutely agree that membership is the single hardest thing to do.

Hard seems to imply here that there is a difficult in defining whom should composesuch a membership organization. We eventually came back to where the IFWP process really started. That being that ALL stakeholders are indeed members of equal status. And as such have equal footing and should have equal voting power within the Membership structure.

> It's such a balance of interests that it can evolve into an infinite
> fight.

Not necessarily, unless there are some Stakeholders that believe they should havemore representation than others. If so, than they can form Supporting Organizations as seek membership as SO's to the NewCo. They than than marshal their forces or membership in the best way they feel is reasonable to influence to whatever degree they wish towards their goals or common goals with other SO's within the NewCo structure as it relates to Supporting Organizations.

> I've personally solved the problem in my own mind by saying "only
> individual people can constitute a membership".

Agreed completely. And this is exactly what our proposal provides for inthe Membership Organization.

> That way the power
> structures can shift and evolve temporary coalitions and not be
> constrained by pre-judgements built into the structure of the
> organization.

True, and irrespective of what other Supporting Organizations those individualsmay be members of.

> But I've obviously not convinced everybody of the wisdom of my solution.
> ;-)
> Yet, as we start building structures to try to provide balances, we are
> prejudging the relative strengths we want the groups to have. Indeed, we
> are prejudging what groups should exist.

Agreed, and this is more of a false perception problem than one that is of substance.

> I'd be much more willing to accept the notion that the IANA documents are
> bi-cameral if the SO's (which form "the other membership") were themselves
> guaranteed to be open. Unfortunately, they are not.

How true. However the permanent board could make a proposal to amend thebylaws to provide for all SO's to have an "Open Membership" based on basic principals that are already historically known to provide for Openness.

> The history of the IANA documents has an explicit rejection of a proposal
> to permit individuals to be members of SO's.

And has consistently not allowed for and Initial Membership Organization thatwe believe is paramount for reasons that are quite evident.

> And the SO's are allowed to establish their own membership criteria. As
> such they tend to be immune from outside forces.

Yes, and this really isn't proper, and possibly not legal in some instances. Ourown discrimination laws should provide some guidance here.

> And given the fact that the IANA proposal gives these bodies the power to
> create policy which must be accepted by the new entity modulo some very
> narrow basis for rejection, this tends to put the greater degree of power
> into the hands of the most conservative and self-interested of the power
> elements.
> It's a judgement call whether that represents "stability" or "sell-out".

You cannot have stability by definition when you put the bulk of power in thehands directly, of a few. This is why an All powerful board is such a bad idea. And the IANA Draft-5 puts all of the power of the NewCo in the hands of the board. This was rejected on consensus votes in all of the IFWP conferences.

> In the BWG proposal, the only change we made three changes affecting the
> membership balance:
> - We mandated that the intitial board establish a membership structure.
> We didn't say what kind or shape.

This is fine, but who and under what set of procedures is the Initial boarddetermined? That being ask yet again, we are again faced with the Chicken-egg problem. We say, there can be no egg unless there is a chicken. Where the egg in the initial board, and the chicken is the Initial Membership Organization.

> The reason for this is that we wanted to make sure that this tough
> fight would in fact happen. We couldn't guarantee that they would
> actually suceed, but we wanted to make sure that they didn't take the
> easy way out. Compromise seems to come easier when there isn't an
> easy way to avoid the question.

Agreed. And this is why we finally determined in our deliberations overseveral weeks, that an Initial Membership Organization that elects the Initial Board, and any other subsequent boards of Directors. Not only that, but that the

Membership Organization, must be central and key to the NewCo in order to insure over the long haul, the stability, fairness of actions, integrity, transparency, and the openness of the NewCo.

> - We added an explicit statement that individual people could be members
> of the SO's.

This however doesn't' go far enough. Without individual vote on resolutionscoming from these SO's and/or Committees created with the approval of the Board, and those committee members elected by the Membership Organization on an individual basis, you invite divisive adverse actions on the part of the SO's and policies and/or standards that are arbitrary and not in the long term best interest of the Stakeholders.

> The reason for this is simply to reinforce the fact that mere mortals
> have interests in what is going on.

And this is a paramount reason why they must be central as individual membersof the NewCo in an Initial Membership Organization.

> From a personal point of view, I have trouble creating a governing
> entity which bars me from participation.

As do most Stakeholders.

> - We removed the powers to the SO's to make binding nominations of board
> members.

This is a good idea, however one could also conceive that the SO's should be requiredto provide more than one candidate by which an Individual Membership Organization may have a choice to vote for.

> This is a balance -- the SO's ability to drive policy is power of vast
> significance. We felt that putting both the power to force policy
> *and* to have significant board representation was too great a
> concentration of power versus what would be more likely a more diffuse
> membership organization. This is especially the case when the that
> membership's voice would be further diluted because it's only
> vehicle to speak is via the board, and the board's role in setting
> policy is largely constraind by its basic obligation to accept the
> direction's set by the SO's.

With the IANA's bylaws this would indeed be so. However within our structure,with a Individual Membership Organization that is central to the power structure of the NewCo. This gives the Individual Member, within a reasonable amount of time to review and than render a vote on any policy proposals that the SO's or the Board may place before them for their approval by majority vote.

> There seemed to be two ways to correct this balance:
> - Remove the SO's ability to make binding nominations to the board.
> -or-
> - Remove the SO's ability to make nearly binding statements of
> policy in their subject areas.

Agreed within the confines which I have outlined in brief above. Howeverthe SO's should have the ability to select candidates that must than stand Accept or reject vote by the Individual Membership Organization.

> The former choice was the lesser of the two changes, and the BWG's
> groundrule was to minimize the changes to the IANA plan.

Well we felt that the IANA's Draft-5 was backwards from what was the IFWPconsensus votes as well as in direct violation of the basic requirements of the White Paper, those being a "Bottom-up" structure, Transparency, public accountability, fairness, and openness.

> > If we have a bad board...
> It's hard under the IANA proposal to know whether we really have a good
> board or a bad board.

It is not possible at at all.

> First of all, there is no requirement that votes be tallied and published
> in a way so that we on the outside can see who voted for what. (That's
> why the BWG proposal added a requirement that voting by on the record.)

Agreed, however our proposal would make all measures or election resultsmade publicly available on the ICANN website.

> Secondly, the real measure of a good versus a bad board is whether we
> feel comfortable putting trust in it.

Well we aren't going to trust any board that is appointed.

> I don't think that anybody has a great deal of excess trust right now. Our
> internecene battles have drained that away and created unnecessary
> animosities.

Very true. Hence and even greater argument for an Initial IndividualMembership Organization.

> There's no doubt in my mind that the only way that trust is going to be
> re-established is by giving a degree of freedom of decision and seeing how
> it is exercised.

This is not a good judgment in our view. In fact, once started down thispath, it is difficult to change direction should things get our of hand until so much damage is done that only legal remedies will suffice.

> The question thus devolves to how much freedom?

However much the Initial Individual Membership Organization will allow.

> The issues facing the new entity are significant and many of the early
> choices made by the new entity are going to be ones that are both major in
> impact and difficult to reverse

Very true. (See above on previous comment on this issue)

> This implies, to me anyway, that the degree of freedom should be
> relatively tightly constrained.

And the best way that we could come up with ws through an InitialIndividual Membership Organization that is central to the NewCo.

> That could be attempted by placing long lists of limitations and
> procedures into the corporate structure. If this were done I doubt that
> the entity would survive under the weight of its own operations.

But this is not necessary nor acceptable.

> Or it could be done by creating a membership structure which is able to
> act as a corrective force. Yet, we don't want a membership structure that
> is so sensitive and volitile that it is liable to become a bomb that blows
> up and destroy's the new entity every time there's a minor disagreement.

Not if the SO's in conjunction with the Board ar responsible with coming up withresolutions for policy and standards issues by which the Initial Individual Membership Organization must vote on within a given period of time after they are presented.

> Another answer to this is to try to suggest that we define the core
> assets, what I call "fundamental assets" and require the new entity to
> exercise a higher degree of responsibility with regard to those than to
> other more mundane matters. This notion is incorporated into the BWG's
> proposal.

And a good part of your proposal as well. >;)

> As regards the fact that under both the IANA and BWG proposals (which are
> word-for-word identical on 95% of the issues), the Calfornia AG stands in
> loco parentis to protect our common interests:
> California is a big state, bigger and richer than most nations of the
> world. As such, the protection is both larger and smaller than we would
> hope. It is larger because the AG has a reasonably significant staff.
> It is smaller because the California AG is a highly political position,
> usually considered the penultimate step towards the governorship. Even
> though I live and vote in California, and could get to Sacramento in a
> couple of hours, I'm not particularly sanguine that the AG would be all
> that willing to act as a force to guide the new entity back onto the rails
> should it start to wander.
> --karl--
> __________________________________________________
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CC: US commerce department <>

Jeffrey A. Williams
DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.

From: Milton Mueller <>
To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)
Date: 10/9/98 5:31pm
Subject: Comments on private sector proposals for new corporation

Honorable William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce
c/o Karen Rose
Office of International Affairs, Room 471
National Telecommunications and
Information Administration
United States Department of Commerce
14th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230

RE: Management of Internet Names and Addresses

THE AUTHOR of this statement:

Dr. Milton Mueller is Associate Professor and Director of the Graduate Program in Telecommunications and Network Management at the Syracuse University School of Information Studies. Dr. Mueller is known for his scholarly publications on telecommunication and Internet policy. He filed comments with the NTIA twice during its development of the White Paper and participated in the Reston, Virginia and Geneva, Switzerland meetings of the International Forum on the White Paper.


The US Government must face the fact that the ICANN corporation proposed by IANA does not command a consensus. The government now has two options. First, it can take direct responsibility for modifying the draft articles of incorporation, the by-laws, and the proposed list of interim Board members. This would involve weighing the alternatives before it and issuing a final set of decisions that meet its own White Paper criteria and its own sense of the public interest. Alternatively, it can mediate an open negotiation among the disputing parties to resolve the differences among the contending parties. If it chooses the latter route, it must make sure that the negotiations are open and representative and in particular that the process does not privilege either one of the two government contractors (IANA and NSI) who have dominated the post-White Paper process so far. Whichever path is chosen, these comments recommend that the Boston Working Group (BWG) proposal be used as the basis for the final document. With respect to the interim board, NTIA should start from scratch and develop an open process for the selection of a new group of people.


1. Consensus does not exist.

The NTIA White Paper called on private sector Internet stakeholders to form a not-for-profit corporation to administer policy for the Internet name and address system. From the White Paper and Ira Magaziner*s subsequent comments in various public fora, it is clear that the NTIA anticipated the receipt of a single proposal with solid backing from the vast majority of Internet stakeholders. Unfortunately, that expectation was not met by the filing of the ICANN draft. At the time of this writing, at least four serious alternative drafts with backing from significant individuals and organizations are on the table (BWG, Electronic Frontier Foundation, European ISP Association, and the Open Root Server Confederation). There are still important substantive differences about membership, the nature of the so-called supporting organizations, the representation of SOs on the Board, protection of freedom of expression, and the composition of the interim Board. Some of the opponents of the ICANN draft are, of course, of marginal significance. It would be fundamentally dishonest however to dismiss or ignore the dissatisfaction of parties as broad and diverse as the four groups mentioned above. The BWG in particular represents a mainstream viewpoint within the International Forum of the White Paper (IFWP) proceedings.

Both the process and the outcome by which IANA selected an interim Board has been criticized and rejected by a substantial number of parties. IFWP spokesperson Dr. Tamar Frankel, in recent congressional testimony, publicly criticized IANA*s procedure as *closed.* At that hearing, IANA*s legal representative was unable to answer basic questions about how the selections were made. International organizations, including CABASE, the Latin American trade association, and the International Trademark Association have expressed opposition to the results of the process.

At this point NTIA has no choice but to recognize that the process has not been successfully concluded and that the IANA draft does not provide a solid basis for incorporating the new entity.

2. What went wrong?

It is important to recognize not only that consensus was not achieved, but also to understand why. I believe that NTIA policy contains a conceptual flaw that must be recognized and corrected before the transition can be concluded.

When it issued the White Paper, the Clinton administration announced that self-regulation by industry rather than direct government intervention would solve the problem of moving the Internet into the private sector. The philosophy of industry self-regulation makes good sense in many contexts. It is apparent now that it makes no sense whatsoever in guiding the Internet transition.

The Internet transition is really a process of privatization, not industry self-regulation. The US government is supposed to be transferring to the private sector processes and resources that it created and funded. There is, in fact, no pre-existing *private sector* in Internet address allocation or domain name root server operation. These processes have been created and monopolized by the US government, and developed in other countries informally by governmental and educational institutions. It is up to the US government to transfer the relevant property rights to a private organization, and to establish the legal principles under which that will be done.

The basic flaw in the industry self-regulation model is simply this: the two biggest players in the White Paper process have been Jon Postel*s IANA, the DARPA contractor that controls address assignments, and Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), the National Science Foundation contractor that controls the name space and root servers. By abdicating responsibility for the transition to a mythical *private sector,* the White Paper in effect asked two government contractors to define the terms of their own privatization. The participation of private sector interests eventually degenerated into a process by which various commercial interests lined up behind one of these two government contractors. The parameters of the debate were set by what was or was not acceptable to IANA or NSI. I do not think this is what the administration had in mind when it initiated a transition to private-sector administration.

The key role of IANA in this process requires comment. From day one, IANA insisted upon defining the terms of the transition in a way that maintained its own control. It developed its own draft articles that located the organization in southern California and were plainly intended to make the existing IANA staff the core of the new organization. IANA did not put this draft before the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP) as a submission to be considered and negotiated alongside others. Instead, it set up its own, one-way process through which people could comment on its proposals and it could, at its own discretion, decide whether to use or ignore the suggestions. In order to develop support for its own proposals, IANA leveraged its longstanding connections to the IETF and to Internet administrators around the world, and drew upon the political alliances that developed out of the ill-fated and notorious gTLD-MoU. In the final stages of the IFWP process, IANA effectively destroyed any opportunity for a consensual compromise by refusing to participate in a final negotiating session within the open IFWP framework.

One can only ask: by what right does a government contractor set itself up as a quasi-governmental authority with the power to hold proceedings on how to privatize its own functions?

NSI, for its part, did participate fully and openly in the IFWP proceedings and did not adopt the unilateralist model of IANA. But in the final analysis, the IFWP process was inherently incapable of resolving any of the outstanding issues involving NSI. This was true simply because every serious issue about NSI revolved around the terms of contracts between NSI and the US government. In the negotiation of those contracts, IFWP simply had no standing. For this reason alone, the *industry self-regulation* model made little sense.

On the positive side, the IFWP did an excellent job of mobilizing hundreds of idealistic and independent participants from every continent. These activists, who came from the Internet Service Provider (ISP) industry, public interest groups, academia, law firms, and electronic commerce interests from all over the world, did manage to come up with various proposals and consensus points that can guide the US Government in its final determination. Most notable in this regard are the articles of incorporation and by-laws of the Boston Working Group. (See Also worthy of note are the proposals of the European ISP Association (See Both proposals were produced by independent, private-sector actors with no economic or political relationship to IANA or NSI. While their models differ in certain respects it is not difficult to reconcile them. Note should also be made of the submission of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which calls attention to the importance of protecting principles of freedom of expression. (See

3. What to do now.

In concluding this process, the US Government must abandon the fiction of *industry self-regulation.* Before it turns over critical Internet administrative functions to a new corporation, it must take responsibility to modify the articles and by-laws of that organization to ensure that they satisfy both its own conception of the public interest and the consensus points that emerged from the independent IFWP process.

In moving forward, please bear in mind the following key points:

* The dominant, leading role that IANA has played in the transition is symptomatic of a problem, not the key to a solution. Although it does enjoy strong support from various factions, IANA is not a neutral intermediary but a partisan player, just as NSI is. Much of its support is derived from its previous attempts to privatize itself via the gTLD-MoU process. Whatever resolution process is initiated must not privilege IANA or NSI in any way. The transition should be driven by the private sector, not by government contractors.

* The articles and by-laws must instruct the interim Board to create a membership structure. This should not be an option but a requirement.

* The supporting organizations should follow the structure outlined by the BWG. In the IANA draft, SOs both create policy and, as Board members, make decisions on the merits of policy. If the supporting organizations are also the primary means through which ICANN will obtain a membership, there is a great risk of politicizing the SOs.

* The interim board must be selected through an open process, not through closed, private negotiations between IANA and its allies.

There are two viable ways to go about making these changes. First, NTIA can take direct responsibility for modifying the draft articles of incorporation, the by-laws, and the proposed list of interim Board members. This would involve weighing the alternatives before it and issuing a final set of decisions that meet its own White Paper criteria and its own sense of the public interest.

Alternatively, it can mediate an open negotiation among the disputing parties to resolve the differences among the contending parties. If it chooses the latter route, it must make sure that the negotiations are open and representative and in particular that the process does not privilege either one of the two government contractors (IANA and NSI) who have dominated the post-White Paper process so far. Whichever path is chosen, these comments recommend that the Boston Working Group (BWG) proposal be used as the basis for the final document.

Respectfully submitted,

Dr. Milton Mueller

From: Mikki Barry <>
To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)
Date: 10/9/98 12:35pm
Subject: Comments

Please accept the attached comments. They were created with Microsoft Word 98 and saved as text only.

Please contact me if there are any questions. I can be reached at:
703.925.0282 (work)
703.759.7758 (home)




The Association for the Creation and Propagation of Internet Policies, Inc.

(A-TCPIP) and its working group the Domain Name Rights Coalition (DNRC),

October 13, 1998


DNRC is a public interest organization that has been working on behalf of the rights of domain name owners since 1996. DNRC represents the interests of individuals, entrepreneurs and small businesses. Its website with comments, speeches and letters to the White House, the Department of Commerce, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the International Ad Hoc Committee can be found at


DNRC thanks the National Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA) for providing the opportunity for public comment on the proposals submitted in response to the White Paper call for a private sector proposal. DNRC and its individual members have actively participated in the White Paper process, including participation in the International Forum for the White Paper (IFWP) and the online discussion lists that have played an important part in building industry consensus on these issues.


DNRC believes that the White Paper's challenge to create consensus in the Internet community was indeed a difficult one. Happily, the Internet community has largely proven itself up to the challenge. Nevertheless, the process has not been without its difficulties. In particular, DNRC is concerned with the apparent position of the IANA that it should serve as the final arbiter of the Internet consensus. Indeed, at times it appeared that the IANA regarded the role of the IFWP and of other stakeholders to be simply advisory, providing input for the IANA - and specifically for Dr. Postel - as the IANA created the new corporation and selected its board.

While it is appropriate, both for reasons of history and for reasons of practicality, for the IANA and Dr. Postel to assume prominent roles in this process, it is also important to recognize that the Internet has grown beyond the realm of the technical community. Once, it is true, that consensus by the IANA, the IETF, and other technical stakeholders represented the consensus of the community as a whole. This is no longer the case. The Internet community has grown to include not merely the developers of protocols and the assignors of IP numbers, but the millions of name holders and users who contribute to the vibrancy and growth of the medium.

DNRC recognizes that someone must, ultimately, make the final decision and serve as the arbiter of stakeholder consensus. That role, however, does not belong with the IANA or any other private party. Rather, that role must be played by NTIA and the Administration's Internet Task Force. As history has shown, legitimacy flows from open processes and administration by neutral players. Previous efforts to create a private sector management of the DNS, such as the gTLD-MoU, failed on precisely this point. No single private entity or process possessed sufficient credibility to act as arbiter of the Internet consensus. Nor can the IANA or Dr. Postel fulfill this role now. While everyone acknowledges both the tremendous contributions of the IANA and Dr. Postel, and their attempts to develop a consensus document, these considerations cannot change the fact that IANA is a government contractor and Dr. Postel is a single, private individual. Only this process, which incorporates both the due process protections inherent in an administrative proceeding and the respect earned by this task force for its openness and even-handedness, can serve as the final arbiter of consensus and resolve the outstanding disputes among the stakeholders.

DNRC believes that, unfortunately, the IANA proposed ICANN and the proposed board of directors suffer from this misperception of the role of IANA. The ICANN draft omits key consensus points from the IFWP process and from other sectors of the community, notably those addressing financial accountability, due process, openness, freedom of expression and membership. At every IFWP meeting, the attendees agreed that the power of the board of directors must be limited and that the organization created must be a membership organization accountable to its members. Nevertheless, the ICANN draft would create a Board with extremely broad powers, no requirement for a membership organization, and no accountability to the membership in the event that membership is permitted. For these reasons, DNRC cannot support the ICANN draft submitted by the IANA, and questions the IANA's claim that this draft represents a consensus of the entire Internet stakeholder community.

For the same reason, DNRC expresses its concern over the selected board of directors. Although the proponents of the ICANN draft maintain that selection of the Board of Directors took place in an open, transparent manner consistent with the requirements of the White Paper, this was not the case. Indeed, no public announcement was made of any formal process, although Dr. Postel did announce his personal criteria for selection on some online discussion lists. At a recent Congressional hearing, those closest to the process could not identify who, ultimately, selected the Board of Directors or articulate what formal procedures were used. Rather, it appears that the drafters of the ICANN proposal took it upon themselves to solicit suggestions, pass judgment on suggestions contributed by others, and investigate the willingness of individuals to serve. As a result, significant sectors of the Internet community, such as Latin American & the Caribbean, have objected to the new Board on the grounds that their input was excluded and their interests not represented. Also significant is that no representation of Africa or the Middle East exists on the Board.

Of the three proposals submitted, DNRC believes the draft submitted by the Boston Working Group (BWG) comes closest to capturing stakeholder consensus, and benefits from open processing. The BWG draft includes the consensus points regarding membership and accountability. The BWG draft also benefits from the openness of its process. The proposed by-laws incorporate the IFWP meetings, the IANA draft, and took place at an open meeting held in Boston. The draft further benefited from open discussion online. DNRC notes that DNRC President Mikki Barry is part of the BWG, although DNRC is not.

The Open Root Server Confederation (Open-RSC) has combined the BWG by-laws with even more extensive due process provisions and some of the Electronic Frontier Foundation's protection for Freedom of Speech and of Expression. DNRC would urge NTIA to seriously consider their proposal as well, located at Their comprehensive work also includes a means to determine membership, a feat that no other proposal has yet incorporated. Their contributions are well worthy of inclusion in any final proposal.

DNRC also would like NTIA to consider the proposal of the EFF found at The materials located at this URL contribute significantly to the importance of Freedom of Speech and of Expression in the electronic world. These fundamental rights should be addressed and integrated into the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation.

Finally, DNRC notes that it shares many of the concerns expressed by Ronda Hauben in her proposal. DNRC recognizes, however, that Ms. Hauben's proposal is not politically tenable at this stage. Furthermore, Ms. Hauben's proposal does not enjoy broad stakeholder consensus. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, DNRC believes that the concerns expressed by Ms. Hauben for consideration of the public interest and the danger of capture by private interests should be addressed in the final by-laws.


NTIA has not provided clear guidance on how it will proceed. NTIA faces several options. It can limit itself to choosing one of the three proposals. If NTIA takes this action, DNRC urgesNTIA to accept the draft submitted by the Boston Working Group. Alternatively, NTIA could reject all three proposals as failing to produce an acceptable private sector entity. This alternative, however, creates further difficulties for NTIA regarding how to proceed, and would introduce great uncertainty into the Internet community and into the process as a whole.

DNRC therefore recommends that NTIA do what has been stated it would do all along. Ira Magaziner, on numerous occasions, has said that if NTIA were presented with multiple proposals, that the authors would be brought together, and the drafts would be melded into a final consensus draft. The ICANN draft, is a worthy beginning. The addition of comments from the BWG, the EFF, and Ms. Hauben would add significant openness, credibility, and Internet consensus to the process based on these public comments and other input from the stakeholder community. Furthermore, NTIA should require that a new board of directors be selected in an open and transparent manner.

DNRC recognizes and applauds NTIA's desire to let the private sector lead in the process, and recognizes the potential legal difficulties with NTIA taking an active role in the formation of the corporation. Nevertheless, DNRC notes that NTIA has, in fact, played an important participatory role in shaping the private sector debate. At key times, Ira Magaziner has not hesitated to address the Internet community at public gatherings and in private meetings. This carefully neutral intervention has proven tremendously valuable in focusing the parties and helping them put aside their differences. NTIA should continue in this role, helping the private sector to work past these last obstacles to final consensus.


For the reasons stated above, DNRC believes that neither the ICANN draft, the EFF draft, nor the Hauben proposal embodies the consensus of the Internet community, and that therefore neither should be accepted by the NTIA. DNRC believes that the draft submitted by the Boston Working Group best embodies the industry consensus and the open processes set forth in the White Paper. DNRC also believes, however, that NTIA should continue to build consensus in the community, and should assist the stakeholders in resolving differences between the BWG draft, the EFF draft, and the ICANN draft. Specifically, a final ICANN draft must be membership based, and include provisions for accountability and openness.

Respectfully submitted,

Mikki Barry
Domain Name Rights Coalition
950 Herndon Parkway #240
Herndon, VA 20170
Phone: (703) 925.0282
Fax: (703) 759.9198

Harold Feld
Acting General Counsel
Domain Name Rights Coalition
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20044
Phone: (202) 662-5132
Fax: (202) 778-5132

From: John Patrick <>
Date: 10/9/98 6:32pm



IBM is pleased to provide comments on the above subject, pursuant to the Department of Commerce's September 29, 1997 press release and its notice on the above subject posted at the Web site of the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA). ( Web site "").

For the past three years, a variety of efforts have been undertaken both within the private sector and among governmental representatives, to establish a permanent, private sector organization that would succeed the United States Government, and organizations selected by it, in managing the central administrative functions of the Internet. These functions include the management of: the allocation of IP addresses; the top-level domain name space; the network of root servers; and the numbering of Internet protocols.

In order for the Internet to realize its potential as a global network of networks that supports commercial, educational, cultural, and social functions, it is essential that its central administrative functions be managed by an organization that is both international in character and unambiguous in the private sector. It is also essential that these and related Internet administrative functions continue to operate smoothly and seamlessly even as we proceed through a period of fundamental organizational change in how they are managed. Finally, it is essential that any plan that emerges enjoy the widest possible support from the Internet community and that it be designed to give due respect to intellectual property and other rights that lie at the foundatio n of a successful Internet. For these reasons, IBM has followed the discussions over the creation of a new Internet management organization with great care and made continuous contributions to those discussions. Most recently, we have followed closely and contributed directly to the immediate private sector efforts to develop a specific and workable plan.

IBM believes that the proposal for the establishment of a Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) submitted by Jon Postel on behalf of IANA on October 2, 1998 represents a workable and viable plan for the new Internet management organization that is needed. While no single proposal in this area would ever enjoy unanimous support in the private sector, we believe this plan enjoys the widest possible global support. Inevitably, that means that there are some provisions of this proposal that do not reflect IBM's preferences. Nonetheless, taken as a whole, the proposal for an ICANN, including its Interim Board of Directors, represents a major step forward in Internet self-governance.

We intend to support the proposal for the creation of ICANN in every way possible, and we would encourage the U.S. Government and the governments of other countries to do so as well.


John Patrick
Vice President - Internet Technology, IBM Corporation
Chairman, Global Internet Project (
Homepage and PGP public key at

CC: Neil Abrams <>

From: Pete Farmer <>
To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)
Date: 10/9/98 8:51pm
Subject: Comments of Peter J. Farmer (corrected version - please ignore th e previous e-mail)

October 9, 1998

The Honorable William M. Daley
Secretary of Commerce
c/o Karen Rose
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
United States Department of Commerce

Via E-mail

Dear Secretary Daley:

I am writing as a private citizen and one who has been involved in ongoing discussion regarding the system for Internet names and addresses. I have participated in the commercial on-line messaging and information services industry for twelve years and have watched the Internet outmatch my expectations at every turn. Establishing an environment that permits continued growth of this medium is a proper role of government.

In June, the NTIA "White Paper" expressed the United States Government's desire to transfer responsibility for the Internet system of names and addresses to a private entity. I endorsed and continue to support this wise approach.

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has offered its proposal to assume that function, and I wish to state my support for their proposal. That support, however, is tempered by the comments I offer below:

1. I am highly disappointed with the manner in which the Interim Board of NewCo was selected. ICANN puts their selections forward as "consensus" choices, but their process for qualifying and selecting candidates was in no way open, and therefore can represent only the "consensus" of people operating behind a curtain. I hope that you will personally take an interest in personally expressing to IANA your grave concern at its failure to devise an interim Board through transparent processes.

2. While I am concerned with their manner of selection, I do not challenge the credentials of those who have been named, nor do I personally feel qualified to suggest alternatives.

3. I do not agree with the Boston Working Group or the ORSC that all Board seats should be 'at large' seats (i.e. that Supporting Organizations should not each have a designated number of seats). I believe that it is important that the Board include representatives from key areas regarding the Internet naming and address system. Having a mixture of Board members from SOs, plus a significant number of at-large Board members, makes for a large and possibly cumbersome Board, but also one that is likely to have all concerns represented. Therefore, I support the structure of the Board as proposed by ICANN.

4. I agree that coming up with a specific membership and voting structure is problematic and cannot be coherently discussed and agreed to in the short run. I believe it is appropriate, under the circumstances, to charge the Interim Board with these tasks, as is done in the ICANN proposal.

5. I believe that a number of the Electronic Frontier Foundation's suggestions regarding transparent operation and due process have merit and should be incorporated into NewCo's bylaws. In addition, I consider the remarks of J. William Semich regarding financial accountability to have merit and would like to see changes made to the ICANN proposal to incorporate those changes.

6. A number of people involved in the discussion regarding the White Paper and the ICANN proposal have expressed concern on ICANN's choice of location for incorporation. I have no qualifications to review this issue; however, based on my own business experience, I suspect that people looking back on this debate will wonder why the "Delaware vs. California" incorporation issue was ever considered significant. I hope this issue gets all the attention it deserves in the Government's review -- and no more.

7. There has been much considerable mistrust among the parties to this debate. Unless we can bridge these gaps in trust, I fear that the Internet names and address system will continue to be a divisive issue, possibly leading to protracted legal challenges. Ultimately, the performance of the Interim Board will be critical to bridging the gaps among the parties and creating a broader consensus around NewCo. If the Interim Board performs in a manner that clearly demonstrates a commitment to operate NewCo for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, drawing upon input from the broad and growing community of Internet users, then we may yet bridge the divide.

The contract between the United States Government and NewCo offers a clear opportunity for the Government to provide continued oversight during a transition period. I urge strongly that the US Government lay down the expectation that the Interim Board performs in a manner consistent with the White Paper's prescription. In particular, I urge that the US Government provide the strongest encouragement to the Interim Board to successfully arrive at a membership and voting structure and to obtain and demonstrate broad support for that structure, in relatively short order.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this matter.

Peter J. Farmer

Peter J. Farmer
Strategies Unlimited Voice: +1 650 941 3438
201 San Antonio Circle, Suite 205 Fax: +1 650 941 5120
Mountain View, CA 94040 WWW:

From: Ronda Hauben <>
To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)
Date: 10/9/98 9:29am
Subject: Comment on Proposals for adminstration of Domain Name System

Following is the testimony I was asked to submit to the record at the Basic Research Subcommittee hearing on Oct. 7, 1998 in the U.S. Congress. I welcome comments and discussion on my testimony.



Testimony before the

Subcommittee on Basic Research


Subcommittee on Technology

of the

Committee on Science

on the subject of

Internet Domain Names

Rayburn House Office Building

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515


Ronda Hauben

researcher, writer,

co-author Netizens: On the History and Impact of

Usenet and the Internet

Published 1997 by IEEE Computer Society Press

October 7, 1998


I am pleased to be invited to submit testimony to the House Science Subcommittee on Basic Research and Subcommittee on Technology on the subject of whether the Domain Names System and related essential functions of the Internet should be transferred from U.S. Government oversight into a private sector corporate entity.

My name is Ronda Hauben. I am co-author of the book Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet published in May 1997 by the I.E.E.E. Computer Society Press. I am also an editor and writer for the Amateur Computerist newsletter which has covered the history and importance of the Internet since 1988.

I have studied and taught computer programming and have participated online since 1988 and on Usenet since 1992.

Also I submitted the proposal "The Internet an International Public Treasure" to Ira Magaziner and the U.S. Department of Commerce at the request of Mr. Magaziner based on the concerns I presented to him about the narrow phrasing of the question of the transfer of the Domain Name System to the private sector. I also responded to the Green Paper and submitted comments expressing concern that the general nature of the Internet and its history and traditions, and its nature as a communication medium were being lost sight of in the Framework for Electronic Commerce issued by Mr. Magaziner and his staff and in the Green Paper and subsequent White paper. And I attended the Geneva IFWP meeting in July 1998 and wrote up an account of what happened in an article "Report from the Front: Meeting in Geneva Rushes to Privatize the Internet DNS and Root Server System".(1)

The proposal that I wrote and submitted to Mr. Magaziner on September 4, 1998, is now one of the three proposals that has been posted at the U.S. Department of Commerce web site by the NTIA with a request for comments.

As you can see from my proposal I have found your hearing process valuable and have referred to testimony given by one of the witnesses in this matter in the Preface to my proposal. I want to commend the committee for both holding these hearings and for putting the testimony received on the committee's web site. I want to make a further recommendation, however. I want to recommend that you explore having an online discussion group. There the public could comment on the issues before the committee and on the testimony received or offer additional information or viewpoints into the public record so that you will have a broader set of information and viewpoints to influence your deliberations, especially when those deliberations concern the operation and future of the Internet. I hope that after you hear the rest of my comments you will understand better why this is so important.


First, I would like to offer a bit of history of how the Internet came to be and I will endeavor to show how knowing this history will be helpful in determining how to evaluate the proposals before the NTIA.

Then I will provide some recommendations toward the policy decision that this Committee and the NTIA are proposing to make.

The Internet is a product of several significant and successful research projects that were conducted under funding from the Advance Projects Research Agency (DoD) in the 1960s and 1970s.

One of the earliest of these projects is perhaps one of the most important in its relevance to the problem before this committee today. That project was the creation and support for interactive computing and time-sharing. In 1962-3, a computer scientist and engineering researcher, J. C. R. Licklider was invited to join ARPA and to begin the Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO). At that time the common form of computing available was known as batch processing using large mainframe computers. Someone who wanted to run a program would bring a stack of punch cards to a computer center and return several hours later or the next day to retrieve the printout that the program generated to see if the program achieved the desired aim.

Needless to say this was a cumbersome and frustrating means of using a computer. J.C.R. Licklider and the time-sharing projects that ARPA subsequently funded set out to change the form of computing and to make it possible for an individual to be able to type his or her own program into a computer and to achieve the results of the program immediately. This new type of computing that they created was called time-sharing. Relying on the speed of the computer, these computer pioneers were able to set up a series of different terminals for use by users who were all able to utilize the computer at the same time. As a result of time- sharing systems, multiple users were able to interact directly with a computer simultaneously.

One of the projects funded by J.C.R. Licklider was called the Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS). It was part of the project funded at MIT by ARPA which was known as Project MAC.

There were several important surprises that the pioneers of Project MAC reported from their research into time-sharing.

1) They didn't have to rely on professional programmers to do much of the needed programming for their time-sharing system. What they found was that the participants in the project would create programs and tools for their own use and then make them available to others using CTSS.

2) A community of users developed as a result of the ways that people contributed their work to be helpful to each other.

3) CTSS made it possible for users to customize the computing system to their own needs. Thus the general capabilities available provided a way for the individual user to create the diversity of computing applications or programs that this diverse community of users needed.

As a result of this project, the researchers realized that once you could connect a remote terminal to a time-sharing system, you could develop a network with people spread out over large geographical distances.

The networks that developed as a result of the research in time- sharing provided working prototypes and also a vision that would help to guide the next stage in the development of networking technology. The effort to improve the throughput of data across telephone lines led to ARPA supported research in packet switching and the funding of the ARPANET research to use packet switching to link up the computers that were part of ARPA's research program.(2)

The next piece of history that is important to consider is the period during which the early Internet was formed. In 1981/1982 a mailing list was begun on the ARPANET. This mailing list was called the TCP/IP Digest and the moderator was Mike Muuss, a research computer scientist at the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL). The BRL during this period was one of the DARPA sites making the transition from an early ARPANET protocol, NCP to TCP/IP, which was to be the protocol suite that would make an Internet possible.

By 1983 the cutover from NCP to TCP/IP had occurred and this made possible a particularly relevant event for the matters under consideration by this committee. That event was the separation of MILNET and the ARPANET into two independent networks to create an Internet. This split would allow MILNET to be devoted to the operational activities of the Department of Defense. And those on the ARPANET would be able to continue to pursue network research activities. Gateways between the two networks would provide inter-networking communication.(3)

This gets us to a definition utilized in 1974 by Louis Pouzin, who had worked on CTSS at MIT and then returned to France to work on creating a packet switching network that was called Cyclades. Computer science researcher, Louis Pouzin, defined an internet as a network of independent networks. (He called "an aggregate of networks [which would] behave like a single logical network" a CATENET. DARPA adopted his concept as the goal of the research project it was supporting).(4)

Each network could determine for itself what it would do internally, but each recognized the need to accept a minimum agreement so that it would be possible to connect with others who were part of the diverse networks that made up the Internet.


I have taken the time to review these two important developments in internetworking history because these two developments are at the foundation of the design of the current Internet as we know it today.

These two developments highlight what is so special and particular about the Internet.

The Internet that has grown up and developed is a continuation of the time-sharing interactive communities of users and computers where users contribute to and are in effect the architects of the network that they are part of. Also this understanding leads to another significant aspect. That is that this system of human- computer networking partnerships has a regenerative quality. New connections and programs, and databases or mailing lists are contributed by the users themselves. And thus the Internet grows and spreads and connects an increasingly larger number of computers and users around the world.

The second important aspect is that the Internet architecture and design accommodates different needs and capabilities of a diverse set of users and user communities. For example, someone in Ghana with a 386 or 486 computer and a modem can be connected to and send email to someone in a research laboratory in Switzerland which has the most modern computer workstations. That is because the architecture of the Internet requires the least possible equipment and capability to be able to make Internet communication possible.

Thus people and computers around the world who are using an extremely diverse set of equipment and computing capability are able to interact and communicate.

I have taken the time to describe these general features of the Internet for a few reasons. The first reason is that this is what is so precious about the Internet and this is what I believe needs to be understood and protected when considering any change that may be contemplated in how the Internet is controlled, managed or operated.

Any change in the minimal requirement that makes communication possible across the independent networks that make up the Internet can obsolete thousands of computers and many more users around the world and thereby jeopardize the connectivity and global communication that the Internet has achieved.

Any change in the ability of users to represent themselves and to utilize the Internet for their diverse purposes and to contribute to what is available to others on the Internet, (as long as this does not put demands on others on the Internet), any such change can deprive millions of users of the Internet of the general form that makes it possible for the Internet to serve the communication needs of so many diverse communities of users.

This diversity includes the computer scientists at MIT or the high school student in Sydney, Australia. If there are particular needs of any one group, such as the security needs of DARPA, or the ability to write with Japanese characters of users in Tokyo, the architectural design provides that within an individual network or several networks such needs can be accommodated, without imposing such requirements on the users of other networks. These two principles are important to study and understand because they represent what is being violated by the Framework for Electronic Commerce prepared by Ira Magaziner and his staff. This framework does not treat the Internet as a network of independent networks, but instead as a single network that must be changed to meet the needs of a particular set of users.

Thus instead of recommending that an independent commercial network or a few commercial networks be created as part of the Internet to meet the special needs of commercial Internet users, Ira Magaziner's framework document requires that the entire Internet be changed to meet the particular needs of a particular set of users. This is a violation of the concept of an Internet.

My recommendation is that the Framework that Mr. Magaziner has created needs to be recast to be a Framework for the Internet as a New Means of International Communication. Within that framework Mr. Magaziner can describe the particular needs of particular communities of users, but these particular needs cannot be allowed to replace the generality of the Internet design so that other users of other independent networks are being imposed on to satisfy the needs of any particular group of users.

The second important precaution is that users must be protected to continue to represent themselves and their needs. This is what provides for the diversity of what is available on the Internet and is the continuation of the culture and regenerative quality of the early time-sharing communities. This is what makes it possible for a user in Benin for example, to spread the Internet to other users there, and for a student in Finland to start the linux project that has been developed by thousands of others into an operating system that gives Microsoft competition. Those who might want a different type of network, as I have heard some large corporate entities in the United States explain, as they want to be able to more carefully choose who will do what functions for them, can do so in their corporate network as part of the larger Internet, but they must not be allowed to impose their special demands on the larger Internet community. The reason for this is that then users in MILNET, for example, will be required to do things in their network that do not serve their needs, and the concept of an Internet will be violated, leading not to the further growth and extension of the Internet, but back to a single network, to one that serves only a few commercial entities at the great loss to the many other users on the Internet.

The other precaution that follows from understanding these essential characteristics of the Internet is that commercial entities want to carry on certain experiments in how to subject various aspects of the Internet to so called "competition". They must not be allowed to do this in a way that affects the whole Internet, but must be restricted to the particular network that they develop for their commercial purposes. Thus the commercial corporation that is being planned by the U.S. Government to sell off parts of the Internet's essential functions must not be allowed to control anything but its own commercenet. Those who are interested in such experimentation should be advised that they will have to form their own network which can be connected to the Internet, but that such experiments can only go on inside their own network, and cannot be imposed on the rest of the users of the Internet.

To do otherwise is to jeopardize the fact that only a minimal requirement is necessary for all to connect to the Internet and this is only that which makes the communication across the many independent networks that make up the Internet possible. To do otherwise will mean the obsoleting of many machines and cutting their users off from communication with the rest of those on the Internet.

Thus the corporation that IANA and NSI have designed, or that the Boston Group has proposed must not be allowed to take over the essential functions of the entire Internet. Instead such corporate activity needs to be restricted to an independent commercial network that can be part of the Internet but cannot be allowed to impose its special requirements on the others who use the Internet. This might mean that the .com machines will become part of a .com network, and would be able to communicate with others on the Internet, but not impose their "for sale" and speculative practices on the users in the educational or scientific communities who make up much of the Internet.

Before there are any plans to change the form or structure or management of the Internet, it is crucial that there be an assessment of the special characteristics and functionality that must be preserved and a plan created for how to be certain that this is done.

Since both the IANA/NSI proposal and the Boston Group proposal are for structures that are to be limited to a commercial network, and not imposed on the Internet itself, how then can the essential functions of the Internet be administered in a way that represents the cooperative and international nature of the Internet itself?

My proposal provides for a prototype cooperative research program involving researchers in any country or region that agree to participate. These researchers who will be part of this program are to be responsible for carrying out the investigation and inquiry among online users to determine the general characteristics and functions so that they can propose a plan to safeguard these crucial characteristics and functions.

There is one final lesson from the history and development of the Internet that it is important to consider when trying to determine how to form a more international system for protecting and administering the essential functions of the Internet represented by the Domain Name System, IP numbers etc.

Usenet was begun in the 1979-80 period by graduate students who were part of the Unix community. The invitation to join Usenet which was handed out at the January 1980 Usenix conference explained why it was crucial to develop an online network, not to form committees. They describe why it was crucial for those who were interested in developing Usenet to actually use the network, so that they "will know what the real problems are." It is with this goal in mind that I created the design in my proposal for a prototype where researchers from a diverse set of nations or regions will utilize the Internet to figure out how to create the necessary cooperative, protective forms and processes to administer and support the essential functions of the Internet. Just as adhering to the principle of relying on "using Usenet" made it possible to grow Usenet, so the principle of "using the Internet" will make it possible to scale the Internet and create a means for a shared international oversight of the essential functions and to solve the problems that arise along the way.

The Internet is the symbol and manifestation of hope for people around the world. As more and more people communicate on a worldwide basis. the foundation is increasingly set to find peaceful and productive ways to solve the many serious problems that exist in the world today. Also, however, this vision has its enemies. But the U.S. Government has the proud distinction of being the midwife of the achievement of achievement of the 20th Century represented by the development of the Internet. If there are those in the U.S. Government who recognize the importance and respect that comes from giving birth to the communications system that has spread around the world with such amazing tenacity and determination, they must find the means to treat the decisions and changes needed to further develop the Internet with the proper care and concern.




(2) See chapter 6 "Cybernetics, Time-Sharing, Human-Computer

Symbiosis and Online Communities" in Netizens: On the History and

Impact of Usenet and the Internet, IEEE Computer Science Press,

1997. A draft is available at

(3) Describing this transition, Vint Cerf wrote:

"The basic objective of this project is to establish a model and a set of rules which will allow data networks of varying internal operation to be interconnected, permitting uses to access remote resources and to permit inter-computer communication across the connected networks.

(4) Louis Pouzin, "A Proposal for interconnecting packet switching networks," EUROCOMP Conference, Brunel Univ, May 1974, p. 1023 -1036, p. 1023. It was also reprinted in "The Auerbach Annual-1975 Best computer papers. pp. 105-117. Isaac Auerbach ed."

Ronda Hauben

P.O. Box 250101

New York, N.Y. 10023


From: Ronda Hauben <>
To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)
Date: 10/9/98 9:43am
Subject: RE: [netz] Testimony submitted into the record-Oct 7 - house hear ing on DNS

Comment Received from Arie Verburgh <> to be forwarded to ntiapolicy comments:

From: Arie Verburgh <>
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 1998 10:07:25 +0200
> Subject: [netz] Testimony submitted into the record-Oct 7 - house
> hearing on DNS

Dear Ronda

I hope your plea will be successful.

Arie Verburgh

Mpumalanga, South Africa.

> ----------




From: Ronda Hauben <>
To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)
Date: 10/9/98 9:54am
Subject: Comments being submitted based on exchange on mailing lists

This is from an exchange that occurred on the ietf and ifwp mailing list about the proposals for the future of the DNS:

Subject: Re: Battle Heats Up - but the real issues are still being hidden

Ronda Hauben responding to:
Fred Baker <> wrote:
>>At 04:05 PM 10/5/98 -0400, Ronda Hauben wrote:
>>The U.S. Govt is offering to set up a private corporation
>>for them to be able to carry on their control over the Internet
>>with no accountability or oversight over what they do.
>With all due respect, I don't believe that's an accurate description of the
>current IANA proposal. There are three "supporting organizations" that have
>this oversight. They are explicitly not US in origin, and are intended to
>be international. There is also a specific comment about the make-up of the

So you are saying that the supporting organizations have oversight over the Board and that the Board is accountable to them?

According to the lawyer who spoke at the Geneva IFWP final Plenary Session, that would be illegal according to American corporate law as the Board has to be in charge.

But even if that weren't true how can the supporting organizations be oversight over a Board of Director?

The form of the IANA proposal is that of a corporation. In a corporation the Board has to be in charge.


And the situation being created with IANA is where some of the supporting organizations have people pressuring for their special interests to support their financial investments (as in the Names Council meeting I went to in Geneva). So the situation being set up is that the forces I saw operating at the Names Council needed someone to oversee them. It wasn't that they were in any way capable of being the oversight over anyone else.

Someone I know when to the group that was going to form the Protocols and the Numbers Councils. (Two separate groups) The service providers at the meeting said what a difficult time they had getting IP numbers and getting any response from the Number registry. They said they were little guys and so there was no response to their needs. Then they said it was like forming an organization of your vendors to oversee your vendors relationship with you. (I.E. the one to be overseen is in charge of the organizational form.)

So it demonstrated that without government there was no place to go with a complaint.

When I originally presented a comment about this kind of situation at an ISOC meeting where some of the large U.S. backbone and service providers were speaking and other providers at the time were speaking (it was in Montreal in 1996), one of the large service providers said I could always "vote with my feet" if I didn't like what they were doing. I could go to another one. I don't call that voting and I don't call that oversight.

I call that removing the necessary regulation that is needed to have something worthwhile and legitimate happening.

That's some of the reason for government to exist. And these efforts to remove government from the process leaves the process open to the worst possible abuses.

>Board (if it's still in the current draft) which suggests an equal number

>of persons from each major geographic region of the planet.

I didn't think it was equal numbers of persons from each major region, but I would have to look again as well.

But it was clear from the people named to the board that many regions or countries and all users had no recourse via the Board. And the principle of the user being able to speak for oneself, which is the principle that has helped to build the APRANET and then the Internet is gone. Instead there is a group of people that someone has chosen to be in control of us. That is contra what the U.S. Federal District Court in the CDA case, backed by the U.S. Supreme Court required of the U.S. Govt. The court decision required that the U.S. Govt protect the autonomy that the Internet provides to the ordinary citizen as well as the media magnate.

That autonomy is gone via this board.

Also, to have some members from different countries or regions of the world is not in any way "international". There are many corporations in the U.S. who have people who work for them who are from different countries. That in no way makes the corporation "international".

To be international involves a relationship among nations, not of people of different nationality.

The Internet, on the other hand, is international.

That is because it is the development of communication supported by different nations and peoples around the world.

The Acceptable Use Policy governing the development of the NSFNET offered to allow communication with people in other nations as long as those other nations granted the right to communicate to the people from the U.S.

And my proposal is international as it proposes a prototype form (based on the research I have done about how the ARPANET and Usenet were formed and developed) that supports cooperative work among researchers supported by their nations or regions of the world.

I have other examples of international if you want me to describe others -- like for example the cooperative efforts that helped UNIX and Usenet to spread to Europe and Australia etc. It involved work by people at mc in Amsterdam, at inria in France, I think at cern in Switzerland, etc. These were cooperative efforts with the support from the computer science research centers in different countries. Most often these centers were connected with or under government support and funding.

This is how science can be international.

>>Therefore, the third proposal is one I was asked to write by Ira
>>Magaziner, after I complained to him and the world
>>online and at ISOC in Geneva, about what was happening in
>>privatizing these essential functions.

>As I understand your proposal, you would have the US government, with other
>countries who choose to participate, fund a project to write a proposal.
>That proposal would include a record of history about the DNS, and suggest
>a way to manage it.

No that is not my proposal. That is a piece of my proposal. But it is good you raise the question and that you are making the effort to understand my proposal.

Basically my proposal is to create a prototype for the kind of international cooperation and collaboration that is needed to protect the integrity and functioning of these essential functions of the Internet.

To create the prototype I have proposed the first essential work that this prototype cooperative collaboration would undertake, which has to do with the 3 points I outline in Part IV.

But before looking at that aspect of the proposal it is important you look at Section III.

This section requires the researchers to utilize the Internet as much as possible in carrying out the work they will do for section IV.

This means "they will develop and maintain a well publicized and reachable online means to support reporting and getting input on their work."

This means they have an obligation as an integral part of the proposal to establish a way to both report on what they are doing and to welcome input via the Internet on the work they are doing. This becomes a problem they have to solve as part of their work, much as the folks on early MsgGroup mailing or on Usenet were using the Network they were developing to solve the problem of creating the Network.

Here the researchers have to solve the problem of both using the Internet to cooperate in their work together and in also maintaining contact with and input from the online community who are interested in participating in what the researchers are doing.

The last part of Section III requires that the reseachers "explore the use of Usenet newsgroup, mailing list and web site utilization, and where approprite RFC's etc." in their work.

That means that part of their research is to see how each of these forms can be helpful in the objective of both doing their coordinated work and also in the reporting to and gathering input from the online community.

For example, I used to be able to access the IETF mailing list via a newsgroup I could get connected with Usenet. That made it easier for me to stop in and check on whether what was being discussed was something relevant to my research. I haven't been able to get the IETF mailing list as a newsgroup any longer, and I don't have room for multiple mailing lists so it is harder for me to look in on and see if the discussion going on is something relevant to my work.

It would be an obligation of the researchers to try to see how to create online means to make it possible for people online to be able to both learn of and be part of discussing the work tha was being done. >First, check me on that - do I correctly understand your proposal?

Does this description of parts I, II, and III help you to see that your quick statement about my proposal didn't really look at what the proposal was outlining? (all of the above is basically in the proposal, with the exception of the example of the ietf newsgroup.)

Part IV describes in more detail the duties of the research group. Those duties are not trivial. And they are duties that will help to make possible the transfer of the task of protection of the essential functions of the Internet to an international collaborative group as

1)they outline what functions are, what is known about them and what RFC's have been created,

2)they provide for an examination of how the Internet is serving the communication needs of its users and the different communities of users on the Internet, so that a broad and general view is the focus of the work to be done and so that the special and valuable characteristics are identified so that they won't be lost in trying to solve some more particular problem.

3)they provide for an examination of the essential functions that are to be transferred so that the problems that have developed are identified and so that there is an understanding of the critical nature of the functions that are being transferred, and what must be protected. (This means involving the people who are part of adminstering these essential functions now in the examination the international group of researchers is doing.)

4)that out of this analysis and research into the general and important characteristics of the Internet, and the online reporting and discussion with interested online participants will come a proposal that is produced as a result of this online process and particular examination of the special and general nature of the Internet.

5) The proposal has several other specific requirements which I will be glad to further elaborate on, and which are designed to determine how to protect these essential functions and to learn from the prototype work done doing this cooperative work, how to form the kind of needed international and cooperative body of people to oversee and provide for the needed administration of the essential functions of the Internet.

(See part IV(3)(a-h) ) in the proposal.

I will be glad to describe each part and how it is integral to the development of the needed cooperative model to solve the problem of sharing control and support for the essential functions of the Internet including root server system, management and distribution of IP numbers, protocols, domain names etc.

>Second, assuming that I do understand it, let me say that I believe that we

No you didn't understand it, so perhaps you can look over what I have elaborated and then see what your thoughts are.

>are past the time for a research project. We are at a point where the

That is strange. It seems to me that the private corporation being proposed by both different other proposals to manage the essential functions of the Internet and to determine public policy with regard to this strategic and important communications and people system, that these other proposals are in fact conducing research, but without acknowledging that and without building on the lessons principles and models that have grown up as part of the Internet.

So what these proposals are offering is the most irresponsible form of research because it is imposing a model hostile to the development of the Internet to take over control of essential functions of the Internet.

>>discussions that needed to happen have for the most part happened, and most

I was in Geneva at the IFWP meeting and when I asked for discussion I was told that wasn't allowed. Instead there was the vote for consensus with no discussion permitted.

If you want to see my report from the meeting in Geneva of the Names Council, it is available at

So it is clear to me there is no discussion that has taken place, or the secret negotiations that have gone on wouldn't have had to be secret, and the views and input of others would have been welcomed, but it wasn't.

>of the parties understand each other's viewpoints. Now is the time for

Who are these parties that you are referring to?

The Internet community is primarily a community of users- and it has been from its earliest days.

That is one of the essential characteristics of the Internet as the users contribute and it is a users network.

Clearly what you are referring to is not an Internet or a users network but something else. If that is true maybe you and those who feel that users are no longer needed to be the architects of the Internet, maybe those parties should go off and form the kind of experimental research network you have in mind.

I don't understand why you think you can take over the Internet, disenfranchise the users and the public who has supported its development with public funds and all kinds of other volunteer contributions.

If you think you can build a better network without users, go and build it.

But why do you think it is ok to get rid of the Internet as a users network to do your experiments on?

In the early 1980's there was compuserve and there was the ARPANET and Usenet.

Clearly the ARPANET grew and developed into the Internet with the help and support of Usenet.

And compuserve was fine for a commercial network, but it didn't have regenerative capability to grow and develop into an international and worldwide network of networks like the Internet.

Therefore if you have a model more like compuserve which is the kind of network run by a corporation, then that's fine.

But in the early days of networking folks explained that those wanting to do commercial networking would see as a problem a public network.

That seems to be the case now.

The forms and structures of the Internet have made it possible to evolve and develop a worldwide communications system that is one of the proudest achievements of our past century.

But it seems that there are those who find the principles and forms that have nurtured the growth and development of the Internet no longer what they deem worthy of support.

Then they should go and do their experiment in forming a network built on the corporate model and controlled by a corporate model.

But it is a curious question why those who think that the corporate model is so powerful, why they don't just gather their money together and form their own network based on their corporate model.

Why are these folks trying to take the Internet which has done fine via the cooperative and collaborative processes, why the folks who want to experiment with creating a corporate modeled communication system, why they don't just leave the Internet alone, and go off and do their experiments with their own funds?

Why this effort to take the the public and international Internet and experiment with it?

I realize that as long as there is an Internet then the corporate model may have some of the so called "competition" that seems to be the buzz word of those who are the proponents of how the corporate model can build a better network.

If so, then the folks doing this shouldn't need to take over the Internet to perform their experiments.

Or is it that in fact the Internet, with its old fashioned cooperative ways and collaborative methods has proven superior for creating a human-computer network of network communications system?

Is it in fact that the corporate model has lost out in the "competition" with the cooperative and collaborative Internet mdoel model?

Is that what is underlying this effort to grab private control over the essential elements of the Internet?

Is it that otherwise those speculating and devoted to the success of the victory of the corporate model are worried?

>closure and action.

When I walked into the Names Council meeting and the call was made for consensus, and I asked what about discussion, and was told none was needed, that was the same kind of call for "closure and action."


This is time to discuss the different proposals.

That means examining the details and processes and the principles behind each of the proposals.

To claim that it is too late for a proposal makes it seem as if you have no logical analysis of the problems of the proposal and that the only way it can be dismissed is on an excuse like saying "this is the time for closure and action."

To the contrary, Sept 30 has come and gone. There is *NO* proposal with the support of the great majority of the Internet community to be implemented. And implementing some of the proposals created after the Sept. 30 deadline is not only outside any mandated procedure but would also be outright irresponsible as the proposals to form a corporate structure to own and control resources that have been created in a public process and cooperative agreement.

Thus there is no basis to give over such resources to a privately owned and formed corporation. That is an illegitimate activity.

So maybe it would do well to stop claiming that the time for figuring out the problem is over.

And instead it would be a good idea to support the discussion of the real issues involved in how to make the DNS and other functions of the Internet that are the essential functions and that need to be protected, to support the discussion of how to create the kind of international cooperation to provide the needed support and protection.

My proposal does provide a prototype to do that.

So it deserves to be considered and discussed with the greatest of seriousness and then accepted and implemented.

It is good that you have begun this process :-)


Netizens: On the History and Impact
of Usenet and the Internet
in print edition ISBN 0-8186-7706-6

From: <>
To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy),NTIADC40.SMTP40("silvana@ca...
Date: 10/9/98 5:51pm
Subject: New Internet Domain Name Corporation

Buenos Aires, October 9, 1998

Honorable William M.Daley
Secretary of Commerce
C/O Karen Rose
Office of International Affairs
Room 471
National Telecommunications and
Information Administration
United States Department of Commerce
14th. and Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20230

Re: Management of Internet Names and Addresses

Dear Secretary Daley,

CABASE - Argentine Chamber of Databanks and Online Services, has a membership composed of Internet Service Providers, Telecoms Carriers, Value-Added Carriers, Content Providers, and Hardware & Software Companies providing Internet solutions, in Argentina, and was incorporated in 1989 as a non-profit Association.

Our entity operates a NAP which interconnects the Internet Service Providers who service more than 90% of the Internet users in this country, and which is physically installed on CABASE premises.

CABASE, as a member of the IFWP steering committee, participated in all four regional meetings, and hosted the fourth meeting (IFWP LA&C) held in Buenos Aires.

On Tuesday, October 6th., we forwarded our initial reaction to the IANA proposal on the Management of Internet Names and Addresses. This clearly pointed out a fundamental oversight in the proposed list of nominees for the Interim Board, namely, that Latin America was not represented therein.

We fully understand the problems involved in establishing a board with international geographical representation, with only nine at-large members seats to be alloted, and thus propose that these 9 seats be expanded to 11, thus allowing our region to be adequately represented with two nominees, without disrupting a board which we presume has been carefully selected.

In accordance with the request for comments on the proposals which are being submitted on the Management of Internet Names and Addresses, we would be willing to endorse Jon Postel's proposal on condition that the following modifications to his proposal be made:




With nine At Large members nominated to the board it has proved impossible to ensure a broad international representation, as can be seen from Jon Postel's list of nominees. Proposed ammendment of text: The initial Board of Directors of the Corporation ("Initial Board") shall consist of eleven At Large members, ....



We consider that to ensure a broad international representation, more equitable rules must be set. Proposed ammendment of text: In order to ensure broad international representation on the Board, no more than forty per cent (40 %) of the total number of At Large Directors serving at any given time shall be residents of any one Geographic Region and all regions should be represented.....

If the above modifications to Jon Postel's proposal are implemented, CABASE will then be able to endorse this proposal.

We would also point out that we consider that the issues of membership and accountability, should be awarded primary consideration in the organizational process of the corporation, and recommend the following ammendments be considered.


We agree with the Boston Group comments to this article, namely: "The Board should proceed with all due rapidity to establish a membership organization which shall be the beneficiaries and the ultimate source of authority for Board activities."



Paragraph (c)


Directors shall be elected by the membership or by any Supporting Organization Proposed ammendment of text: As proposed by the Boston Group the following text should be eliminated: "Unless a majority of the At Large members of the Initial Board determines that it is not posible to create a workable membership structure, such process shall call for election of At Large directors by one or more categories of members of the Corporation admitted pursuant to qualifications established by majority vote of the At Large member of the Initial Board. "

In closing we would express our hopes that due consensus may be achieved very shortly, and the legitimate concerns of all Internet stakeholders be contemplated in the final bylaws.

Yours truly,

Tony Harris

CABASE -Argentina
Tel/Fax 54-1-326-0777

From: Eric Weisberg <>
To: "" <
Date: 10/8/98 9:16pm
Subject: Re: [ifwp] Delicate balance

Fundamental errors in the early stages of an argument can be explained in several ways. And, they may predict the argument to follow. What do you think of Zittrain's first sentence?

Jonathan Zittrain wrote:

> Documents alone can't produce an organization that well serves the public
> interest and holds a public trust. Of equal if not greater importance are
> the people who run the organization, and to whom those people are and feel
> accountable.

The cardinal rule of designing a government is "don't rely on people, rely on systems." You design governance to anticipate and deal with potential problems rather than assume there aren't going to be any.

> For this reason, much of the insistence on a
> "to-be-determined" membership structure -- i.e., one that is to be mandated
> by the bylaws, but not specifically spelled out -- may be misplaced.
> Charging the interim board with executing a fair and representative
> membership structure is only slightly more specific than charging the
> interim board with investigating the merits of such a structure, and no
> less open to failure if the board isn't already inclined to broaden the
> organization's base.

I am going to try to translate that to English. Tell me if I misstate.

Write the Bylaws so there is no option but a membership structure.

> More important, then, may be securing commitments by
> the "at-large" board members to create a perpetuation structure by which
> their succcessors will be answerable to the broad Internet communities.
I do not go for such negotiations. Should we let them choose the board if they

promise to be good (with out discussing what that means)? Does anyone doubt that we would be better served by people elected to do this job than by an appointed board? There is no question about that. What a bizarre suggestion when IANA has reportedly told us that they do not think it can be done. What makes his appointees so zealous for democratic designs. I do not think that makes sense.

> The IANA proposal offers an architecture for corporate governance which, if
> properly implemented, could produce a fair and elegant balance between the
> engineering communities that have brought the Net to its present state, and
> the at-large internet communities.

Elegance is in the eyes of the beholder. Some do not share your view. The question is who actually has the majority. That must be tested, not assumed.

> If the initial at-large directors choose an open electoral
> process based on as broad an elective system as is workable, then we would
> have some assurance that the public interest mission of the corporation
> will be served--

If that is the intent, why isn't Karl Auerbach, Jim Dixon, Patrick Greenwell , Dan Steinberg, or Peter Deutsch on the board? We know their views on membership. They just disagree on what kind. It may take a vote to settle that, by the way. They know they would carry out the mandate. They are the kind of people we need on the board. Not doubters and aginners ON THIS.

> after all, half the board would owe their seats to a
> large public electorate

That is sophistry. When? After the decisions we are talking about are made, not initially.

Here is another point. The people you let vote on the SO board members as organizations will also be voting for the "at-large" representatives as individuals (if that is how it is done).

The SO will be the House originating legislation. You want them to control the Senate, as well. That is called an "imbalance of power." It is a bad idea.

We do not know who these SOs will represent, anyway.

There are just too many pigs in this poke for it to make sense to leave it all to good intentions. There is no substitute for doing it right as we intended with the IFWP process..

> . But to the extent that future at-large directors
> are selected in any less than open or less inclusive way, then, to that
> extent, the public will fear that the corporation is subject to capture and
> perversion of its mission.

That's good. How do you do that?

> If the initial at-large directors are committed to achieving their public
> mission, and provided the means to make well informed choices and to be in
> touch with the populations that the document calls upon them to serve, then
> many objections to the IANA proposal melt away,

Did anyone announce that as the criteria of selection?

> leaving in their wake an
> architecture for a responsible self-governing corporate organism which is
> legally and conceptually fair and balanced.

ICANN translate that, as well. "Square is round." Again, I don't think so.

> Charles Nesson and Jonathan Zittrain
> The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School

They are speaking as the institution. That is too bad. I had hoped for more. This is a lesson not to be forgotten. The discussion just came out in the open. We have just heard what Becky Burr is hearing. Is there any way to straighten this thinking out?

From: Eric Weisberg <>
To: "" <>
Date: 10/8/98 9:17pm
Subject: Consensus

Kent Crispin wrote:

> It's a common mistake. There never has been consensus, and
> I don't think there is any realistic hope of getting one in a time
> frame of interest.

It is amazing how things have changed since Reston, where there was not consensus but unanimity on most things. One of them was fairness to all--which we agreed meant some kind of membership so everyone would feel represented. "Consensus" meant that there was no real disagreement.

Today, the great Oz turns "consensus" around to where "consensus" means minority rule. I may not know what "consensus" is, but I certainly know what it is not. It is not minority rule. It is a question of what kind of majority.

The IANA does not have consensus by any meaning of that word. Yet it would rule to the exclusion of a whole bunch of others. We are told that IANA "does not do democracy." IANA doesnt do representative form, either, and it does not want to experiment with it in the formative stages of governance. " Have faith." "Trust me." I know best all the time on every thing. You can't be trusted to vote. There is no known way to vote. And, there is no time to vote. There is no place to vote. There is no right to vote. And, there is no "no" vote. And, for most, there is no vote.

Is that how you want it? What are you going to do about it?

The alternative is clear. Minority rule or majority rule. A system for determining. It is called a vote. Not dictation. Not one man's rule. But, rule by the rules.

You in the corners and back rows have been quiet. It is time for you to speak up. It is about to happen. You have witnessed it all. It is your world we are structuring right now. How do you want it? What are you going to do about it?

Am I crazy? Or, is what is happening crazy?

Here is what I think. I think we will all be crazy if we let this thing happen. And, we will pay for it for the rest of our lives.

The rest of the building will not be better than the foundation we lay, today. Lets DO IT RIGHT.

Eric Weisberg The Boston Working Group

I do not say anything about the man or his work

> This is not a new debate. There is a fundamental schism between those
> who view the root zone as primarily a public trust (speaking loosely
> and not in a legal sense) and those who view it primarily as an
> economic opportunity. The latter are in the minority; the former are
> the majority.
> These two groups are not going to agree, and eventually the majority
> will win. But the minority is very vocal, lives in a dream world, and
> has financial backing....
> All the rest of this stuff -- the "internet governance" stuff -- is
> obfuscation, and a seductive trap for those whose idealism exceeds
> their realism. The idea that there is no oversight over NewCorp is a
> theoretical fantasy, championed by otherwise intelligent people who
> are lost in the messianic dream of birthing a new form of governing
> entity. Clearly, "NewCorp" will survive only if it walks the
> narrowest of lines dictated by anti-trust authorities around the
> world. World governments will be watching; big and small businesses
> will be watching; consumer groups will be watching; the press will be
> watching, and the threat of anti-trust action will be ever-present.
> NewCorp will be accountable to a degree few organizations ever are.
> --
> Kent Crispin, PAB Chair "No reason to get excited",
> the thief he kindly spoke...
> PGP fingerprint: B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44 61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
> __________________________________________________
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From: Eric Weisberg <>
To: IFWP Discussion List <>
Date: 10/8/98 8:35am
Subject: [ifwp] Selection of the interim board


Let me engage you on this critical point. I begin by noting that you are not alone in your concerns. This is a real issue. How should it be resolved?

Pete Farmer wrote:

> Christopher Ambler [] wrote:
> >Is anyone other than me just a little bit angry that the proposed
> >ICANN board was, for all intents and purposes, hand-picked by
> >Jon Postel, with no nomination, voting, or even ratification?
> I don't like it either.
> >From Postel's testiony: [emphasis added by me]
> "... There were some who called for global Internet election
> of this interim board -- a kind of "one e-mail address, one vote"
> process.

First, this is a "straw man." The Boston Group's proposal is much different. We provided for an election by the participants in the IFWP meetings and readers of this list. That is the group who are interested, signed up, and identified. The list is open and a few more people may choose to join. But, by and large, we are it.

> Most stakeholders simply didn't think this was practical at
> this time, with no organization in place to manage and monitor such a
> process.

This is a conclusion rather than a fact. The fact can be tested in numerous ways, including a poll of our list.

> ***Thus, the only workable alternative method for creating an
> interim board we could devise

That statement was properly modified by "we."

> was to invite suggestions from anyone and
> everyone, to consider and seek reactions to those suggestions, and
> finally to try to come up with a proposed board that would be able to
> command the consensus support of the Internet community."***
> I agree with part of what's said here. I agree that direct election of
> the imterim Board is impractical -- we lack consensus on any detailed
> proposals to make this happen.

Lets start here. Do we lack consensus or have we merely failed to determine what that consensus actually is?

Does the lack of current consensus mean that consensus is impossible or merely that we must do something in order to develop it?

If we can reach and can determine our consensus, would elections then become practical? We vote in every level of government and every organization we join, including ISOC.


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From: Eric Weisberg <>
To: "" <
Date: 10/9/98 3:49pm
Subject: Re: [ifwp] Re: Expert Engineers and the Bicameral Board

Steve Page! You lurker! Where have you been?

Can you hold that thought till I find a Congressman? It is clear and compelling.

And, so well said.

steve wrote:

> Kent Crispin wrote:
> >I believe Mr Zittrain's mispoke, slightly, and used the word
> >"engineer" as a code word for "those with an already established
> >constituencey in the Internet". Early on in this process I wrote a
> >short paper on this topic, and called the two "houses" the "defined
> >constituency" house, and the other the "open membership" house. Of
> >course, I am somewhat gratified that the ICANN draft almost exactly
> >models my proposal, but I really can't take credit for it, since it
> >comes directly from the POC/PAB model.
> Using the interstate highway example again to reflect your view of
> two "houses", the constituency house (those with a stake in the development
> of the highway, like Caltrans, asphalt companies, construction firms like
> DeSilva Gates, would comprise 9 seats, the "drivers" the other 9 seats, and
> that would be justified because they have a stake, right?
> <snip>
> >> Therefore, in a bicameral Board as proposed by IANA, the 9 SO Directors will
> >> not represent expertise, they will represent the groups with the most
> >> immediate and direct stake in the issues.
> Let's use another example, if Livermore Lab, which is Kent's
> employer has a "stake" maintaining its $1 Billion plus budget and its 6000
> person workforce, using this logic of Kent and the POC/PAB it is justified
> in a 50% leadership role in Congress, which represents the "open
> constituency" (people). Am I getting this right?
> >The 9 SO directors do not represent expertise. They explicitly
> >represent the groups with the "most immediate and direct stake in the
> >issues." That's for two reasons: 1) on the face of it, the ones with
> >the most stake need representation; 2) these groups are also powerful
> >politically, and no proposal that fails to acknowledge that fact will
> >succeed.
> Just as the engineers who are building the highways don't represent
> engineering expertise (oh really?), and Livermore Lab doesn't represent
> nuclear physics expertise (oh really?), your assertion #1) that the "ones
> with the most stake need representation" is a lobbyist's argument and not
> justification to sell-out the open constituency by diluting representation
> to self-interested stakeholders who have no interest in building a
> foundation for the future, other than to protect their own financial
> interests, at all costs. However, your comment is consistent with the
> behavior of Livermore laboratory whose existence is dependent upon its
> ability to lobby the breast of the U.S. government for more milk-money.
> Once again, you are attempting to impose a lobbyist's ethics on a new
> system which is pure in its design, one which by its very structure gives
> power to the open constituency, located at the interface-drivers seat.
> >> Expertise has its place in governance, but not in driver's seat. In the US
> >> government, the Library of Congress or the former OTA brought expertise to
> >> governance decisions. However, they themselves did not govern. If they
> >> did, you would quickly have seen government policy altered to serve the
> >> interests of the Library of Congress and the OTA.
> >>
> >> If the proposal for a bicameral Board is based on the assumption of an
> >> expertise-interest dichotomy, then it rests on flawed foundations.
> >
> >Fortunately, it isn't based on that dichotomy. Instead, it is based
> >on a dichotomy between defined interests and open interests.
> Instead of the sanitized term "defined" interest, why don't you
> call a spade a spade Kent, it is based upon the principle of "special"
> interest. It is that absence of principles which led the President to sell
> access and influence to high rollers who can spend $100,000 for a "coffee"
> with the leader of the free world. It is the same principle which allows
> Trent Lott and the Republicans to have special weekend get-togethers with
> special interest groups trying to buy influence.
> Kent, you exist in a world where influence is bought and sold,
> without principles. The President's policy has, at times, represented the
> same sort of animal. Take a look at Bill Moyers' PBS special "The Other
> Scandal", and tell everyone if you like what you see: the Executive Office
> of the President and Congressional leadership both selling out the
> individual people, the voters in the United States. If you like it, then
> go ahead and continue to justify the 9/9 ratio. If not, then recognize
> what you are helping to build...a rigged, corrupt power vortex where the
> only thing that matters representing the vested, or "defined" interests.
> Stephen J. Page
> T: 925-454-8624
> __________________________________________________
> To view the archive of this list, go to:
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> ___END____________________________________________

CC: "Sr. Management" <>

From: Eric Weisberg <>
To: NTIA.NTIAHQ(dnspolicy)
Date: 10/9/98 4:31pm
Subject: Comments on Private Sector Proposal for New Domain Name Corporation

Attachment in WordPerfect 6.1 (Windows) format.

Eric Weisberg
General Counsel
Internet Texoma., Inc.,
The Boston Group


Eric Weisberg is the General Counsel and a principal in Internet Texoma, Inc., an Internet service provider serving the Dallas, Texas calling scope north to Oklahoma. He is 54 years old, resides and practices law in Denison, Texas, is a graduate of Austin College in Sherman, Texas, and of the University of Texas School of Law (Austin) and is a member of the Texas Bar. Internet Texoma is a member of the Texas Internet Service Providers Assn., the ISP/C, and the American Registry of Internet Numbers.

Mr. Weisberg filed comments with the NTIA on behalf of himself and Internet Texoma in response to the so called Green Paper <> and participated in the process known as the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP). As an extension of that activity, he participated in the meeting held in Boston, Mass. on September 19 & 20, 1998, to review the documents proposed by the IANA and NSI for the formation of an entity to assume certain activities relating to the management of the Internet. The participants in that meeting came to be known as the Boston Working Group (BWG) and the documents they produced were filed with the NTIA and are now under consideration.


The White Paper resulted from fierce opposition to the "Green Paper" by elements of the European Union, the U.S. Government's genuine inability to resolve the complicated issues involved in the management of Internet. The U. S. government wisely concluded the best way to accomplish a broadly accepted resolution was to ask the Internet community to meet and reach consensus on such issues. The government concluded that it should transfer its oversight functions to a private entity fairly representing the diverse interests to be affected in an open and transparent manner. The Internet community accepted the responsibility for creating such an entity and undertook an open and inclusive process of meetings and discussions to determine its consensus and craft the entity. That process was known as the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP), and involved meetings in the four corners of the world as well as continuous on-line discussions on the Internet. The archive of that discussion may be found at <>.

The Boston Working Group is an extension and expression of the IFWP and the Boston Working Group proposal reflects the consensus <> achieved in the IFWP process. However, that process was not completed before it was derailed and the planned wrap up meeting necessary to resolve the remaining issues has not been held.

The Boston Working Group proposal involves textual changes and plug-ins to the ICANN proposal intended to make ICANN conform to the recorded CONCENSUS of the community and requires a WRAP UP MEETING to reach consensus on the remaining points, to the extent possible, and an election of the initial board by the IFWP participants to complete that process. An item by item comparison between the two proposals may be found at <> as well as the Harvard Law School site.

A careful reading of the IFWP discussion list archive for the past month <> will reveal the width and breadth of the support for the BWG proposal, the outrage at the derailment of that process, and the objections to various aspects of the ICANN proposal.

The Boston Working Group proposal addresses ICANN divergences from the IFWP consensus in several critical areas--accountability and representation being the most significant -- and strengthens the ICANN proposal by adding a statement of principles, guarantees of due, open and transparent processes and a requirement of financial planning, disclosure and accountability. But, most importantly, it represents the community's desire to participate in a representative form of governance. We do not want and will not accept anyone arrogating that function to themselves to our exclusion.

The Boston Working Group has refused to incorporate, to date, in order to avoid some of the evils we ascribe to the alternative process. We do not want our decisions and opinions to be set in concrete and substituted for those of the community we seek to represent. There are several

issues to resolve, including the state of incorporation, number of board members, whether the members should be trade organizations, individuals or a combination, and how to deal with pre-existing investments and arrangements. These must be addressed in a consensus based mechanism guaranteeing fairness and consistency -- a wrap up meeting.

The group of non-profit corporations which assumed the role of steering the IFWP process called several wrap up meetings to resolve outstanding issues, but those meetings were postponed and never rescheduled when the steering committee was told that NSI was withdrawing from the IFWP process and entering into separate negotiations with IANA and needed a delay so those parties could present a unified proposal for the community's consideration. Subsequently, the IANA refused to participate in a wrap up meeting and the steering committee could not reach consensus on what to do without IANA cooperation. That failure of leadership is addressed by the BWG proposal, which calls for a reconvening of the IFWP membership in that deferred wrap up meeting, which can be scheduled on two or three weeks notice by the Boston Working Group once our plan is approved.

Failure to proceed through the use of a consensus mechanism will result in continued strife and instability of the Internet and is not acceptable.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the Boston Group proposal assures stability in the following ways. We do not eliminate the position of CHIEF TECHNICAL OFFICER found in the ICANN proposal, which we assume would be filled by Dr. Jon Potel. And, we do not include a provision which might keep the entity from entering into a consultative contract with ISI should that be deemed desireable during the transition period.


The Boston Working Group has several questions regarding the review process which has begun.

The Boston Group has two questions which we need addressed, immediately.

1. First, the ICANN proponents have incorporated an entity. The Boston Group has not understood that to be appropriate until the USG decides which plan best satisfies NTIA's requirements. However, we need to know NTIA's (and the panel's) position on whether

incorporation at the time of consideration is required or, indeed, a relevant issue.

2. Likewise, we have deemed it inappropriate for us to name interim board members as our proposal calls for such selection to be made through an election of the IFWP to assure fair representation, as well as diversity of interests and geography. Great concern has been expressed in the IFWP as well as other groups that the NTIA might disqualify our proposal on such grounds. What weight will be placed upon such factor?

Additional questions are:

3. What are the criteria to be applied by the NTIA in reviewing the competing proposals for designing the new entity?

4. How will those criteria be weighted in making the decision?

5. How should those submitting proposals communicate or have dialogue with the reviewers so we may deal with any uncertainties or concerns which become evident during the process?

6. Will there be an opportunity to refine proposal in order to meet objections or concerns of the reviewers?

7. Will there be an opportunity for oral presentations, either in person or on the telephone?

8. Who are the persons and staff actually involved in the decision?

9. Will there be written findings in support of any decision?

10. To whom may an appeal be made in the event any party disagrees with the result?

11. What law and administrative rules apply to this process?

12. Do you expect the NTIA to discuss these issues with the parties in the next few days to make sure the process accomplishes the purposes of the White Paper and gives the government the kind of assistance it needs to properly evaluate all the proposals?

13. Which governments shall be consulted?

14. In what formal or informal manner will such consultations occur and what written record will be created and made available to the public?

15. What formal notice requirements apply to the NTIA proceeding?

16. When does the deadline for filing comments actually expire?

Respectfully submitted,

Eric Weisberg, Gen. Counsel
Internet Texoma, Inc.
The Boston Working Group