Spectrum Engineering
NOTE: These reports are available either on-line in PDF (portable document) format or only as hard-copy. If you would like a copy of a report that is not available electronically, please make note of the document number and submit your request to:
NTIA Office of Spectrum Management
System Engineering and Analysis Division
Tel. (202) 482-2608
Fax (202) 482-4595
e-mail edrocella@ntia.doc.gov
Related content
Emission Measurements of a Contraband Wireless Device Jammer at a Federal Prison
This report describes emission spectrum and time domain measurements of a contraband wireless device micro-jammer that was operated temporarily in four Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) bands at a Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) at Cumberland, Maryland. The four jammed CMRS bands were between 730 MHz and 2.155 GHz. The micro-jammer targeted CMRS service indoors, in a single medium-security prison cell. Spectrum measurements of the jammer emissions were performed at two places inside the targeted prison cell and at two non-targeted nearby locations outdoors. Jammer emission measurements were performed at each location with multiple measurement bandwidths and detectors across a frequency range of 300 MHz to 4.34 GHz. Measurements at each location were performed twice, with the jammer device on versus off, so as to show the relative power levels of the jamming signal versus the ambient CMRS signals at each location. Aggregate emissions from multiple micro-jammer devices such as would be required to cover an entire prison facility were not measured. Jammer emissions are presented in units of power per unit bandwidth in measurement system circuitry; a table for conversion of those data to units of incident field strength in space is provided.
Keywords: electromagnetic compatibility (EMC); harmful interference; aggregate emissions; cellular communications jamming; denial-of-service jamming; emission bandwidth; radio jamming; in-band emissions; commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) jamming; communications jamming; micro-jammer; radiation hazard (RADHAZ); wireless device jamming
Interference Protection Criteria Simulation
Interference protection criteria (IPC) determine the interfering signal power a system can tolerate when sharing spectrum with other services. IPC are typically determined by measurements, but good measurements are often hindered by restrictions on equipment availability and inaccessible intermediate signals, performance metrics, and operational parameters. The purpose of this research is to determine if radio system software simulation can accurately emulate these measurements and alleviate their hindrances. Our approach is to use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) radio system simulator software to model previous IPC measurement test fixtures and compare simulated to measured results. Measurements of mutual interference between SPN-43C radar and LTE systems are compared. The comparison revealed that 1) when the SPN-43C pulse repetition interval was the same as the LTE subframe period SPN-43C interference in the LTE UE was highly dependent on which OFDM word within the LTE subframe the SPN-43C pulse was repeatedly placed on and 2) simulation is more accurate than measurement for IPC tests with fixed threshold radars such as SPN-43C. These revelations show that simulation is a useful addition and potentially viable alternative to IPC measurement.
Keywords: spectrum engineering; spectrum sharing; electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) analysis; Long Term Evolution (LTE); interference protection criteria (IPC); Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS); radio system software simulation; surveillance radar
Received Signal Power Measurements On Select Air Traffic Control Radars In Colorado
Received signal power measurements were performed on the Common Air Route Surveillance Radar (CARSR) operating in the 1300–1370 MHz band in Parker, Colorado and on the Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR 9) operating in the 2700 2900 MHz band in Platteville, Colorado. The measurements were taken along five radials extending from each radar transmitter. Four or five fixed locations were chosen along each radial where predicted received signal power varied from relatively strong to weak levels. Multiple peak received power measurements were made at each location to provide statistically significant results. In another effort, these measurements will be used to validate spectrum usage contours and the methodology used to generate them as developed by the Office of Spectrum Management (OSM) of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).
Keywords: radar measurements; airport surveillance radar (ASR); received signal power measurements; peak received power; Common Air Route Surveillance Radar (CARSR) ; spectrum usage contours